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Abstract
This thesis investigates monetary policy within the New Keynesian framework in dy-
namic macroeconomics. It includes three original research papers. The first paper
examines the rules and transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in one of the fast
growing economies in the 21st century, China, by extending a standard New Keynesian
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions and investment-
specific shocks in order to capture some of the Chinese characteristics and applying
a Bayesian estimation strategy to real-time data. It offers a new way of empirically
examining the rule of China’s monetary policy and indicates a structural break of the
neutral technology development that may have caused the slowing down of GDP growth
since 2010.
The second paper revisits optimal monetary policy in open economies, in particular,
focusing on the noncooperative policy game under local currency pricing in a theoretical
two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Quadratic loss functions
of noncooperative policy makers and welfare gains from cooperation are obtained in
the paper. The results show that noncooperative policy makers face extra trade-offs
regarding stabilizing the real marginal costs induced by deviations from the law of one
price under local currency pricing. As a result of the increased number of stabilizing
objectives, welfare gains from cooperation emerge even when two countries face only
technology shocks, which usually leads to equivalence between cooperation and nonco-
operation. Still, gains from cooperation are not large, implying that frictions other than
nominal rigidities are necessary to strongly recommend cooperation as an important
policy framework to increase global welfare.
The third paper focuses on the noncooperative policy game specified by choice of
policy instrument for implementing optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-
economy model similar to the one in the second paper. It examines four options of policy
instruments including the producer price index inflation rate, the consumer price index
inflation rate, the import price inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. It shows
that choosing different policy instruments generally leads to different equilibria and,
4
5in particular, choosing the nominal interest rate results in equilibrium indeterminacy.
In addition, the welfare ranking of these policy instruments depends on a country’s
degree of openness which is measured as the weight assigned to imported goods in the
consumers’ utility function. In less open countries, domestically produced goods carry a
relatively higher weight in the consumers’ utility function. For these less open countries,
choosing the producer price index inflation rate induces a larger welfare cost from
noncooperation than choosing the consumer price index inflation rate would. Choosing
the consumer price index inflation rate in turn causes a larger welfare cost than choosing
the import price inflation rate. Conversely, the reverse is true when countries are more
open. This result sheds light on the important role that policy instrument choice plays
in determining the equilibrium outcomes, to which policy makers should pay special
attention when implementing optimal monetary policy under noncooperation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Jordi Gal´ı (2015) offers a nice overview of current monetary policy analysis in his book,
Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle: Over the past two decades, mone-
tary economics has been among the most fruitful research areas within macroeconomics.
The efforts of many researchers to understand the relationship among monetary policy,
inflation and the business cycle have led to the development of a framework–the so
called New Keynesian model–that is widely used for monetary policy analysis. The
central mission of monetary policy analysis is to understand the links between mon-
etary policy and the aggregate performance of an economy, that is, the transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy, and to determine the objectives of monetary policy and
how the latter should be conducted in order to attain those objectives. The present
thesis contributes to the New Keynesian literature with a deeper understanding of both
the transmission mechanisms and the objectives of monetary policy.
In a standard market economy, a central bank conducts its monetary policy by
adjusting its policy interest rate in response to aggregate conditions of the economy
according to its policy function.1 Changes in the interest rate then have an influence
on the valuation of financial assets and their expected return, as well as on the con-
sumption and investment decisions of households and firms. Those decisions can in
turn have consequences for GDP growth, employment and inflation. The transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy shocks in such a standard economy are well established
in the New Keynesian literature. What is not so clear, on the other hand, are the
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in a non-standard market economy with
various distortions and unidentified monetary policy rules resulting from unfinished
market reform and state intervention. These conditions are all observable in one of the
1A standard market economy under the New Keynesian framework is an economy where there are
no distortions other than monopolistic competition in goods market and short-term nominal rigidities.
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fastest growing emerging market economies (hereafter, EMEs): China. Understanding
the links between monetary policy and the aggregate conditions in China thus calls for
extensions of the standard New Keynesian models to incorporate these factors. This is
exactly what Chapter 2 does.
Specifically, Chapter 2 looks into the transmission mechanisms of China’s monetary
policy and the main source of fluctuations in its business cycle, provided that the mon-
etary policy rule is known. To this end, a standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (hereafter, DSGE) model is extended with financial frictions and
investment-specific technology shocks to capture some of the characteristics in China’s
macroeconomy. Moreover, since there is no consensus on the form of the policy rules
that the People’s Bank of China (hereafter, PBoC) has been employing, a hybrid form
of monetary policy function is proposed in this chapter and coefficients of the variables
in the function are estimated by applying a Bayesian estimation strategy to Chinese
data.2 This offers a new way of examining the rule of China’s monetary policy for
future researchers. The results show that the PBoC indeed has been employing a hy-
brid monetary policy rule over the sample period from 2001 to 2017 by adjusting the
policy rate in response to inflation, output growth and real money growth. This finding
suggests that assuming a pure Taylor-type rule or a pure quantity-type rule for the
Chinese monetary policy, as a number of past studies did, may induce misspecification
problems. It also finds that there is a structural change in the policy rule before and
after the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, with a larger response of the PBoC to
real money growth in the post crisis period, everything else equal. Given the estimated
monetary policy function, variance decompositions show that neutral technology shocks
and preference shocks are the main drivers of fluctuations in output and consumption,
while neutral technology shocks, investment-specific technology shocks, markup shocks
and marginal efficiency of investment shocks are the key sources of the variation in in-
vestment in China. Finally, historical decomposition indicates that a structural break in
the neutral technology development may have caused the slowing down of GDP growth
in China since 2010, to which policy makers should pay special attention.3
Central banks in the world, either the Federal Reserve Bank or the PBoC, do not
conduct their monetary policy in an arbitrary or whimsical manner. Their decisions
2The proposed monetary policy function is hybrid in the sense that it is in form of a combination
of the pure Taylor-type rule and the pure quantity-type rule. The latter two policy rules are used
extensively in the literature for standard New Keynesian model economies but not directly applicable
to the Chinese economy.
3The neutral technology refers to the technology applied to production of consumption goods or
final goods, differentiating from the investment-specific technology, which is applied to investment
goods sector.
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are meant to be purposeful, that is, they seek to attain certain objectives, while taking
as given the constraints posed by the workings of domestic as well as foreign private
agents. What should be the objectives of monetary policy and how the latter should
be conducted in order to attain those objectives? The New Keynesian literature is
advantageous in answering these questions due to the inclusion of microfoundations of
private agents, which makes households’ welfare a natural objective.4 In normative
dimensions, the objectives of monetary policy are thus derived from the maximization
of households’ welfare and central banks as Ramsey social planners conduct optimal
monetary policy.
Over the years there have been many studies investigating optimal monetary pol-
icy in the context of both closed and open economies under different settings, such as
under cooperation or noncooperation, producer currency pricing (hereafter, PCP) or
local currency pricing (hereafter, LCP), and with or without home bias. As a result,
our understanding of how monetary policy should be conducted, especially in an in-
terconnected world, is deepened. There is, however, one last missing piece, which has
not yet been analyzed in a theoretical two-country DSGE model. That is, how the
optimal noncooperative monetary policy under LCP should be conducted, or whether
there is any gain from cooperation under LCP. Chapter 3 is dedicated to addressing
these questions.
By solving the equilibrium conditions under monopolistic competition and applying
second-order approximation to the households’ welfare function, quadratic loss functions
for both cooperative and noncooperative policy makers are obtained in Chapter 3. The
loss functions show that under LCP noncooperative policy makers naturally aim to
stabilize variables whose fluctuations are to be minimized by cooperative policy makers,
and that they also seek to stabilize fluctuations in the real marginal costs that firms face
when setting prices in both domestic and export markets. These additional objectives
are unique to the noncooperative game and are therefore the sources for potential gains
from cooperation. The welfare gain from cooperation is then computed by solving the
nonlinear Ramsey problem. Within the reasonable range of parameter calibration and
with only technology shocks, the welfare gain from cooperation is in general nonzero but
the size is very small. This finding implies that frictions other than nominal rigidities
are necessary to strongly recommend cooperation as an important policy framework to
increase global welfare.
In the welfare comparison between cooperation and noncooperation in Chapter 3,
4Prior to the New Keynesian model, the traditional literature based on the Mundell-Fleming-
Dornbusch model assigned ad hoc objectives to monetary authorities for conducting monetary policy
which, as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argue, may lead to misleading policy implications.
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the noncooperative game is defined as one in which the domestic policy maker conducts
its optimal monetary policy while taking as given the entire path of the foreign policy
maker’s producer price index (hereafter, PPI) inflation rate . This is an open-loop Nash
equilibrium.
A natural question that follows is whether a different Nash game, that is, a dif-
ferent choice of policy instrument, would affect the equilibrium outcome and welfare
under noncooperation. Chapter 4 addresses this research question in a two-country
DSGE model similar to the one in Chapter 3 by considering four options of policy in-
struments, including the PPI inflation rate, the consumer price index (hereafter, CPI)
inflation rate, the import price inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. Impulse
response results show that choosing different policy instruments indeed leads to differ-
ent equilibria and, in particular, choosing the nominal interest rate induces equilibrium
indeterminacy. In addition, the welfare ranking of these policy instruments depends on
the parameter measuring a country’s degree of openness, which is the weight assigned
to imported goods in consumers’ utility function. Less open countries are defined as
those where domestically produced goods carry a relatively higher weight in the con-
sumers’ utility function. For these less open countries, selecting the PPI inflation rate
as policy instrument induces a larger welfare cost from noncooperation than choosing
the CPI inflation rate would. Choosing the CPI inflation rate in turn causes a larger
welfare cost than choosing the import price inflation rate. Conversely, when countries
are more open, choosing the PPI inflation rate as policy instrument leads to a smaller
welfare cost from noncooperation than choosing the CPI inflation rate does, which in
turn generates a smaller welfare cost than the noncooperative regime specified by the
choice of the import price inflation rate. This result sheds light on the important role
that policy instrument choice plays in determining the equilibrium outcomes, to which
policy makers should pay special attention when implementing optimal monetary policy
under noncooperation.
Chapter 2
A Structural Investigation of the
Chinese Economy with A Hybrid
Monetary Policy Rule
2.1 Introduction
Since around 2010, China has been experiencing a gradual slow-down of GDP growth
from an average of 10 per cent over the thirty years to 2010 to 6.7 per cent in 2016.1
Chinese President Xi Jinping described this as the ‘new normal’ of the Chinese economy
in May 2014.2 The slowing down of China’s economic growth has attracted a great deal
of attention among policymakers and scholars but so far there has been no consensus
on its sources. This motivates us to conduct a structural investigation of the Chinese
economy to better understand the sources of business fluctuations in China, especially
fluctuations in output.
There is one puzzle that needs to be solved before we can proceed with the structural
investigation. China’s monetary policy is the puzzle. On the one hand, it has been
assigned too many objectives––maintaining price stability, promoting economic growth,
supporting employment and achieving balance of payments equilibrium. On the other
hand, there is no consensus on the form of the policy rules that the PBoC has been
employing, let alone whether such policy rules are able to achieve all the said objectives.
Based on the limited communications between the PBoC and the public, some suspect
1The GDP growth rate in 2011, 2012 and 2013 are 9.5 per cent, 7.7 per cent and 7.7 per cent,
respectively. Source: the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
2See, for example, the Xinhua news report titled Xi’s ‘new normal’ theory.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/09/c 133776839.htm
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a money rule, by which the PBoC manages aggregate money supply, has been the
major monetary policy rule, while some speculate an analogous Taylor-type price rule
may be in action. Without a well defined monetary policy rule, it will be difficult to
accurately model China’s macroeconomy. The transmission mechanism of a monetary
policy shock to the economy is uncertain and the effects will be difficult to predict for
the central bank.3
What is the monetary policy rule of the PBoC? Has the rule changed over time?
What do the data say about the actual monetary policy rules at work? What are the
main sources of business fluctuations of the Chinese economy given that the monetary
policy rules are known? These are the questions the paper aims to address.
To this end, we extend a standard New Keynesian DSGE model with financial fric-
tions and investment-specific (hereafter, IS) technology shocks. The financial friction
mechanism was first introduced by Bernanke et al. (1999) to model market imperfect-
ness of the financial sector. The IS technology shock was suggested and developed by
Greenwood et al. (1988, 1997) as a viable alternative to neutral technology shocks as
sources of business cycles. Studies by Kaihatsu and Kurozumi (2014), and Justiniano
et al. (2011) find that the financial friction shock and the IS technology shock are im-
portant sources of business fluctuations in the United States. There are a number of
studies applying DSGE models to the Chinese economy. See, for example, Xu and
Chen (2009), Mehrotra et al. (2013), Yuan and Feng (2014), and Zhang et al. (2014).
None of these studies have explicitly taken into account financial frictions or shocks
to investment.4 It is reasonable to expect that they are significant drivers of China’s
business fluctuations.
We propose a hybrid form of monetary policy rule for the extended model. Past
studies on China’s monetary policy tend to make a choice between Taylor-type rules
and quantity rules that have been used in studies of advanced economies. For exam-
ple, Zhang (2009) argues that a Taylor-type rule is likely to be more effective than a
quantity-type rule in managing the economy. Liu and Zhang (2010) show that using
3To be fair, the puzzle that is China’s monetary policy has many facets. The unknown policy rules
that is examined in the chapter is one of them. Another important facet of the puzzle is related to the
expectations of private agents towards the monetary policy conduct. For example, instead of assuming
rational expectations, people may believe that the central bank follows, say, a Taylor-type rule when
the reality is the central bank is following a money rule. Those types of equilibria where beliefs do not
agree with reality are studied in Kulish and Pagan (2017). This is beyond the scope of the current
chapter and will be left for future research.
4Yuan et al. (2011) and Kang and Gong (2014) incorporate financial frictions, but no IS technology
shocks, in their models.
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both rules outperform a single rule in a four-equation New Keynesian model.5 Since
there is no consensus on the specific form of the policy rules, we incorporate a general
form of monetary policy rule that encompasses the pure Taylor-type rules or quantity-
type rules for estimations.
The main findings of the paper are as follows. Firstly, the central bank of China
has been employing a hybrid monetary policy rule during 2001-2017 where the PBoC
conducted monetary policy by adjusting the policy rate in response to the inflation rate,
output, output growth as well as real money growth in the economy. It is evident that
there is a structural change in the monetary policy rule after the onset of the Global
Financial Crisis, with a larger response of the policy rate to real money growth in the
post crisis period, ceteris paribus. Secondly, the main sources of business fluctuations in
output and consumption growth are neutral technology shocks and preference shocks,
and exogenous demand shocks and intermediate-good price markup shocks play lesser
but still important roles. The fluctuations in investment are driven by shocks to IS tech-
nology, neutral technology, intermediate-good price markup, and marginal efficiency of
investment (hereafter, MEI), while the fluctuations in loans activities are primarily
contributed by IS technology shocks and net worth shocks. Thirdly, the negative neu-
tral technology shocks have been the main contributor to the slowing down of China’s
GDP growth since around 2010 while the on-average positive investment growth has
been contributed by both technology shocks and price markup shocks, although the
individual contribution of those shocks is quite volatile over the full sample period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 constructs the model.
Section 2.3 proceeds with the estimation. Section 2.4 reports and discusses the results,
followed by the concluding remarks in Section 2.5.
2.2 The Model
The model is very close to that of Kaihatsu and Kurozumi (2014 hereafter, KK), ex-
cept for the central bank’s behavior. There are households that consist of worker and
entrepreneur members, financial intermediaries, intermediate-good firms, consumption-
good firms, investment-good firms, capital-good firms and a central bank in the econ-
omy. The financial accelerator mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1999) is employed in
the financial sector. The economy is subject to both technology shocks and financial
shocks.
5Note that Liu and Zhang (2010) use the concept of a ‘hybrid rule’ in their study which actually
means that the central bank uses both the quantity rule and the Taylor rule to conduct monetary
policy. Because of the small scale of their model, this is mathematically solvable.
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Each agent’s behavior is described in details as follows.
2.2.1 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of members normalized to
unity. A proportion of members are workers, denoted by m ∈ [0, 1], and the rest
are entrepreneurs. All members are assumed to pool consumption and make joint
consumption-saving decisions. The representative household maximizes
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtexp(zbt )
[
(Ct − θCt−1)1−σ
1− σ +exp(z
m
t )
(Mt/Pt)
1−σ
1− σ −(Z
∗
t )
1−σexp(zht )
ˆ 1
0
(ht(m))
1+χ
1 + χ
dm
]
(2.2.1)
subject to the budget constraint
PtCt +Mt +Dt = r
n
t−1Dt−1 +Mt−1 + Pt
ˆ 1
0
Wt(m)ht(m)dm+ Tt (2.2.2)
where E0 is the rational expectation operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, σ >
0 and θ ∈ [0, 1] are the degrees of relative risk aversion and internal consumption
habit persistence, respectively, χ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply,
zbt is the intertemporal preference shock, z
h
t and z
m
t represent the labor supply shock
and money demand shock, respectively, Ct is the consumption level, Mt/Pt is the real
money balance the household is holding, h(m) is the labor supply of worker m to the
intermediate-good firms f ∈ [0, 1] and ht(m) =
´ 1
0
ht(m, f)df , Z
∗
t is the composite
technological level (which will be explained below), Pt is the price of consumption
goods, Dt is the deposit saved in financial intermediaries, r
n
t is the gross deposit rate
which is assumed to be the policy rate, Wt(m) is worker m’s real wage, and Tt consists
of profits received from firms and a lump-sum public transfer.
The first-order conditions with respect to consumption and deposits are
Λt = exp(z
b
t )(Ct − θCt−1)−σ − βθEtexp(zbt+1)(Ct+1 − θCt)−σ (2.2.3)
1 = Etβ
Λt+1
Λt
rnt
pit+1
(2.2.4)
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where Λt is the marginal utility of consumption and pit = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation
rate of the consumption-good price. We assume that households in the economy cannot
make optimal decisions over money holdings due to the underlying frictions as a shortcut
of modeling the distortions in China. The detailed discussion is given in Section 2.2.4
when introducing monetary policy rule of the central bank.
2.2.1.1 Workers
The labor market is monopolistically competitive. Demand for worker m’s labor
services is given by
ht(m) = ht
(
Wt(m)/Wt
)−θwt ,
where ht = [
´ 1
0
(ht(m))
(θwt −1)/θwt dm]θ
w
t /(θ
w
t −1) is the aggregate labor service with substi-
tution elasticity θwt > 1 and Wt =
[ ´ 1
0
(
Wt(m)
)1−θwt dm]1/(1−θwt ) is the aggregate wage.
The nominal wage is adjusted according to a Calvo (1983) pricing mechanism. In each
period a fraction of 1− ξw ∈ (0, 1) of workers gets to reoptimize their wages while the
remaining fraction ξw of workers’ wages is set by indexation to both the gross steady-
state balanced growth rate z∗ and a weighted average of past and steady-state inflation
piγwt−1pi
1−γw , where γw ∈ (0, 1) is the relative weight on past inflation (z∗ will be explained
later). Each worker that gets to reset their wage at time t chooses PtWt(m) to maximize
Et
∞∑
j=0
(βξw)
j
[
Λt+jht+j|t(m)
PtWt(m)
Pt+j
j∏
k=1
(
z∗piγwt+k−1pi
1−γw)−exp(zbt+j)(Z∗t+j)1−σexp(zht+j)(ht+j|t(m))1+χ
1 + χ
]
(2.2.5)
subject to
ht+j|t(m) = ht+j
[
PtWt(m)
Pt+jWt+j
j∏
k=1
(
z∗piγwt+k−1pi
1−γw)]−θwt+j (2.2.6)
The first-order conditions for reoptimized wage W 0t are given by
1 =
Et
∑∞
j=0(βξw)
j (1+λ
w
t+j)exp(z
b
t+j)exp(z
h
t+j)(Z
∗
t+j)
1−σ
λwt+j
(ht+j{W
0
t (z
∗)j
Wt+j
∏j
k=1[(
pit+k−1
pi )
γw pi
pit+k
])}−
1+λwt+j
λw
t+j )1+χ
Et
∑∞
j=0(βξw)
j Λt+jWt+j
λwt+j
ht+j{W
0
t (z
∗)
Wt+j
∏j
k=1[(
pit+k−1
pi )
γw pi
pit+k
]}−
1
λw
t+j
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(2.2.7)
where λwt = 1/(θ
w
t − 1) > 0 is the wage markup.
The aggregate wage in equation (2.2.5) is reduced to
1 = (1− ξw)
((W 0t
Wt
)− 1
λwt +
∞∑
j=1
{
(z∗)jW 0t−j
Wt
j∏
k=1
[(pit−k
pi
)γw pi
pit−k+1
]}− 1λwt )
(2.2.8)
2.2.1.2 Entrepreneurs and Financial Intermediaries
At the end of period t − 1, entrepreneurs hold real net worth Nt−1 left from this
period and obtain a loan Lt−1 from financial intermediaries at gross real loan rate
Et−1rEt . They optimally purchase capital Kt−1 from capital-good firms at price Qt−1,
and choose the capital utilization rate ut. Then they provide capital service utKt−1 to
intermediate-good firms at rental rate Rkt , and sell the rest of their capital (1−ut)Kt−1
back to capital-good firms at price Qt. After paying back their loan to the financial
intermediaries, a fraction 1 − ηt ∈ (0, 1) of entrepreneurs becomes workers, while the
remaining ηt survives into the next period.
It is assumed that a higher utilization rate will lead to a higher depreciation rate
δ(ut) during intermediate-good firms’ production. δ(.) satisfies δ
′ > 0, δ′′ > 0, δ(1) =
δ ∈ (0, 1), and δ′(1)/δ′′(1) = τ > 0. With higher utilization rate, entrepreneurs can
provide more capital services but the resultant higher depreciation rate will result in a
lower rental rate.
The first-order conditions for optimal decisions on utilization rate and purchasing
capital can be derived as
Rkt = Qtδ
′(ut) (2.2.9)
EtΛt+1r
E
t+1 = EtΛt+1
ut+1R
k
t+1 +Qt+1(1− δ(ut+1))
Qt
(2.2.10)
where the EF premium function F (.) depends on entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio QtKt/Nt
and satisfies F ′ > 0 and µ = (QK/N)F ′(QK/N)/F (QK/N) > 0 as in regular DSGE
models with a financial accelerator mechanism, such as in Hirose (2008). zµt denotes
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a shock to the EF premium. The gross real loan rate Etr
E
t+1 consists of deposit rate
Et(r
n
t /pit+1) and the EF premium
Etr
E
t+1 = Et
rnt
pit+1
F
(QtKt
Nt
)
exp(zµt ) (2.2.11)
Evolution of net worth Nt is
Nt = ηt
[
rEt Qt−1Kt−1 −
(
Et−1rEt−1
)
Lt−1
]
+ (1− ηt)χZ∗t (2.2.12)
where χ is a constant, χZ∗t represents the transfer from entrepreneurs who become
workers to surviving entrepreneurs, ηt is the probability of surviving and given by
ηt = ηexp(z˜
η
t )/(1 − η + ηexp(z˜ηt )), where z˜ηt is a shock to net worth, and rEt is the
ex-post marginal return on capital and given by
rEt =
utR
k
t +Qt(1− δ(ut))
Qt−1
. (2.2.13)
2.2.2 Intermediate-good Firms and Consumption-good Firms
Each intermediate-good firm f ∈ [0, 1] produces output Yt(f) according to the
production function
Yt(f) =
(
Ztht(f)
)1−α(
Kt(f)
)α − φyZ∗t (2.2.14)
where ht(f) is the labor input from workers at real wage Wt, Kt(f) is the capital
input from entrepreneurs at real rental rates Rt, Zt is the neutral technology and evolves
according to a stochastic process
logZt = logz + logZt−1 + zzt
z > 1 is the gross steady-state rate of neutral technology change and zzt represents
a non-stationary neutral technology shock. ht(f) = [
´ 1
0 (ht(m, f))
(θwt −1)/θwt dm]θwt /(θwt −1)
denotes the labor input, and α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital elasticity of output. φ ∈ [0, 1) in
the fixed cost term −φyZ∗t is chosen to ensure that the zero profit condition holds at
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the steady state, and y is the steady-state value of the detrended output yt = Yt/Z
∗
t .
Z∗t denotes the composite technological level following Z
∗
t = Zt(Ψt)
α/(1−α) where Ψt is
the level of IS technological level. Z∗t /Z
∗
t−1 is the gross rate of balanced growth with
steady-state rate z∗ = zψα/(1−α), derived by equation (2.2.14), and ψ is the steady-state
rate of Ψt.
From the first-order conditions for optimal labor and capital inputs we obtain
1− α
α
=
Wtht
Rkt utKt−1
(2.2.15)
and the real marginal cost is given by
mct =
( Wt
(1− α)Zt
)1−α(Rkt
α
)α
(2.2.16)
where ht =
´ 1
0
ht(f)df and utKt−1 =
´ 1
0
Kt(f)df . Aggregating function (2.2.14) over
intermediate-good firms yields
Ytdt = (Ztht)
1−α(utKt−1)α − φyZ∗t (2.2.17)
where dt =
´ 1
0
(Pt(f)/Pt)
−θpt df is intermediate-good price dispersion.
Each consumption-good firm chooses a combination of intermediate goods {Yt(f)}
at price Pt(f) and produces consumption goods Yt, subject to the production function
Yt = (
´ 1
0
Yt(f)
(θpt−1)/θpt df)θ
p
t /(θ
p
t−1), where θpt > 1 represents elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods. Profit maximization of consumption-good firms yields
demand for intermediate-good f as Yt(f) = Yt
(
Pt(f)/Pt
)−θpt .
It is assumed that consumption-good firms operate under perfect competition, while
intermediate-goods firms face monopolistic competitive market. Hence, the price of
consumption-good Yt is given by
Pt =
( ˆ 1
0
Pt(f)
1−θpt df
) 1
1−θpt (2.2.18)
Intermediate-good firms set price under the Calvo (1983) pricing mechanism, which
assumes a fraction of 1 − ξp ∈ (0, 1) of intermediate-good firms reoptimizes price in
each period, while price of the rest is set by indexation to a weighted average of past
inflation and steady-state inflation, with γp ∈ [0, 1] the relative weight on past inflation,
CHAPTER 2. CHINA’S MONETARY POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLE 20
i.e, pi
γp
t−1pi
1−γp . Price is reoptimized in the current period so as to maximize
Et
∞∑
j=0
ξjp
(
βj
Λt+j
Λt
)[Pt(f)
Pt+j
j∏
k=1
(pi
γp
t+k−1pi
1−γp)−mct+j
]
Yt+j|t(f)
subject to
Yt+j|t(f) = Yt+j
[Pt(f)
Pt+j
j∏
k=1
(pi
γp
t+k−1pi
1−γp)
]−θpt+j
where βj
Λt+j
Λt
shows the stochastic discount factor between period t and t + j. Solving
the above problem, reoptimized price P 0t is given by
1 =
Et
∑∞
j=0(βξp)
j (1+λ
p
t+j)mct+jΛt+jYt+j
λpt+j
{P 0t
Pt
∏j
k=1[(
pit+k−1
pi
)γp pi
pit+k
])}−
1+λwt+j
λw
t+j
Et
∑∞
j=0(βξp)
j Λt+jY t+j
λpt+j
{P 0t
Pt
∏j
k=1[(
pit+k−1
pi
)γp pi
pit+k
]}−
1
λ
p
t+j
(2.2.19)
equation (2.2.18) can be further reduced to
1 = (1− ξp)
((P 0t
Pt
)− 1
λ
p
t +
∞∑
j=1
(ξp)
j
{
P 0t−j
Pt−j
j∏
k=1
[(pit−k
pi
)γp pi
pit−k+1
]}− 1
λ
p
t
)
(2.2.20)
where λpt = 1/(θ
p
t − 1) denotes the intermediate-good price markup.
2.2.3 Investment-good Firms and Capital-good Firms
The investment-good firm fi converts one unit of consumption goods into differ-
entiated investment goods equal to Ψt units and supply them to capital-good firms.
Capital-good firms accumulate capital Kt by choosing an optimal combination of in-
vestment goods {It(fi)} to make further investment It and purchasing (1− δ(ut))Kt−1
capital goods back from entrepreneurs. The accumulated capital Kt is again sold to
entrepreneurs. Here, the level of IS technology Ψt is identical across investment-good
firms and follows the process
logΨt = logψ + logΨt−1 + z
ψ
t
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where zψt is a non-stationary IS technology shock.
Under monopolistic competition, the investment-good firm fi faces demand
It(fi) = It
(P it (fi)
P it
)−θit
(2.2.21)
and corresponding aggregate price of investment good price
P it =
( ˆ 1
0
P it (fi)
1−θitdfi
)1/(1−θit)
(2.2.22)
where It = (
´ 1
0
It(fi)
(θit−1)/θitdfi)θ
i
t/(θ
i
t−1), where θit > 1 is the substitution elasticity, and
P it (fi) is the price of investment goods produced by firm fi set by maximizing profit
(P it (fi)/Pt − 1/Ψt)It(fi).
The corresponding first-order conditions give
P it = P
i
t (fi) = (1 + λ
i
t)Pt/Ψt, (2.2.23)
where λit ≡ 1/(θit − 1) > 0 is the investment-good markup. Combining optimal choice
of P it (fi) with (21) and (22) leads to P
i
t = P
i
t (fi) and It(fi) = It. Hence, the gross rate
of change in the relative price of investment goods to consumption goods is given by
rit =
P it /Pt
P it−1/Pt−1
=
1 + λit
1 + λit−1
Ψt
Ψt−1
The capital-good firms’ problem is to choose an optimal combination of investment
goods {It(fi)} and maximize profit
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
Λt
Λt−1
{
Qt+j
[
Kt+j −
(
1− δ(ut+j)
)
Kt+j−1
]
− P
i
t+j
Pt+j
It+j
}
subject to
Kt = (1− δ(ut))Kt−1 + exp(zνt )
(
1− S
(It/It−1
z∗ψ
))
It (2.2.24)
Here S((It/It−1)/(z∗ψ)) = (ζ/2)[(It/It−1)/(z∗ψ)−1]2 is the adjustment cost with ζ > 0,
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and zνt represents an MEI technology shock that affects the transformation of investment
goods into capital goods.
The optimal decision is determined by equation (2.2.21) and the first-order condi-
tions:
P it
Pt
= Qtexp(z
ν
t )
[
1− S
(It/It−1
z∗ψ
)
− S ′
(It/It−1
z∗ψ
)It/It−1
z∗ψ
]
+Etβ
Λt+1
Λt
z∗ψQt+1exp(zνt+1)S
′
(It+1/It
z∗ψ
)(It+1/It
z∗ψ
)2
(2.2.25)
2.2.4 Central Bank
The central bank is assumed to do two things in the model economy. First, it
controls the money supply in the market according to a quantity rule, and second, it
adjusts the interest rate according to a policy rule. Both rules are defined as follows.
The quantity rule regarding the money supply is defined as in Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005)
M st = µtM
s
t−1
and
logµt = logµ0 + z
mg
t (2.2.26)
where M st is the nominal money supply at time t and M
s
t = Mt when the market clears,
µt is the gross growth rate of the money supply, µ0 is the gross steady state rate, and
zmgt represents a money supply shock and follows an AR(1) stochastic process.
The hybrid rule for setting the interest rate is given as
log(rnt ) = W
(
− log
(
1− 1
λt
exp(zbt )exp (z
m
t ) (mt)
−σ
))
(2.2.27)
+ (1−W )
(
φrlog(r
n
t−1) + (1− φr)
(
logrn +
φpi
4
3∑
j=0
log(
pit−j
pi
) + φy log
Yt/Z∗t
y
)
+ φ∆y log
Yt/Yt−1
z∗
)
+zrt
where 0 ≤ W ≤ 1, rn is the gross steady-state policy rate, λt is the detrended marginal
utility of consumption, defined later in Section 2.3, mt = Mt/Pt is the real money
balance, zmt is the real money balance shock, φr ∈ [0, 1) represents the degree of policy
rate smoothing, φpi, φy, φ∆y > 0 represents the degrees of policy responses to inflation,
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output, and output growth, and zrt represents a policy rate shock and follows an AR(1)
stochastic process. The hybrid rule is essentially a linear combination of a component of
a Taylor-type rule (the part multiplied by 1−W ) and a component of a money demand
in real term (the part multiplied by W ). The first component borrows from a Taylor
rule proposed by Kaihatsu and Kurozumi (2014) while the second component would be
the right hand side of the optimal money demand of households, were there no frictions
preventing households from optimally choosing mt.
6 The hybrid rule is proposed and
constructed in a way that, together with the quantity rule above, encompasses the pure
Taylor rule and the pure quantity rule.
Discussion:
Equations (2.2.27) and (2.2.26) fully describe the central bank’s behavior in the model
economy in three scenarios.
If 0 < W < 1, both components in equation (2.2.27) show up as the central bank’s
monetary policy objectives. The central bank conducts monetary policy by not only
responding to inflation and output conditions like an advanced economy’s authority
according to a pure Taylor rule, but also taking into account the real money demand
of households. Note that we assume that due to the underlying frictions, households
cannot make optimal choices over how much money to hold in the economy. In this
case, the central bank recognizes that and includes the money demand component in its
policy function. This is a shortcut of modeling the constraint the Chinese citizens are
subject to and the policy rule that takes that constraint into account. Subsequently,
equation (2.2.26) pins down the nominal money when the market clears and completes
the model.
If W = 0, only the Taylor-type rule component shows up in equation (2.2.27), and
it reduces to a pure Taylor-type rule as in Kaihatsu and Kurozumi (2014). In this
scenario, households are still assumed to be constrained from making optimal choice
of real money holdings but the central bank does not include the real money demand
component in the policy rule. Equation (2.2.26) again clears the market for the quantity
of money and the model is complete.
If W = 1, only the real money demand component shows up in equation (2.2.27)
and it reduces to be identical to the optimal money demand condition of households in
the absence of underlying frictions. In this case, the central bank sets the policy rate
following the same rule describing households’ optimal choices over money holdings.
6Recall that in the households’ utility maximization problem in unconstrained equilib-
rium, the optimality condition with respect to mt at time t is given by logr
n
t =
−log
(
1− 1λt exp(zbt )exp (zmt ) (mt)
−σ
)
.
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The quantity of money is determined by equation (2.2.26) and the interest rate is set
by equation (2.2.27). The model is complete.
In a nutshell, equations (2.2.27) and (2.2.26) describe the central bank’s behavior
in the model economy in a generalized form that encompasses the pure Taylor rule and
the quantity rule without imposing ex ante model restrictions. Answers to the question
which policy rule is the central bank using can be easily obtained by statistical readings
of the posterior mean estimates of parameters.
2.2.5 System of Equations
The consumption-good market clearing condition is
Yt = Ct +
ˆ 1
0
It(fi)
Ψt
dfi + gZ
∗
t exp(z˜
g
t ) = Ct +
It
Ψt
+ gZ∗t exp(z˜
g
t ). (2.2.28)
The system of equations consists of equations (2.2.3), (2.2.4), (2.2.7) – (2.2.13),
(2.2.15) – (2.2.17), (2.2.19) – (2.2.20), (2.2.23) – (2.2.25), (2.2.27) – (2.2.28), together
with the stochastic processes for the twelve exogenous shocks zxt , x ∈ {b, g, w, p, i, r, z,
ψ, ν, µ, η, mg}, where zbt is the preference shock, zgt = (g/y)z˜gt is the exogenous
demand shock which is a shock to demand for the consumption-good excluding that for
consumption Ct and investment It/Ψt, z
w
t is a composite shock to the labor disutility
disturbance zht and the wage markup λ
w
t , z
p
t and z
i
t are shocks associated with the
intermediate-good price markup λpt and the investment-good price markup λ
p
t , z
r
t is
a shock to the monetary policy rate, zzt and z
ψ
t are neutral and IS technology shocks,
respectively, zνt is the MEI shock, z
µ
t is a shock to the external finance premium, z
η
t is a
shock to the net worth of entrepreneurs, with zηt = η(r
E/z∗ − 1)z˜ηt . Each of the twelve
exogenous shocks follows an AR(1) stationary stochastic process
zxt = ρxz
x
t−1 +ε
x
t , ε
x
t ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2x), x ∈ {b, g, w, p, i, r, z, ψ, ν, µ, η, mg}.
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2.3 Estimation
2.3.1 Estimation Methodology
We adopt a Bayesian likelihood approach from KK with twelve China quarterly time
series: output Yt, consumption Ct, investment It, labor (hours worked) ht, the real wage
Wt , the price of consumption goods Pt, the relative price of investment goods P
i
t /Pt,
the monetary policy rate rnt , the loan rate Et(r
E
t+1pit+1), real loans Lt, real net worth
Nt, and real money balances Mt/Pt.
7
Before estimation, the equilibrium conditions presented in the previous section are
rewritten in terms of detrended variables. As mentioned previously, the model economy
consists of a non-stationary stochastic technology trend Z∗t and variables are detrended
as yt = Yt/Z
∗
t , ct = Ct/Z
∗
t , wt = Wt/Z
∗
t , λt = Λt(Z
∗
t )
σ, it = It/(Z
∗
t Ψt), kt = Kt/(Z
∗
t Ψt),
rkt = R
k
tΨ
∗
t , qt = QtΨ
∗
t , nt = Nt/Z
∗
t , lt = Lt/Z
∗
t and mt = Mt/(Z
∗
t Pt). The station-
arized system is then log-linearized around its deterministic steady sate with a capital
utilization rate of unity (i.e. uss = 1). Details are reported in the Appendix.
Following Smets and Wouters (2007) and KK, we use the Kalman filter to evaluate
the likelihood function for the log-linearized system and apply the Metropolis–Hastings
algorithm to generate draws from the posterior distribution of model parameters.8
2.3.2 The Data
The data are obtained from the CEIC China Premium Database and the sample
period is 2001:Q1 to 2017:Q2. Data on prices is from the CPI. The relative price
of investment P it /Pt is proxied with the PPI divided by CPI. Data on nominal GDP,
consumption, investment and wages is deflated with the CPI. Data on real loans is CPI-
deflated. Real net worth is proxied by data on the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite
Index deflated by CPI. The inverse of the City Labor Market Demand-Supply Ratio is
used as a proxy for labor and normalized to be equal to zero as in Smets and Wouters
(2007). SHIBOR is used as a proxy for the loan rate, and the policy interest rate is
the household deposit saving rate. The aggregate money supply is M2. All series are
7There are studies in the literature that have employed Bayesian estimation strategies for estimating
the Chinese economy. Most of the data series are small-scale. Wang and Tian (2014) apply a Bayesian
estimation approach using four data series while Sun and Sen (2011) use seven data series.
8Our estimation is done using Dynare Adjemian et al. (2011). In each estimation, 200,000 draws
were generated and the first half of these draws was discarded. The scale factor for the jumping
distribution in the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm was adjusted so that an acceptance rate of around
24 per cent was obtained.
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seasonally adjusted. Corresponding observation equations are
100∆logYt
100∆logCt
100∆logIt
100∆loght
100∆logWt
100∆logPt
100∆log(P it /Pt)
100∆logrnt
100∆log(rEt )Yt
100∆logLt
100∆logNt
100∆logMt

=

z∗
z∗
z∗ + ψ
h
z∗
pi
−ψ
rn
rE + pi
z∗
z∗
z∗ + pi

+

z∗t + yˆt − yˆt−1
z∗t + cˆt − cˆt−1
z∗t + z
ψ
t + ιˆt − ιˆt−1
hˆt
z∗t + wˆt − wˆt−1
pˆit
−zψt + zit − zit−1
rˆnt
Etrˆ
E
t+1 + Etpˆit+1
z∗t + lˆt − lˆt−1
z∗t + nˆt − nˆt−1
z∗t + pˆit + mˆt − mˆt−1

where z∗t = 100(z
∗ − 1), ψ = 100(ψ − 1), pi = 100(pi − 1), rn = 100(rn − 1), rE =
100(rE− 1), and hatted variables represent log-deviations from their respective steady-
state values.
2.3.3 Fixed Parameters and Prior Distributions
There are two sets of parameters: one to be estimated while the other is fixed to
avoid any identification issue. The fixed parameters are the depreciation rate δ, the
wage markup λw, the steady state investment-good price markup λi, and the steady-
state ratio of exogenous demand to output g/y. δ is set to 0.025 per quarter, implying
an annual depreciation rate of 0.10 which is consistent with most empirical studies on
the Chinese economy. λw and λi are taken from KK: λw = 0.2, λi = 0.2. g/y is set at
the sample mean 0.212.
The prior distributions of the 49 parameters to be estimated are listed in Table 2.1.
The prior distributions of the steady-state rates of balanced growth, IS technological
change, inflation, the real loan rate and the policy rate (i.e., z∗, ψ, pi, rE, rn) are set to
be Gamma distributions with a standard deviation of 0.1 and the mean given by their
respective sample mean. The prior distributions of the inter-temporal elasticity of sub-
stitution σ and the output elasticity of capital α are identical to those in KK. The prior
means of σ and α are assumed to be 2 and 0.6, respectively, following Zhang (2009). The
prior distribution of W is set to be a Uniform distribution with domain [0,1], imposing
no prior restriction on the hybrid policy rule. For the parameters of shocks, we choose
the Beta distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2 for the persis-
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tence of each shock (i.e., ρx, x ∈ {b, g, w, p, i, r, z, ψ, ν, µ, η, mg}) and an Inverse
Gamma distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of infinity for the stan-
dard deviation of each innovation (i.e.,σx, x ∈ {b, g, w, p, i, r, z, ψ, ν, µ, η, mg}).
The rest of the parameters have the same prior distribution as in the KK model.
2.4 Results
In this section we present the results in three main parts. The first part reports the
statistics of the posterior mean estimates of parameters over the sample period 2001Q1-
2017Q2. Prior and posterior plots of distributions are provided for showing which
parameters are unidentified.9 See Figure 2.1 for details. Possible changes of policy
rule are also considered in this part. The second part of the section presents variance
decompositions of output, consumption, investment and loans based on the estimated
model. Both forecast error variance decompositions and historical decompositions are
reported. Through this exercise we are able to answer some fundamental questions
about the main sources of economic fluctuations in China. The final part presents the
impulse responses to technology shocks and financial shocks.
2.4.1 Estimates of W
The first row of Table 2.1 reports the posterior mean of W and the 90% confidence
interval. On the full sample period, the weight of the quantity-rule component in the
monetary policy rule function,W , is estimated to be 0.09 and is statistically different
from zero. Equation (2.2.27) is in its general form. It is a hybrid monetary policy rule
with quantity of money component taking up a small share of the rule. This result shows
that over the past decade or so, the PBoC conducted monetary policy by adjusting the
policy rate according to the real money growth, inflation rate, output level and output
growth in the economy with assigned weights. Other macroeconomic conditions were
subsequently pinned down through the interest rate channel in equilibrium. This finding
could serve as a benchmark approach for estimating China’s monetary policy rules as
macro and financial conditions in China evolve over time.
We also conduct subsample estimations searching for possible policy rule changes.
During the sample period, there was a global breakdown of the financial system which
might have caused some policy changes to the PBoC. We set 2009Q1 as the potential
change point and estimate the model over the two subsamples, 2001Q1-2008Q4 and
2009Q1-2017Q2. Results are reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
9I thank one of the external anonymous examiners for the suggestion.
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As shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, the mean estimates of W over the two subsamples
are considerably different from each other. W is estimated to be 0.08 over the subsample
from 2001Q1 to 2008Q4 and 0.24 over the subsample from 2009Q1 to 2017Q2, both
of which are statistically significant from zero. China’s monetary policy rule included
a small component of real money growth before 2009 while the weight of real money
growth was significantly increased after 2009. This could indicate that the Global
Financial Crisis may have had impact on the monetary policy practice of the PBoC.
The PBoC has had a larger adjustment of its policy rate in responding to changes in
the real money growth of the economy in the post-crisis time, everything else equal.
We have also tested other possible structural change points: 2007Q1 and 2008Q1, and
the results are very similar to those using 2009Q1 as the structural change point.
2.4.2 Variance Decompositions
This section reports the forecast error decompositions of the variances of output growth,
consumption growth, investment growth and loans growth in Table 2.4 over the full
sample period, and in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 over the two subsample periods. Historical
decompositions of output growth and investment growth are reported in Figures 2.2
and 2.3 based on the estimated model.
Table 2.4 shows the relative contribution of each shock to the variations of out-
put growth, consumption growth, investment growth and real loans growth at forecast
horizons T = 8, 32 quarters, evaluated at the posterior mean estimates of parameters
using data over the full sample period. The main source of the output fluctuation is the
neutral technology shock. The second important source is the preference shock. The
exogenous demand shock and the intermediate-good price markup shock play lesser
but still important roles in contributing to the output fluctuation, and the latter’s role
increases mildly from short-term (14 per cent) to long-term (16 per cent) horizons.
The rest of the shocks are negligible. The four shocks which explain the most of the
fluctuations in output growth also contribute the most of the fluctuations in consump-
tion growth. The relative contribution of each of the four shocks to the variation of
consumption growth is also similar to that to the output growth in the short-term
horizon. Noticeably, the preference shock becomes the dominant source of the con-
sumption fluctuation in the long-term, making up 45 per cent of the variation. The
intermediate-good price markup shock, IS technology shock, neutral technology shock,
and MEI shock all play significant roles in explaining the fluctuations of investment
growth in the short run (around 20 per cent each). The IS technology shock becomes
even more prominent in the long run (41 per cent). Almost half of the variation in real
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loans growth is explained by the IS technology shock and 28 per cent by the net worth
shock in the short-run. The intermediate-good markup shock also plays a sizable role
in affecting loans activities.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the forecast error variance decompositions of output
growth, consumption growth, investment growth and real loans growth in the two sub-
samples: 2001Q1-2008Q4 and 2009Q1-2017Q2, respectively. Compared to the relative
contribution of each of the shocks over the full sample period, the external demand
shock plays an even larger role and the IS technology shock becomes non-negligible in
explaining the variation in output growth over the subsample period before the finan-
cial crisis. Shocks to the neutral technology and to the external demand become more
prominent in contributing to the variation in output growth in the period from 2009
to 2017. More than two thirds of the variation in consumption growth are explained
by the preference shock in the period before 2009 (compared to 46 per cent over the
full sample) while half of that variation is contributed to by the neutral technology
shock in the period after 2009 (compared to 34 per cent over the full sample). The
most significant change in the relative contribution of each of the shocks in explaining
the fluctuations in investment growth is the MEI shock. Its contribution reduces to
be minor in the subsample period before the crisis, accounting only for 4 per cent of
the variation of investment growth while increases to be the second important source
in the subsample period after the crisis, contributing to 24 per cent of the fluctuations
in investment activities. In the subsample before the financial crisis, the net worth
shock becomes the dominant contributor to fluctuations in real loans growth while in
the subsample after the crisis, the most noticeable change in explaining the variation
in real loans activities is that the neutral technology shock becomes sizable, taking up
almost 10 per cent of the variation (relative to only about 5 per cent over the full sample
period).
The results above demonstrate the main sources of business fluctuations in China.
The real sectors, that is, consumption-good sectors, are primarily driven by shocks
to the neutral technology, preference, price markup, and external demand while the
financial sectors are dominated by the IS technology and net worth shocks.
To get a closer look at the fundamentals of business fluctuations in China, we present
the historical decompositions of the percentage point deviations of output growth and
investment growth from their respective steady states in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. Figure
2.2 shows a steady decreasing trend of output growth from around 2011 and the neu-
tral technology shock is the main negative contributor: It was consistently positively
contributing to the output growth in 2001-2007 and mid-2009 - early 2011, and then
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consistently negatively contributing to the output growth since mid-2011. This implies
that negative developments of the neutral technology may have been one of the primary
drivers of the slowing down of China’s GDP growth that we discussed at the beginning
of the paper. There is a drastic fall in output growth from around mid-2008 to early
2009 in Figure 2.2. This corresponds to the onset of the global financial crisis. A sud-
den global meltdown of the financial system and then of the real economy overseas may
affect technology and production through trade and financial channels.
Figure 2.3 shows that investment growth is on average positive over the full sam-
ple period, and its key drivers include shocks to the neutral technology, IS technology,
investment-good price markup, intermediate-good price markup and MEI , although
their contributions are all volatile. The neutral technology shock is a positive contribu-
tor to the investment growth from 2001 to 2005, and a consistently negative contributor
since around 2012, while the MEI shock is a prominent and negative contributor to the
investment growth in 2006-2008 and a persistently positive factor since 2010. Shocks to
the IS technology, investment-good and intermediate-good price markups are all quite
volatile over the whole sample period. Noticeably, there is a significant fall in the in-
vestment growth in 2016 and the investment-good price markup seems to be the main
driver of the drop.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 together bring us another perspective on China’s growth story:
investment was steadily growing, at least until 2016, while economic growth showed
clear signs of slowing down over the past decade.
2.4.3 Impulse Responses
Section 2.4.1 has discussed monetary policy rules in China. Section 2.4.2 has taken a
variance decomposition approach to examine the main sources of business-cycle fluctua-
tions in key macroeconomic variables. In this section, we present the impulse responses
to shocks to the monetary policy rate, neutral technology and net worth. The variables
of interest are the growth rates of output, consumption, labor, investment, real loans,
net worth, the deposit rate (policy rate), the loan rate, and the inflation rate. All
shocks are positive and within one standard deviation. All figures are plotted at the
posterior mean estimates of the respective variables and over 40 periods.
As shown in Figure 2.4, a positive shock to the monetary policy rate leads to a
decrease in output, consumption, labor (hours worked), investment, real loans, net
worth and inflation. The loan rate increases due to the increase of the deposit rate
(policy rate). These are textbook responses to a monetary policy tightening.
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses to a production technology improvement
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shock. Output rises, so does consumption. Investment and loans increase to support
production boom, and firms’ net worth increase subsequently. Labor services fall due
to improved productivity: workers do not have to work as much. The policy rate rises
to prevent the economy from overheating. The loan rate rises and prices fall as a result.
Figure 2.6 shows that a positive shock to net worth increases investment activi-
ties. Output is increasing by less than investment. Consumption falls. Labor services
increase to meet the higher production level. The price level increases. Real loans
decrease due to rising net worth: firms do not have to borrow as much. The loan rate
falls. The deposit rate rises in response to rising output and inflation.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Policymakers and scholars are increasingly concerned with the recent economic slow-
down in China. Our findings show that it is the negative neutral technology develop-
ment that has caused this output fluctuation. After over thirty years of driving high-
speed economic development, the growth potential of neutral technological advance-
ment has shown a clear sign of slowing down. This has important policy implication of
encouraging technological innovations and industrial upgrading in China.
We construct a rich DSGE model in this paper for the structural investigation of the
Chinese economy. The results show that it captures important features of the economy
that have not been found in previous studies using a simple model. For example, we
find that China’s monetary policy rule is a hybrid rule. The central bank of China
conducts monetary policy by adjusting the policy rate in response to inflation, output
conditions as well as real money growth, which accounts for the constrained households
of the economy. The paper also finds clear evidence for changes of monetary policy rules
around the time of the onset of Global Financial Crisis. With everything else equal,
the PBoC responds more to the development of real money in the post crisis time.
Financial friction shocks and investment-specific technology shocks are indispensable
sources of investment fluctuations. Neutral technology development was a consistently
positive contributor to output growth during the period 2001-2007 and became a neg-
ative contributor after 2010. Future work on sources of business fluctuations in China
and China’s monetary policy rule can draw on these results in this paper.
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Table 2.1: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated param-
eters - full sample
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
W Weight on quantity rule U 0.0911 [0.0179, 0.1686]
σ Risk aversion G 2 0.375 0.8737 [0.5647, 1.1324]
θ Habit persistence B 0.7 0.1 0.5582 [0.4176, 0.6862]
χ Inverse of elasticity of labor supply G 2 0.75 2.6598 [1.5509, 3.7217]
ζ Elasticity of investment adjustment
cost
G 4 1.5 3.3357 [2.2265, 4.5573]
τ Inverse of elasticity of utilization rate
adjustment cost
G 0.22 0.1 0.3155 [0.108, 0.5033]
φ Output share of fixed production cost B 0.25 0.125 0.0531 [0.0052, 0.0986]
α Capital elasticity of output B 0.6 0.1 0.144 [0.086, 0.202]
γw Wage indexation B 0.5 0.15 0.2471 [0.1017, 0.3878]
ξw Wage stickiness B 0.5 0.1 0.6422 [0.5621, 0.7186]
γp Intermediate-good price indexation B 0.5 0.15 0.3213 [0.1461, 0.4882]
ξp Intermediate-good price stickiness B 0.5 0.1 0.8075 [0.7412, 0.8664]
φr Monetary policy rate smoothing B 0.75 0.1 0.7664 [0.6873, 0.8412]
φpi Monetary policy response to inflation G 1.5 0.25 1.7688 [1.3955, 2.1307]
φy Monetary policy response to output G 0.125 0.05 0.044 [0.0201, 0.0681]
φ∆y Monetary policy response to output
growth
G 0.125 0.05 0.0579 [0.0267, 0.0869]
z∗ Steady-state rate of balanced growth G 1.163 0.1 1.2187 [1.079, 1.3613]
ψ Steady-state rate of IS technological
change
G 0.077 0.04 0.0672 [0.0144, 0.1195]
h Normalized steady-state hours worked N 0 2 -0.1304 [-2.4195, 2.3909]
pi Steady-state inflation rate G 0.272 0.1 0.266 [0.1459, 0.3955]
rn Steady-state policy rate G 1.03 0.1 1.106 [0.9655, 1.2442]
η Entrepreneur survival probability B 0.973 0.02 0.9552 [0.9276, 0.9838]
n/k Steady-state net worth-capital ratio B 0.5 0.07 0.6077 [0.5089, 0.7027]
µ Elasticity of EF premium G 0.07 0.02 0.0203 [0.0141, 0.0271]
rE Steady-state real loan rate G 1.242 0.05 1.2177 [1.1374, 1.2929]
ρb Persistence of preference shock B 0.5 0.2 0.7916 [0.606, 0.9558]
CHAPTER 2. CHINA’S MONETARY POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLE 33
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
ρg Persistence of exogenous demand
shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.9707 [0.947, 0.9944]
ρw Persistence of wage shock B 0.5 0.2 0.2055 [0.0349, 0.3726]
ρp Persistence of intermediate-good price
markup shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.9039 [0.8407, 0.9774]
ρi Persistence of investment-good price
markup shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.8897 [0.8323, 0.9448]
ρr Persistence of monetary policy shock
in hybrid rule
B 0.5 0.2 0.2256 [0.0632, 0.3813]
ρz Persistence of neutral technology
shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.1307 [0.0295, 0.2226]
ρψ Persistence of IS technology shock B 0.5 0.2 0.9568 [0.9249, 0.9909]
ρν Persistence of MEI shock B 0.5 0.2 0.985 [0.9774, 0.9924]
ρµ Persistence of EF premium shock B 0.5 0.2 0.5413 [0.4254, 0.6784]
ρη Persistence of net worth shock B 0.5 0.2 0.8246 [0.7015, 0.9634]
ρmg Persistence of monetary shock in
quantity rule
B 0.5 0.2 0.3782 [0.1867, 0.5541]
σb S.D. of preference shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 2.8286 [1.5204, 3.8269]
σg S.D. of exogenous demand shock
innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 0.8964 [0.7581, 1.0319]
σw S.D. of wage shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.4458 [0.3527, 0.5515]
σp S.D. of intermediate-good price
markup shock innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 0.1624 [0.1037, 0.2165]
σi S.D. of investment-good price markup
shock innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 1.1037 [0.9333, 1.2754]
σr S.D. of monetary policy shock
innovation in hybrid rule
IG 0.5 Inf 0.1287 [0.1088, 0.1467]
σz S.D. of neutral technology shock
innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 1.7636 [1.4635, 2.0584]
σψ S.D. of IS technology shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.3763 [0.2735, 0.4741]
σν S.D. of MEI shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 4.1778 [3.3739, 4.9908]
σµ S.D. of EF premium shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.2854 [0.2462, 0.323]
ση S.D. of net worth shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.8999 [0.5881, 1.2119]
CHAPTER 2. CHINA’S MONETARY POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLE 34
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
σmg S.D. of monetary policy shock
innovation in quantity rule
IG 0.5 Inf 0.5839 [0.5022, 0.6575]
Note: In the type of prior distributions, U, B, G, IG, and N stand for Uniform, Beta,
Gamma, Inverse Gamma, and Normal distributions, respectively.
Table 2.2: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated param-
eters - subsample: 2001Q1-2008Q4
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
W Weight on quantity rule U 0.0859 [0.0005, 0.1753]
σ Risk aversion G 2 0.375 1.3525 [0.8765, 1.7459]
θ Habit persistence B 0.7 0.1 0.5852 [0.4222, 0.8257]
χ Inverse of elasticity of labor supply G 2 0.75 2.4886 [1.1941, 3.6389]
ζ Elasticity of investment adjustment
cost
G 4 1.5 1.9989 [0.6985, 3.3205]
τ Inverse of elasticity of utilization rate
adjustment cost
G 0.22 0.1 0.2622 [0.0583, 0.458]
φ Output share of fixed production cost B 0.25 0.125 0.0471 [0.0092, 0.0847]
α Capital elasticity of output B 0.6 0.1 0.3066 [0.1694, 0.444]
γw Wage indexation B 0.5 0.15 0.2939 [0.111, 0.4658]
ξw Wage stickiness B 0.5 0.1 0.6172 [0.5352, 0.7205]
γp Intermediate-good price indexation B 0.5 0.15 0.3015 [0.1326, 0.482]
ξp Intermediate-good price stickiness B 0.5 0.1 0.7693 [0.7071, 0.8405]
φr Monetary policy rate smoothing B 0.75 0.1 0.6478 [0.5332, 0.7714]
φpi Monetary policy response to inflation G 1.5 0.25 1.9313 [1.5072, 2.3432]
φy Monetary policy response to output G 0.125 0.05 0.043 [0.0195, 0.0683]
φ∆y Monetary policy response to output
growth
G 0.125 0.05 0.0963 [0.0491, 0.1404]
z∗ Steady-state rate of balanced growth G 1.163 0.1 1.2358 [1.065, 1.3767]
ψ Steady-state rate of IS technological
change
G 0.077 0.04 0.073 [0.0163, 0.1248]
h Normalized steady-state hours worked N 0 2 1.409 [-1.1566, 4.3397]
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Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
pi Steady-state inflation rate G 0.272 0.1 0.3744 [0.1941, 0.5288]
rn Steady-state policy rate G 1.03 0.1 1.0595 [0.9096, 1.2015]
η Entrepreneur survival probability B 0.973 0.02 0.9717 [0.9504, 0.9917]
n/k Steady-state net worth-capital ratio B 0.5 0.07 0.4947 [0.3934, 0.5836]
µ Elasticity of EF premium G 0.07 0.02 0.0224 [0.0142, 0.0317]
rE Steady-state real loan rate G 1.242 0.05 1.232 [1.1524, 1.3114]
ρb Persistence of preference shock B 0.5 0.2 0.6454 [0.3053, 0.9043]
ρg Persistence of exogenous demand
shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.8943 [0.8312, 0.9641]
ρw Persistence of wage shock B 0.5 0.2 0.3522 [0.0732, 0.6039]
ρp Persistence of intermediate-good price
markup shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.8405 [0.7321, 0.9461]
ρi Persistence of investment-good price
markup shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.7362 [0.5906, 0.9162]
ρr Persistence of monetary policy shock
in hybrid rule
B 0.5 0.2 0.4865 [0.2962, 0.7321]
ρz Persistence of neutral technology
shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.1716 [0.0348, 0.296]
ρψ Persistence of IS technology shock B 0.5 0.2 0.9431 [0.9056, 0.9854]
ρν Persistence of MEI shock B 0.5 0.2 0.9747 [0.9545, 0.996]
ρµ Persistence of EF premium shock B 0.5 0.2 0.8114 [0.7099, 0.9071]
ρη Persistence of net worth shock B 0.5 0.2 0.765 [0.6124, 0.9208]
ρmg Persistence of monetary shock in
quantity rule
B 0.5 0.2 0.241 [0.0441, 0.4254]
σb S.D. of preference shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 6.0075 [2.3428, 11.7735]
σg S.D. of exogenous demand shock
innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 1.2548 [0.8911, 1.6161]
σw S.D. of wage shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.5312 [0.3542, 0.7339]
σp S.D. of intermediate-good price
markup shock innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 0.2457 [0.1294, 0.3331]
σi S.D. of investment-good price markup
shock innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 0.8898 [0.6847, 1.1021]
σr S.D. of monetary policy shock
innovation in hybrid rule
IG 0.5 Inf 0.1507 [0.123, 0.1822]
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Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
σz S.D. of neutral technology shock
innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 2.1435 [1.6746, 2.6424]
σψ S.D. of IS technology shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.4347 [0.2928, 0.5719]
σν S.D. of MEI shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 3.4362 [2.1762, 4.4342]
σµ S.D. of EF premium shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.1793 [0.1365, 0.2183]
ση S.D. of net worth shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 1.2113 [0.7844, 1.6362]
σmg S.D. of monetary policy shock
innovation in quantity rule
IG 0.5 Inf 0.4336 [0.3271, 0.5388]
Note: In the type of prior distributions, U, B, G, IG, and N stand for Uniform, Beta,
Gamma, Inverse Gamma, and Normal distributions, respectively.
Table 2.3: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated param-
eters - subsample: 2009Q1-2017Q2
Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
W Weight on quantity rule U 0.2466 [0.0046, 0.5121]
σ Risk aversion G 2 0.375 1.0819 [0.7355, 1.397]
θ Habit persistence B 0.7 0.1 0.6755 [0.5693, 0.7927]
χ Inverse of elasticity of labor supply G 2 0.75 2.2995 [1.3164, 3.3768]
ζ Elasticity of investment adjustment
cost
G 4 1.5 4.839 [3.2622, 6.4291]
τ Inverse of elasticity of utilization rate
adjustment cost
G 0.22 0.1 0.2482 [0.0801, 0.4042]
φ Output share of fixed production cost B 0.25 0.125 0.124 [0.0181, 0.2228]
α Capital elasticity of output B 0.6 0.1 0.1712 [0.1142, 0.2296]
γw Wage indexation B 0.5 0.15 0.4677 [0.2475, 0.6837]
ξw Wage stickiness B 0.5 0.1 0.6025 [0.4935, 0.7156]
γp Intermediate-good price indexation B 0.5 0.15 0.5818 [0.3744, 0.7944]
ξp Intermediate-good price stickiness B 0.5 0.1 0.8019 [0.7269, 0.8755]
φr Monetary policy rate smoothing B 0.75 0.1 0.801 [0.6807, 0.9109]
φpi Monetary policy response to inflation G 1.5 0.25 1.6664 [1.2879, 2.0263]
φy Monetary policy response to output G 0.125 0.05 0.0794 [0.0267, 0.1376]
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Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
φ∆y Monetary policy response to output
growth
G 0.125 0.05 0.1161 [0.0576, 0.1709]
z∗ Steady-state rate of balanced growth G 1.163 0.1 1.1451 [1.0167, 1.2853]
ψ Steady-state rate of IS technological
change
G 0.077 0.04 0.0763 [0.0176, 0.1353]
h Normalized steady-state hours worked N 0 2 -2.3959 [-4.5247, -0.1487]
pi Steady-state inflation rate G 0.272 0.1 0.2334 [0.1023, 0.3559]
rn Steady-state policy rate G 1.03 0.1 1.1051 [0.9671, 1.2318]
η Entrepreneur survival probability B 0.973 0.02 0.9292 [0.8976, 0.9599]
n/k Steady-state net worth-capital ratio B 0.5 0.07 0.5809 [0.4934, 0.6743]
µ Elasticity of EF premium G 0.07 0.02 0.0336 [0.0223, 0.0446]
rE Steady-state real loan rate G 1.242 0.05 1.2259 [1.1388, 1.3026]
ρb Persistence of preference shock B 0.5 0.2 0.3179 [0.0456, 0.5699]
ρg Persistence of exogenous demand
shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.9493 [0.9213, 0.9821]
ρw Persistence of wage shock B 0.5 0.2 0.2446 [0.0481, 0.4495]
ρp Persistence of intermediate-good price
markup shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.8293 [0.6927, 0.9755]
ρi Persistence of investment-good price
markup shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.8467 [0.7585, 0.944]
ρr Persistence of monetary policy shock
in hybrid rule
B 0.5 0.2 0.4587 [0.1, 0.8045]
ρz Persistence of neutral technology
shock
B 0.5 0.2 0.1655 [0.0381, 0.2872]
ρψ Persistence of IS technology shock B 0.5 0.2 0.9619 [0.9374, 0.99]
ρν Persistence of MEI shock B 0.5 0.2 0.9659 [0.9472, 0.9853]
ρµ Persistence of EF premium shock B 0.5 0.2 0.2073 [0.0559, 0.3554]
ρη Persistence of net worth shock B 0.5 0.2 0.5218 [0.285, 0.7456]
ρmg Persistence of monetary shock in
quantity rule
B 0.5 0.2 0.3737 [0.1227, 0.65]
σb S.D. of preference shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 1.8163 [0.8817, 2.7888]
σg S.D. of exogenous demand shock
innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 0.7046 [0.551, 0.8704]
σw S.D. of wage shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.3571 [0.2584, 0.4449]
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Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean S.D. Mean 90% interval
σp S.D. of intermediate-good price
markup shock innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 0.1899 [0.1141, 0.2564]
σi S.D. of investment-good price markup
shock innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 1.2825 [0.997, 1.5376]
σr S.D. of monetary policy shock
innovation in hybrid rule
IG 0.5 Inf 0.1086 [0.0855, 0.1322]
σz S.D. of neutral technology shock
innovation
IG 0.5 Inf 1.7497 [1.2774, 2.2522]
σψ S.D. of IS technology shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.2778 [0.1801, 0.3815]
σν S.D. of MEI shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 3.4748 [2.6189, 4.304]
σµ S.D. of EF premium shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.3267 [0.2609, 0.3989]
ση S.D. of net worth shock innovation IG 0.5 Inf 0.8334 [0.5687, 1.104]
σmg S.D. of monetary policy shock
innovation in quantity rule
IG 0.5 Inf 0.7029 [0.5697, 0.8478]
Note: In the type of prior distributions, U, B, G, IG, and N stand for Uniform, Beta,
Gamma, Inverse Gamma, and Normal distributions, respectively.
Table 2.4: Forecast error variance decompositions - full sample
Output Consumption Investment Loans
T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32
zb Preference 20.58 19.75 19.75 45.49 0.86 0.93 2.44 2.19
zg Exogenous demand 14.21 13.5 13.5 4.67 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.18
zw Wage 0.3 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.24 0.23 0.49 0.41
zp Intermediate-good price
markup
14.39 16.36 16.36 12.98 28.36 23.97 14.84 12.32
zi Investment-good price markup 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.09 4.8 3.7 0.56 0.78
zr Hybrid monetary policy 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.99 0.74 0.49 0.39 0.31
zz Neutral technology 46.87 44.66 44.66 33.08 18.62 12.3 4.7 4.26
zψ IS technology 1.02 2.77 2.77 1.44 23.28 41.26 44.76 48.47
zν MEI 1.41 1.38 1.38 0.5 16.7 12.17 2.08 4.88
zµ EF premium 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.73 0.48 1.39 1.07
zη Net worth 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.35 5.63 4.42 28.14 25.15
zmg Quantitative monetary policy 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0
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Table 2.5: Forecast error variance decompositions - subsample: 2001Q1-2008Q4
Output Consumption Investment Loans
T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32
zb Preference 14 13.19 69.14 67.35 2.53 2.4 2.75 2.21
zg Exogenous demand 22.94 21.56 2.03 2.06 1.06 1.03 1.42 1.19
zw Wage 0.82 0.9 0.44 0.45 1.26 1.19 1.5 1.16
zp Intermediate-good price
markup
13.73 14.49 2.85 2.83 31.24 26.86 10.09 7.61
zi Investment-good price markup 0.52 0.51 0.02 0.03 2.33 1.81 0.25 0.25
zr Hybrid monetary policy 0.9 0.85 0.26 0.25 1.96 1.47 1.38 1.13
zz Neutral technology 40.2 37.83 21.23 20.72 20.91 15.78 4.97 5.29
zψ IS technology 4.23 8.08 2 3.53 25.32 38.75 34.75 41.56
zν MEI 1.68 1.59 0.32 0.61 4.2 3.32 1.5 3.24
zµ EF premium 0.55 0.54 0.18 0.22 3.39 2.68 1.22 1.04
zη Net worth 0.44 0.44 1.53 1.93 5.8 4.72 40.16 35.32
zmg Quantitative monetary policy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2.6: Forecast error variance decompositions - subsample: 2009Q1-2017Q2
Output Consumption Investment Loans
T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32 T=8 T=32
zb Preference 8.02 7.63 29.61 28.26 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07
zg Exogenous demand 24.82 23.74 2.1 2.16 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.19
zw Wage 0.14 0.17 0.28 0.33 0.13 0.14 0.58 0.53
zp Intermediate-good price
markup
8.84 10.96 11.04 12.76 20.4 17.97 21.13 18.66
zi Investment-good price markup 0.48 0.53 0.05 0.09 8.3 6.15 0.4 0.59
zr Hybrid monetary policy 0.57 0.56 0.85 0.82 1.08 0.71 0.78 0.66
zz Neutral technology 54.62 51.98 53.21 50.9 28.87 18.32 9.69 8.98
zψ IS technology 0.13 2 1.48 2.4 12.98 35.08 34.89 38.26
zν MEI 1.67 1.71 0.47 1.35 24.47 18.86 3.83 7.5
zµ EF premium 0.02 0.02 0 0 0.3 0.19 3.76 3.07
zη Net worth 0.1 0.11 0.04 0.07 2.19 1.67 24.36 21.25
zmg Quantitative monetary policy 0.58 0.59 0.87 0.85 1.07 0.75 0.28 0.24
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Figure 2.1: Prior-posterior distributions of estimated parameters
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Figure 2.2: Historical decomposition of output growth
Figure 2.3: Historical decomposition of investment growth
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to monetary policy rate shock er (+1 s.d.)
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to neutral technology shock ez (+1 s.d.)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
output
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
consumption
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
investment
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
loans
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
labour
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
net worth
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
policy rate
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
loan rate
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
inflation
CHAPTER 2. CHINA’S MONETARY POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLE 43
Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to net worth shock eη (+1 s.d.)
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Chapter 3
Optimal Monetary Policy in Open
Economies Revisited
3.1 Introduction
In a world of integrated trade in goods and assets, sovereign nations become more and
more interdependent. The prolonged recession after the Global Financial Crisis again
reminds policy makers in major economies of the depth and scope of such interrelations.
Understanding the nature of cross-country spillovers of shocks and policy impacts comes
back to center stage in policy discussions.1 Should central banks cooperate in order to
internalize the possible externality from policy reactions? Is there any gain from such
cooperation? And if so, how large might it be?
The desirability of policy cooperation, namely whether there exist gains from cooper-
ation, has been one of the central issues in macroeconomics. The root of the discussion
can be traced way back to Hume (1752), who first noticed possible policy spillovers
among countries. Since then, there have been vast studies investigating the nature of
policy games in open economies. Recently, many have studied optimal monetary policy
in open economies using the microfounded, open-economy sticky-price models based
1Spillovers originated from other countries are as important for interdependent large open economies
as for small open economies. The difference is that in the case of two large open economies, there is
a dimension of interaction between policy makers, which is absent for the case of one large and one
small open economies. Policy makers in small economies take policies in large economies as given and
should only care about the movements of macroeconomic and financial variables of the large economies
that can have direct impact on the small open economies, such as output or consumption of the large
economy, monetary policy rate, and CPI inflation rate. A useful example can be found in Davis et al.
(2017). Their research questions are different from the analysis in Chapter 3 but the model can be
regarded as a limiting case of the two-country model when the home country becomes a small open
economy with country size approaching to zero.
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on the so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics (hereafter, NOEM) initiated by
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989). Contrary to
the traditional studies using the Mundell-Fleming model, correct welfare can be com-
puted with the NOEM models. Thus, comparison of different policies becomes possible
without resort to ad hoc criteria.
As will be discussed in detail in the next subsection, optimal monetary policy in
open economies has been investigated under many different settings in the NOEM, such
as under cooperation or noncooperation, PCP or LCP, and with or without home bias.
Consequently, our understanding of how monetary policy should be conducted in an
interconnected world is deepened. There is, however, one last missing piece, which
has not yet been analyzed in a theoretical DSGE model. That is, how the optimal
noncooperative monetary policy under LCP should be conducted, or whether there is
any gain from cooperation under LCP. These are the questions to which we aim to give
answers in this paper.
For this purpose, we first solve the equilibrium conditions under monopolistic com-
petition and sticky prices in a two-country model. Also, the Ramsey (deterministic)
steady states under both cooperative and noncooperative regimes are computed. In
both schemes, the deterministic steady state turns out to be identical to that under
the flexible-price equilibrium.2 Thus, the exact welfare comparison between coopera-
tion and noncooperation becomes possible. Then, we approximate welfare around this
deterministic steady state up to the second order. In a noncooperative regime, even
if the steady state is efficient thanks to the optimal subsidy, linear terms cannot be
eliminated. Following Sutherland (2002), Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno
and Benigno (2006), we take a second-order approximation to the structural equations
to substitute out the linear terms by only second-order terms. Correct welfare metrics
up to the second-order approximation are thus obtained.
Our loss functions show that noncooperative policy makers naturally aim to stabi-
lize variables whose fluctuations are to be minimized by cooperative policy makers as
analyzed in Engel (2011), including output, PPI inflation rates, import price inflation
rates, and deviations from the law of one price.3 In addition, they also seek to stabi-
2In addition, this steady state is at efficient levels since the optimal sales subsidy, which is identical
regardless of cooperation and noncooperation, eliminates the steady state distortion stemming from
suboptimally low output under monopolistic competition. Early literature with the linear-quadratic
optimal monetary policy problems such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) or Woodford (2003) assume
such a subsidy to obtain the correct second-order approximated welfare. Benigno and Woodford (2005)
propose a method to compute the correct second-order welfare measure when the steady state is
distorted.
3Note that last terms are not considered under PCP, since the law of one price holds.
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lize fluctuations in the real marginal costs that firms face when setting prices in both
domestic and export markets. These additional objectives are unique to the noncoop-
erative game and therefore the sources for potential gains from cooperation, which are
absent in the previous studies on optimal monetary policy in open economies.4
Then, in order to clarify the nature of optimal monetary policy in open economies,
we compare impulse responses under optimal monetary policies among three cases: (1)
PCP; (2) cooperative regime and LCP; (3) noncooperative regime and LCP. Note that in
our setting with only technology shocks, optimal cooperative as well as noncooperative
policies result in identical allocations and prices under PCP.5
Fluctuations in CPI inflation rates become smaller under LCP than under PCP.
This is because the violation of the law of one price induces inefficient price dispersions
within producer as well as export prices, as emphasized by Engel (2011). As a result,
the ‘inward-looking’ policy that focuses on stabilization of PPI inflation rates is no more
optimal under LCP. In addition, under LCP, noncooperative policy makers stabilize CPI
inflation rates more than cooperative central banks do. This larger stabilization motive
arises from the unique objectives in the loss functions under noncooperation. Inability
to cooperate constrains the dynamics toward more efficient outcomes. Reactions of
domestic output to a domestic technology shock become smaller under noncooperation.
Without any frictions, the global welfare increases when the production of the country
with favorable efficiency shocks increases. This difference in the responses of output
creates room for cooperative policies to improve global welfare.
We also compute the welfare gain from cooperation under LCP by solving the non-
linear Ramsey problem. Welfare gains from cooperation become largest with log utility
even though both countries become insular in structural equations under PCP. Still,
welfare gains computed from nonlinear Ramsey problems are not sizable with only tech-
nology shocks. Within the reasonable range of parameter calibration, the welfare cost
stemming from the inability to cooperate can only be, at most, 0.04 per cent in con-
sumption units, in response to one standard deviation of technology shocks. Corsetti
(2008) remarks that in early leading studies, the quantitative assessment of the welfare
gains from cooperation is found far from sufficient to be in favor of cooperation, and
whether it still holds in richer models is a critical research question. Our paper finds
that given only price rigidities, sizable welfare gains may not arise from cooperation.
4Technically, these additional objectives arise from the linear terms in the second-order approxi-
mated welfare, that are eventually substituted by second-order approximated aggregate supply condi-
tions.
5Note that our model assumes a Cobb-Douglas aggregator for domestic and foreign goods. For
the cases where cooperative and noncooperative policies produce different outcomes, see Benigno and
Benigno (2003).
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3.1.1 Literature Review
Let us first classify the previous studies on optimal monetary policy in open economies
by three dimensions.6 The first dimension regards the assumption on nominal rigidities,
that is, either the one-period ahead price setting or the staggered price setting a` la Calvo
(1983).7 In early studies using the NOEM framework, nominal rigidities are introduced
as the one-period ahead price setting. With money supply as the control variable
of monetary policy, analytical solutions can be obtained. Thus, no approximation
is necessary for optimal policy analysis. With more relevance to the price setting
behavior and monetary policy in practice, the staggered price contract together with
nominal interest rates controlled by the central bank becomes the major assumption
about nominal frictions, in particular after Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2002) in the
open-economy context.8 In contrast to the one-period ahead price setting, optimal
monetary policy is analyzed in a linear-quadratic framework following Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005). Central banks
maximize the correctly approximated social welfare up to the second order subject to
the linearly approximated structural equations. The second dimension is about export
price setting, namely PCP or LCP.9 In the former, export prices fully reflect exchange
rate fluctuations, while not at all in the latter. The third dimension is whether monetary
policy in open economies is conducted in a cooperative or noncooperative manner.
Table 3.1 offers a taxonomy of previous studies on optimal monetary policy in open
economies. Regarded as the beginning of the NOEM framework for monetary policy
analysis in open economies, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) develop a micro-founded two-
country model with PCP and a one-period in advance price setting rule to analyze the
dynamics of exchange rates and other variables in response to money supply shocks.
Their investigation of the (log-linearized) global welfare appraises the first-order welfare
effect of monetary expansion on raising global demand and world output. It also sug-
gests that the conventional Mundell-Fleming paradigm may overstate the importance of
6Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) offer a comprehensive survey of optimal monetary policy in
open economies including other aspects such as financial market imperfections.
7Rotemberg (1982) proposes a different type of price stickiness due to a staggered cost adjustment
process.
8According to the Calvo rule, firms reset prices in a forward-looking rational expectation manner.
This raises the question of how to affect and/or manage the private sector’s rational expectation for
monetary policy practice. Related theoretical discussions include conducting monetary policy under
commitment versus under discretion, delegation problem, credibility of cooperation, targeting rules
versus instrument rules, etc.. Investigation of these issues are beyond the scope of this paper. As an
incomplete list, see, for example, Persson and Tabellini (1995), Benigno (2002), Bilbiie (2002), Jensen
(2002), Woodford (2003) and Svensson (2002, 2003, 2004).
9Corsetti and Pesenti (2005b) briefly analyze a third and less used pricing behavior: dollar-pricing.
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the beggar-thy-neighbor effects that a currency-depreciating country inflicts on trading
partners since the induced terms-of-trade and current-account effects are only of second-
order welfare importance. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) extend the model of Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995) to highlight the international dimension of distortions stemming from
a country’s monopoly power on its terms of trade by assuming different elasticities of
substitution within and across goods categories.10 They keep the assumptions of PCP,
one-period ahead price resetting rule and money supply shocks but focus on national
welfare. A domestic monetary expansion can be either beggar-thy-neighbor or beggar-
thyself depending on the elasticity of substitution, giving rise to national policy makers’
incentives to manipulate the terms of trade in favor of their own welfare. Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2002) assume the one-period ahead rule for nominal wage setting (prices for
goods are flexible) and the existence of the non-tradable sector for their examination of
international cooperation under PCP. Utility of each country is expressed in terms of
covariances of logs of endogenous variables, and monetary rules are assumed as explicit
(log-linear) functions of exogenous productivity shocks in a stochastic environment.11
When nominal stickiness has little interaction with real distortions, welfare gains from
cooperation (in percentage output) are relatively small.12
Devereux and Engel (2003) assume LCP and both strategic games in a two-country
model while keeping the price setting in the period-by-period basis.13 They derive and
compare optimal monetary rules (as log-linear functions of productivity and velocity
shocks) to examine the desirability of flexible exchange rates as advocated in Friedman
(1953). The flexible exchange rate regime is no longer optimal under LCP. Distortions
stemming from the violation of the law of one price should be corrected by restricting the
fluctuations of nominal exchange rates. Thus, optimal policy under LCP fully stabilizes
fluctuations in exchange rates in both games. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a) propose a
unifying approach to model the exchange rate pass-through in which PCP and LCP
are two extreme cases of the parameterization.14 No welfare gains from cooperation
are found under either complete or no exchange rate pass-through. In general cases
with partial exchange rate pass-through they argue that a country can do better than
10For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Tille (2001).
11Productivity shocks, along with cost-push shocks, become the main sources of exogenous distur-
bances that optimal monetary policy responds to in later studies.
12Note that Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) define the cooperation gain as the gain from deviating from
flex-wage equilibrium to cooperative equilibrium. Noncooperative equilibrium lies between the flex-
wage and cooperative policy responses and thus the estimation is an upper bound on the gains from
moving from noncooperation to cooperation.
13Much empirical evidence points to the possibility of LCP, see, for example, Engel (1999), Engel
and Rogers (2001), Parsley and Wei (2001), and Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
14Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a) also offer insights from the staggered price setting.
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‘keeping one’s house in order’ but whether the gains are sizable is left for future studies
with more realistic model settings.
Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2006) all assume
the staggered price adjustment rule a` la Calvo (1983) and obtain quadratic loss func-
tions under cooperation as well as noncooperation for their respective optimal policy
analysis under PCP.15 By contrast, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2002) choose output
as policy variables under noncooperative regime and set the first derivative of national
utility function to zero by assuming an appropriate subsidy to eliminate the linear
terms in the second-order approximation of the utility function. As a result, Ramsey
steady states become different between cooperation and noncooperation. Benigno and
Benigno (2003) set up a ratio of the notional price over the average actual price as
noncooperative policy instruments, and obtain a zero first derivative of the national
utility function from households’ price setting condition as monopolists selling goods to
achieve the elimination of the linear terms. The quadratic loss function under nonco-
operation can be derived since price stability turns out to be optimal monetary policy.
Benigno and Benigno (2006) choose PPI inflation rates for their noncooperative games
and make use of second-order approximations of some of the structural equations to sub-
stitute out those linear terms following Sutherland (2002) and Benigno and Woodford
(2005). Besides the methodological differences, these three studies also take on differ-
ent focuses on the implications of optimal policy analysis. Specifically, Clarida, Gal´ı,
and Gertler (2002) appraise the potential gains from cooperation arising from inter-
nalizing the terms-of-trade externalities, in the context of (inefficient) cost-push shocks
and discretionary optimal policy. Benigno and Benigno (2003) explore the theoretical
conditions under which flexible-price allocations are optimal, and cooperative and non-
cooperative allocations coincide under PCP. Finally, Benigno and Benigno (2006) show
how to design simple rules for noncooperative policy makers to achieve cooperative
allocations in the linear-quadratic framework with technology shocks, markup shocks
and government spending shocks.
Engel (2011) incorporates the staggered price setting rule for optimal monetary anal-
ysis under LCP and the cooperative regime. Home bias in consumption preferences is
also assumed.16 With home bias, central banks face the trade-off between the costs
of currency misalignment and stabilization of asymmetric output fluctuations. The
derived quadratic global loss function highlights international relative price misalign-
15Benigno and Benigno (2003) also assume a one-period ahead price setting rule for policies under
commitment and the Calvo rule for policies under discretion.
16Faia and Monacelli (2008) and Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) also consider different consumption
preferences for a similar purpose.
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ments stemming from the violation of the law of one price under LCP. Thus, optimal
cooperative policy under LCP should trade off these misalignments with inflation and
output goals, and should target CPI inflation rates rather than just PPI inflation rates.
Our paper is an extension from Engel (2011) to the noncooperative game, providing
the final block of the class of the NOEM literature as summarized in Table 1.17
Table 3.1: Taxonomy of optimal monetary policy in open economies
Games
Pricing
PCP LCP
Cooperation
one-period
ahead
OR (1995), OR (2002)
one-period
ahead
DE (2003), CP
(2005a)
staggered
CGG (2002), BB
(2003), BB (2006)
staggered Engel (2011)
Noncooperation
one-period
ahead
CP (2001), OR (2002)
one-period
ahead
DE (2003), CP
(2005a)
staggered
CGG (2002), BB
(2003), BB (2006)
staggered This Paper (2017)
Note: OR denotes Obstfeld and Rogoff, CP denotes Corsetti and Pesenti, CGG denotes Clarida, Gal´ı
and Gertler, BB denotes Benigno and Benigno, and DE denotes Devereux and Engel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 specifies the model and
derives equilibrium conditions. Section 3.3 sets up optimal policy problems in both
nonlinear and linear-quadratic frameworks. Quadratic loss functions under LCP and
noncooperation are derived. Section 3.4 compares impulse responses under both games
and computes welfare cost stemming from noncooperation. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The model is close to the one considered in Engel (2011). There are two countries of
equal size, Home and Foreign, each populated with a continuum of households with
population size normalized to unity. Agents in the two countries consume both home
goods and foreign goods but have a symmetric home bias. Households supply labor
services to firms within their own country via a competitive labor market. Households
are also the owner of domestic firms. Firms maximize profits in a monopolistically
17For the sake of completeness of this literature review, we note that there are other studies that
also incorporate the key features of the models in the class of the NOEM. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998,
2000) and de Paoli (2009) assume PCP in their monetary policy analysis. Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2000), Betts and Devereux (2000) and Engel (2003) consider LCP and one-period ahead price setting.
Sutherland (2006) assumes LCP for monetary policy analysis in a small open economy.
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competitive market using labor as the only input according to aggregate technology.
Governments levy a lump-sum tax on households and subsidize firms so that the deter-
ministic steady-state output level becomes efficient. Central banks are benevolent and
aim to maximize social welfare through either cooperation or noncooperation.
3.2.1 Households
A representative household in the home country maximizes welfare:
WH,t0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u (Ct)− v (ht)] (3.2.1)
subject to the budget constraint:
Et [mt,t+1At+1] +Bt+1 + PtCt ≤ At + (1 + it−1)Bt +Wtht + Πt + Tt,
for t ≥ t0, where the consumption aggregator Ct, the aggregate consumption of locally
produced goods CH,t, and the aggregate consumption of imported goods CF,t is given
by
Ct = C
ν
2
H,tC
1− ν
2
F,t , (3.2.2)
CH,t =
[ˆ 1
0
CH,t (j)
1− 1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, (3.2.3)
CF,t =
[ˆ 1
0
CF,t (j
∗)1−
1
ε dj∗
] ε
ε−1
, (3.2.4)
respectively. u (.) is the period utility function, increasing and concave in consumption.
v (.) is the period disutility function, increasing and convex in labor ht (measured by
working hours). Wt denotes the nominal wage. At+1 denotes the holdings of the state
contingent (Arrow) securities at the end of period t denominated in the domestic cur-
rency, which equates the marginal rates of substitutions of two countries even ex post.
mt,t+1 denotes the price of the Arrow securities in period t which gives an unitary return
in period t + 1. Bt is the amount of one-period risk-free nominal bonds held at the
beginning of period t with net rate of return it−1. Πt represents the dividend from the
ownership of firms. Tt represents the lump-sum tax levied by the government. β is the
discount factor.  denotes the elasticity of substitution among differentiated varieties
within each country. ν ∈ [0, 2] determines the (symmetric) home bias. When ν is larger
(smaller) than unity, consumer preference exhibits home (foreign) bias. There is no
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home bias when ν equals unity. CH,t (j) and CF,t (j
∗) denote the home representative
household’s consumption of the goods produced by the home firm j and the foreign firm
j∗, respectively. Note that Lagrange multipliers on the constraints in equations (3.2.2)
to (3.2.4) represent CPI Pt, PPI PH,t, and the import price index PF,t. A representative
household in the foreign country solves a similar optimization problem on the welfare:
WF,t0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u (C∗t )− v (h∗t )] . (3.2.5)
3.2.2 Firms
Firm j in the home country sets prices in a monopolistically competitive market to
maximize the present discounted value of profits:
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
θt−t0mt0,tΠt (j) ,
where
Πt (j) = (1 + τ)PH,t(j)CH,t(j) + (1 + τ)StP
∗
H,t(j)C
∗
H,t(j)−Wtht (j)
subject to the production function:
Yt (j) = exp (zt)ht (j) , (3.2.6)
and the resource constraint:
Yt (j) = CH,t(j) + C
∗
H,t(j). (3.2.7)
St denotes the nominal exchange rate of the foreign currency in units of the home
currency. τ represents the government subsidy rate. Firm j produces Yt (j) of the
product by hiring ht (j) of labor service from the domestic households according to
aggregate production technology exp (zt), where zt follows an AR(1) exogenous process.
Firms set their optimal prices in a staggered manner a` la Calvo (1983) rule. Each time,
only with probability 1− θ, can they re-optimize their prices. Note that the Lagrange
multiplier on a constraint where the production function in equation (3.2.6) and the
resource constraint in equation (3.2.7) are combined represents nominal marginal costs:
NMCt =
Wt
exp (zt)
.
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There is no firm specificity in marginal costs.
Regarding the export price, there are two types of price setting. Under PCP, firms
fully reflect changes in exchange rates in export prices. Thus, the law of one price holds:
PH,t(j) = StP
∗
H,t(j).
On the other hand, under LCP, firms faces the same Calvo (1983) friction even when
setting export prices. As a result, firm j reoptimizes both PH,t(j) and P
∗
H,t(j) in order
to maximize profits.18
Firm j∗ in the foreign country solves a similar profit maximization problem.
3.2.3 Governments and Central Banks
The government in each country collects a lump sum tax from households and subsidizes
firms to eliminate steady state distortions stemming from monopolistic competition.19
Thus, the subsidy rate is given by
τ =
1
− 1 .
Governments’ budget constraints are
Tt = τ
ˆ 1
0
[
PH,t(j)CH,t(j) + StP
∗
H,t(j)C
∗
H,t(j)
]
dj,
T ∗t = τ
ˆ 1
0
[
PF,t(j
∗)
St
CF,t(j
∗) + P ∗F,t(j
∗)C∗F,t(j
∗)
]
dj∗.
Balanced budgets are always achieved for the two governments.
Benevolent central banks aim to maximize social welfare as Ramsey planners. We
consider two cases: both central banks cooperate to maximize global welfare; each
maximizes social welfare of its own country in a noncooperative game. Details of such
optimal policies will be discussed later.
18We do not consider interim cases as in Monacelli (2005).
19There is no strategic interaction between the government and the central bank.
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3.2.4 Aggregate Conditions
Taking the integral of equation (3.2.6) over j gives the aggregate production function
of the home country:
Yt = exp (zt)ht.
Taking the integral of the resource constraint equation (3.2.7) over j and making use
of the Hicksian demand functions for good j by consumers in both countries gives the
aggregate resource constraint of the home country:
Yt = CH,t∆H,t + C
∗
H,t∆
∗
H,t,
where ∆H,t ≡
´ 1
0
[
PH,t(j)
PH,t
]−
dj and ∆∗H,t ≡
´ 1
0
[
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
]−
dj are the price dispersion
terms. (Derivation of the Hicksian demand functions is in Appendix A.) The foreign
country has an analogous production function and resource constraint.
We assume a complete assets market, and thus trades in the Arrow securities equate
the marginal rates of substitution between two countries even ex post :
u′ (Ct+1)
u′ (Ct)
Pt
Pt+1
=
u′
(
C∗t+1
)
u′ (C∗t )
StP
∗
t
St+1P ∗t+1
.
With the assumption of the symmetric initial conditions of wealth, the standard risk
sharing condition is obtained as follows:
u′ (C∗t ) = etu
′ (Ct) ,
where we define the real exchange rate:
et ≡ StP
∗
t
Pt
.
Note that et is unity only when purchasing power parity (PPP) holds (i.e. identical
consumption preferences and under PCP). Otherwise it is time-varying either because
of the non-identical consumption preferences under PCP, or due to the imperfect pass-
through under LCP.
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3.2.4.1 Gains from Price Stability
Under PCP,
∆∗H,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
[
StP
∗
H,t(j)
StP ∗H,t
]−
dj = ∆H,t.
Resource constraint and production function becomes
CH,t + C
∗
H,t = ∆
−1
H,tYt = ∆
−1
H,texp (zt)ht.
Price dispersion stemming from the staggered price contracts becomes distortionary
and works as if it were a negative technology shock. Thus, welfare can be enhanced by
achieving price stability, namely PH,t(j) = PH,t, P
∗
H,t(j) = P
∗
H,t or ∆H,t = ∆
∗
H,t = 1.
3.2.5 Equilibrium Conditions
The home representative household’s period utility is specified as
u (Ct) ≡ C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ ,
v (ht) ≡ χ h
1+ω
t
1 + ω
.
The system of equations consists of the first-order necessary conditions from solving
households’ as well as firms’ optimization problem together with market clearing con-
ditions. All nominal variables are detrended as follows: pH,t = PH,t/Pt, p
∗
H,t = P
∗
H,t/P
∗
t ,
pF,t = PF,t/Pt, p
∗
F,t = P
∗
F,t/P
∗
t , pit = Pt/Pt−1, pi
∗
t = P
∗
t /P
∗
t−1, piH,t = PH,t/PH,t−1,
pi∗H,t = P
∗
H,t/P
∗
H,t−1, piF,t = PF,t/PF,t−1, pi
∗
F,t = P
∗
F,t/P
∗
F,t−1, MCt = NMCt/Pt, MC
∗
t =
NMC∗t /P
∗
t , wt = Wt/Pt and w
∗
t = W
∗
t /P
∗
t . Thus the system of equilibrium conditions
is summarized as follows:
Table 3.2: Equilibrium conditions
Home Foreign
(i) C−σt = βEt 1+itpit+1C
−σ
t+1, (xix) (C
∗
t )
−σ = βEt
1+i∗t
pi∗t+1
(
C∗t+1
)−σ
,
(ii)
χhωt
C−σt
= wt, (xx)
χ(h∗t )
ω
(C∗t )
−σ = w
∗
t ,
(iii) CH,t =
ν
2p
−1
H,tCt, (xxi) C
∗
H,t =
(
1− ν2
)
p∗−1H,t C
∗
t ,
(iv) CF,t =
(
1− ν2
)
p−1F,tCt, (xxii) C
∗
F,t =
ν
2p
∗−1
F,t C
∗
t ,
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Home Foreign
(v) p
ν
2
H,tp
1− ν
2
F,t =
(
ν
2
) ν
2
(
1− ν2
)1− ν
2 , (xxiii)
(
p∗H,t
)1− ν
2
(
p∗F,t
) ν
2
=
(
ν
2
) ν
2
(
1− ν2
)1− ν
2 ,
(vi) MCt =
wt
exp(zt)
, (xxiv) MC∗t =
w∗t
exp(z∗t )
,
(vii) exp (zt)ht = CH,t∆H,t + C
∗
H,t∆
∗
H,t, (xxv) exp (z
∗
t )h
∗
t = CF,t∆F,t + C
∗
F,t∆
∗
F,t,
(viii) Yt = exp (zt)ht, (xxvi) Y
∗
t = exp (z
∗
t )h
∗
t ,
(ix) ∆H,t = (1− θ)
(
1−θpi−1H,t
1−θ
) 
−1
(xxvii) ∆F,t = (1− θ)
(
1−θpi−1F,t
1−θ
) 
−1
+θpiH,t∆H,t−1, +θpi

F,t∆F,t−1,
(x) ∆∗H,t = (1− θ)
(
1−θpi∗−1H,t
1−θ
) 
−1
(xxviii) ∆∗F,t = (1− θ)
[
1−θ(pi∗F,t)
−1
1−θ
] 
−1
+θ
(
pi∗H,t
)
∆∗H,t−1, +θ
(
pi∗F,t
)
∆∗F,t−1,
(xi) KH,t = FH,t
[
1−θ(piH,t)−1
1−θ
] 1
1−
, (xxix) KF,t = FF,t
[
1−θ(piF,t)−1
1−θ
] 1
1−
,
(xii) KH,t =
CH,tMCt
et
(xxx) KF,t = etCF,tMC
∗
t
+βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
piH,t+1KH,t+1, +βθEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σt et+1
piF,t+1KF,t+1,
(xiii) FH,t =
CH,tpH,t
et
(xxxi) FF,t = CF,tpF,t
+βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
pi−1H,t+1FH,t+1, +βθEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σt et+1
pi−1F,t+1FF,t+1,
(xiv) K∗H,t = F
∗
H,t
[
1−θ(pi∗H,t)
−1
1−θ
] 1
1−
, (xxxii) K∗F,t = F
∗
F,t
[
1−θ(pi∗F,t)
−1
1−θ
] 1
1−
,
(xv) K∗H,t =
C∗H,tMCt
et
(xxxiii) K∗F,t = etC
∗
F,tMC
∗
t
+βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
(
pi∗H,t+1
)
K∗H,t+1, +βθEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σt et+1
(
pi∗F,t+1
)
K∗F,t+1,
(xvi) F ∗H,t = C
∗
H,tp
∗
H,t (xxxiv) F
∗
F,t = etC
∗
F,tp
∗
F,t
+βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
(
pi∗H,t+1
)−1
F ∗H,t+1, +βθEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σt et+1
(
pi∗F,t+1
)−1
F ∗F,t+1,
(xvii) piH,t = pit
pH,t
pH,t−1 , (xxxv) piF,t = pit
pF,t
pF,t−1 ,
(xviii) pi∗H,t = pi
∗
t
p∗H,t
p∗H,t−1
, (xxxvi) pi∗F,t = pi
∗
t
p∗F,t
p∗F,t−1
,
(xxxvii) (C∗t )
−σ = etC−σt .
These equations together with monetary policy rules solve the rational expectations
equilibrium. Equations (xi) to (xiii), (xiv) to (xvi), (xxix) to (xxxi) and (xxxii) to
(xxxiv), which are derived from firms’ profit maximization problems, represent the new
Keynesian Phillips curves for pH , p
∗
H , pF and p
∗
F , respectively. Ks and F s are auxiliary
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variables, the details of which are shown in Appendix A.
Under PCP, equations (xiv) to (xvi) and (xxix) to (xxxi) collapse to
(xxxviii) p∗H,t =
pH,t
et
,
(xxxix) pF,t = etp
∗
F,t,
and equations (x) and (xxvii) are replaced by
(xxxx) ∆∗H,t = ∆H,t,
(xxxxi) ∆F,t = ∆
∗
F,t.
3.2.6 Log-Linearized Equations
We approximate the above structural equations around the deterministic steady state up
to the first order. Note that the deterministic steady state is efficient as monopolistic
distortion in production is effectively eliminated by an appropriate subsidy. Thus,
this deterministic steady state coincides with the Ramsey steady state, which will be
discussed in the following section.20 Details of the derivation of the steady state are also
shown in Appendix A. Below, the circumflex ˆ indicates the log-deviation of a variable
from its respective steady state.
Linear approximation to equations (xi) to (xiii), (xxxii) to (xxxiv), (xxix) to (xxxi)
and (xiv) to (xvi) leads to the New Keynesian Phillips curves:
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(m̂ct − pˆH,t) , (3.2.8)
pi∗F,t = βEtpi∗F,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(
m̂c∗t − pˆ∗F,t
)
, (3.2.9)
piF,t = βEtpiF,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(m̂c∗t − pˆF,t + eˆt) , (3.2.10)
pi∗H,t = βEtpi∗H,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(
m̂ct − pˆ∗H,t − eˆt
)
. (3.2.11)
As in the closed-economy model of Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) or the open-economy model
under PCP of Benigno and Benigno (2006), in equations (3.2.8) and (3.2.9), PPI in-
flation rates depend on the real marginal costs that producers face when setting prices
for the domestic market. Equations (3.2.10) and (3.2.11), appearing specifically in the
open-economy model under LCP, show that import price inflation rates depend on the
20As Woodford (2003), Chapter 6 argues, this type of steady state is the one that is appropriate
for ranking alternative policies. See also Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Khan, King, and Wolman
(2003).
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real marginal costs that producers face when setting prices for the importing country’s
market.21
First-order approximation to equations (ix) to (x) and (xvii) to (xviii) results in
∆ˆH,t = ∆ˆ
∗
H,t = ∆ˆ
∗
F,t = ∆ˆF,t = 0.
Together with linearly approximated equations (ii) to (viii), (xx) to (xxvi), and (xxxvii),
we have
m̂ct − pˆH,t = (σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt + (2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆt + eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆt,
(3.2.12)
m̂c∗t − pˆ∗F,t = (σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆ∗t − eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t ,
(3.2.13)
m̂c∗t − pˆF,t + eˆt = (σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆ∗t − eˆt)−
ν
2
dˆ∗t ,
(3.2.14)
m̂ct − pˆ∗H,t − eˆt = (σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆt + eˆt)− ν
2
dˆt,
(3.2.15)
where qˆt and qˆ
∗
t denote log deviations of the domestic and foreign terms of trade from
their steady states:
Qt ≡ PF,t
StP ∗H,t
=
pF,t
etp∗H,t
, (3.2.16)
Q∗t ≡
StP
∗
H,t
PF,t
=
etp
∗
H,t
pF,t
, (3.2.17)
and dˆt and dˆ
∗
t denote those of the deviations from the law of one price:
Dt ≡
StP
∗
H,t
PH,t
=
etp
∗
H,t
pH,t
, (3.2.18)
D∗t ≡
PF
StP ∗F,t
=
pF,t
etp∗F,t
. (3.2.19)
Equations (3.2.12) to (3.2.15) show that, in open economies, deviations from steady
state of the real marginal costs are not only proportional to deviations from steady
state of output, but also depend on relative prices. The first and the second terms are
those also included in the New Keynesian models in the closed economy. The third
21Note that MCtpH,t =
NMCt
PH,t
is the marginal cost evaluated at output price level while MCt =
NMCt
Pt
is
the marginal cost evaluated at consumer price level. The former is relevant to firms’ pricing decisions.
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and the fourth terms appear only in open economies. Specifically, the third terms
capture the interdependence: economic activities abroad affect the domestic economy
via international relative prices. The qualitative impacts depend on σ. When σ > 1
(σ < 1), positive changes in the international relative prices exert negative (positive)
impacts on the real marginal costs. When σ = 1, the spillovers are zero. Note that the
transmission mechanism of such spillovers differs under PCP and LCP. Under PCP, the
real exchange rate moves in proportion to the terms of trade of the home country. A
deterioration of the terms of trade, associated with a real exchange rate depreciation,
has two opposing effects: it increases the consumption through the global assets market
and therefore increases the marginal costs; it decreases the consumption due to higher
import prices and therefore decreases the marginal costs. According to the terminologies
by Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2002) for PCP, the former is called the risk-sharing effect
while the latter is called the terms-of-trade effect. When σ > 1 (σ < 1), the latter
(former) dominates or, in other words, the home and foreign goods are Edgeworth
substitutes (complements). When σ = 1, the two effects are cancelled out and thus
two countries become insular. Under LCP, on the other hand, consumer prices of
the imported goods are inelastic to movements in exchange rates and thus changes
in the terms of trade do not entail the expenditure-switching effect as under PCP.
Consumption and the real marginal costs are less responsive to the international relative
prices represented by the third terms.22 A depreciation of the real exchange rate leads
to an improvement of the home terms of trade under LCP due to the increases in
the home-currency denominated revenues from export sales. It is deviations from the
law of one price that affect the real marginal costs under LCP, which are the fourth
terms. Equations (3.2.12) and (3.2.15) illustrate that deviations from the law of one
price for the home goods increase (decrease) the real marginal costs that firms face
when selling the home goods domestically (abroad), ceteris paribus. The changes in the
marginal costs in turn lead to PPI inflation at home (import price deflation abroad),
via the New Keynesian Phillips curves in equations (3.2.8) and (3.2.11). As will be
shown later, these terms are also objectives to be minimized by noncooperative policy
makers under LCP. Note that the spillovers on the marginal costs represented by the
fourth terms exist independently of goods’ substitutability or complementarity, that is
whether σ is greater, smaller or equal to 1.
Log-linearization to the aggregate resource constraints in equations (vii) and (xxv),
22See also Corsetti and Pesenti (2005b) for a discussion in a one-period ahead price adjustment model
under LCP and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) for a discussion focusing on effects of international
relative prices on consumption.
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 60
and the risk sharing condition in equation (xxxvii) gives
yˆt − yˆ∗t +
ν
2
pˆH,t +
2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t −
(ν − 1)
σ
eˆt − ν
2
pˆ∗F,t −
2− ν
2
pˆF,t = 0. (3.2.20)
Also, we have log exact deviations for the definitions of inflation rates in equations
(xvii), (xviii), (xxxv) and (xxxvi):
piH,t = pit + pˆH,t − pˆH,t−1, (3.2.21)
pi∗H,t = pi
∗
t + p
∗
H,t − pˆ∗H,t−1, (3.2.22)
piF,t = pit + pˆF,t − pˆF,t−1, (3.2.23)
pi∗F,t = pi
∗
t + pˆ
∗
F,t − pˆ∗F,t−1, (3.2.24)
Note that under PCP, the law of one price holds, thus
dˆt = dˆ
∗
t = 0.
Consequently,
pˆH,t = eˆt + pˆ
∗
H,t,
pˆF,t = eˆt + pˆ
∗
F,t.
3.3 Optimal Monetary Policy in Open Economies
In this section, we first set up the Ramsey problem. Optimal monetary policy un-
der noncooperation is derived in an open-loop Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive the
quadratic loss functions which central banks aim to minimize by the second-order ap-
proximation to social welfare around the Ramsey steady state.
3.3.1 Ramsey Policy Problems
Central banks under cooperation maximize global welfare:
WW,t0 = WH,t0 +WF,t0 ,
subject to the nonlinear equilibrium conditions in equations (i) to (xxxvii).
On the other hand, under noncooperation, the domestic central bank maximizes
equation (3.2.1) subject to equations (i) to (xxxvii) given {pi∗F,t}∞t=t0 , while the for-
eign central bank maximizes equation (3.2.5) subject to equations (i) to (xxxvii) given
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{piH,t}∞t=t0 . The equilibrium conditions of the Ramsey policy under both cooperation
and noncooperation are shown in Appendix B. The choice of the policy variables taken
as given in a noncooperative game is crucial in determining the equilibrium.23 We fol-
low Benigno and Benigno (2006) and choose PPI inflation rates as the policy variables
for the noncooperative game.
The aims of computing the Ramsey policy in this paper are twofold. First, we
need to obtain the Ramsey steady state around which the equilibrium conditions are
approximated. It turns out that irrespective of cooperation or noncooperation, the
Ramsey steady state is that under the flexible price equilibrium, or the equilibrium un-
der the constant aggregate price levels. Second, we compute the welfare cost stemming
from the inability to cooperate. The welfare cost is computed in the next section in a
conventional manner following Lucas (1992) in a consumption unit.
3.3.2 Linear-Quadratic Framework
As Appendix B shows, the characteristics of the optimal noncooperative monetary
policy under LCP is not easy to be understood from the optimality conditions from the
Ramsey policy. In this subsection, we derive the quadratic objective functions which
the central banks aim to minimize under LCP in a noncooperative game.
The domestic welfare can be approximated up to the second order as
WH,t0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ − χ
h1+ωt
1 + ω
)
(3.3.1)
≈ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0C1−σ
(
cˆt − hˆt + 1− σ
2
cˆ2t −
1 + ω
2
hˆ2t
)
+ t.i.p + h.o.t,
where C is steady-state value of Ct, t.i.p and h.o.t denote the terms independent of
policy and higher order term than the second order, respectively. As shown by Kim
and Kim (2003) with a simple example, existence of the linear terms in the loss functions
leads to spurious welfare evaluation. Thus, these must be substituted out by the second-
order terms.
23Wang (2015) examines a set of choices as policy variables including PPI inflation rates, import price
inflation rates, CPI inflation rates, outputs and nominal interest rates in a two-country model with
LCP. When nominal interest rates are chosen to be the policy variables, equilibrium indeterminacy
occurs. This repeats the findings in Blake (2012), de Fiore and Liu (2002) and Coenen et al. (2010)
although they use different models with nominal rigidities from Wang (2015).
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3.3.2.1 Closed Economy
In a closed economy, the log exact form of the resource constraint is given by
zt + hˆt = cˆt + ∆ˆH,t.
Thus, as shown by Woodford (2003), the linear terms cˆt − hˆt are replaced by the price
dispersion terms −∆ˆH,t, which is of the second order and eventually replaced by the
quadratic term of inflation rates (see Appendix C).24
3.3.2.2 Open Economies
In open economies, linear terms cannot be easily substituted out as in the closed econ-
omy.
– PCP and Cooperation For example, under PCP with a logarithmic utility
function, as shown in Fujiwara, Kam, and Sunakawa (2015), the log exact form of the
home resource constraint is given by
zt + hˆt = −pˆH,t + cˆt + ∆ˆH,t
= 2qˆt + cˆt + ∆ˆH,t.
The linear terms cˆt− hˆt are now replaced by not only the price dispersion terms −∆ˆH,t
but also the terms of trade −qˆt which is absent in the closed economy.
Note that under cooperative regime, the sum of the linear terms of the global welfare
cˆt − hˆt + cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t leads to the cancellation of the terms-of-trade term by using the log
exact form of the foreign resource constraint:
z∗t + hˆ
∗
t = −2qˆt + cˆ∗t + ∆ˆ∗F,t.
The terms of trade externality is internalized, by definition, under cooperation.
– PCP and Noncooperation Under noncooperative regime, each central bank
in an open economy is incentivized to strategically manipulate the terms of trade in its
favor. This indeed represents the terms-of-trade externality as analyzed in Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001), Benigno (2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2006). Sutherland (2002),
24Note that zt is independent of policy.
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Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Benigno (2006) substitute out the
linear terms by the quadratic terms by using the second-order approximation to the
structural equations for correct welfare evaluation.
– LCP and Cooperation Like the case under PCP, social welfare under coop-
eration under LCP can be approximated up to the second order without resort to the
second-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions, as shown by Engel (2011).
Log-linear approximation to the resource constraints in equations (vii) and (xxv) results
in
zt + hˆt = ct +
ν
2
(
−pH,t + ∆ˆH,t
)
+
2− ν
2
(
−p∗H,t −
1
σ
eˆt + ∆ˆ
∗
H,t
)
,
z∗t + hˆ
∗
t = c
∗
t +
ν
2
(
−p∗F,t + ∆ˆ∗F,t
)
+
2− ν
2
(
−pF,t + 1
σ
eˆt + ∆ˆF,t
)
,
where the log exact forms of the demands in equations (iii), (xxi), (iv), (xxii) and the
risk sharing condition in equation (xxxvii) are substituted. Together with the log exact
forms of equations (v) and (xxiii), we can derive
cˆt − hˆt + cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t = −
ν
2
∆ˆH,t − 2− ν
2
∆ˆ∗H,t −
ν
2
∆ˆ∗F,t −
2− ν
2
∆ˆF,t.
Thus, central banks under cooperation aim to stabilize fluctuations in four inflation
rates: piH,t pi
∗
H,t, pi
∗
F,t and piF,t. Appendix C shows how to transform price dispersions
into inflation rates.
– LCP and Noncooperation Under the noncooperative regime and LCP, linear
terms for the terms of trade cannot be eliminated. Thus, they need to be substituted
out by the second-order approximation to AS equations under the assumption of com-
mitment, resource constraints and price dispersions. Details are shown in Appendix C.
In particular, equations (4.5.118) and (4.5.119) in Appendix C show how linear terms
can be replaced by quadratic terms.
Upon obtaining the quadratic expressions for the linear terms, the loss function that
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the home central bank aims to minimize is then given by
Lt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
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1 + ω
2
(yˆt − zt)2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1 +
σ + ω (ν − 1)
γ
)(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1− σ + ω (ν − 1)
γ
)(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)2
+
ν
8δ
(
1 +
α
γ
)
(piH,t)
2 +
 (2− ν)
8δ
(
1 +
α
γ
)
(piF,t)
2
+
ν
8δ
(
1− α
γ
)(
pi∗F,t
)2
+
 (2− ν)
8δ
(
1− α
γ
)(
pi∗H,t
)2
+
[
σ − 1
2
− (σ − 1)
2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
4γ
](
yˆt − 2− ν
2
qˆt +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
+
(σ − 1)2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
4γ
(
yˆ∗t −
2− ν
2
qˆ∗t −
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν) (σ − 1 + ω + 2ν )
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν)
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2ν
)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2

,
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and the loss function that the foreign central bank aims to minimize is given by
L∗t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
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1 + ω
2
(yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1− σ + ω (ν − 1)
γ
)(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1 +
σ + ω (ν − 1)
γ
)(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)2
+
ν
8δ
(
1− α
γ
)
(piH,t)
2 +
 (2− ν)
8δ
(
1− α
γ
)
(piF,t)
2
+
ν
8δ
(
1 +
α
γ
)(
pi∗F,t
)2
+
 (2− ν)
8δ
(
1 +
α
γ
)(
pi∗H,t
)2
+
(σ − 1)2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
4γ
(
yˆt − 2− ν
2
qˆt +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
+
[
σ − 1
2
− (σ − 1)
2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
4γ
](
yˆ∗t −
2− ν
2
qˆ∗t −
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
−ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν)
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2ν
)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν) (σ − 1 + ω + 2ν )
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2

,
where α = ω+1+(1− σ) (1− ν), γ = σνω (2− ν)+σ+ω (1− ν)2, and δ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
.
The expressions of the loss functions are simplified and more intuitive when we set
σ = 1. Note that as discussed in Section 3.2.6, the international spillovers exist under
LCP even when σ = 1 so imposing this restriction does not mean the absence of gains
from cooperation.
When σ = 1, the quadratic loss function which the domestic central bank aims to
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minimize is given by
Lt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0

1 + ω
2
(yˆt − zt)2
+
ν
4δ
(piH,t)
2 +
 (2− ν)
4δ
(piF,t)
2
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
8
(
dˆt
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (1− Ω)
8
(
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
dˆt
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
−ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
−(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
dˆt
)2

, (3.3.2)
while that for the foreign central bank is
L∗t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0

1 + ω
2
(yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
+
ν
4δ
(
pi∗F,t
)2
+
 (2− ν)
4δ
(
pi∗H,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
8
(
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)2
+
ν (2− ν) (1− Ω)
8
(
dˆt
)2
+
ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
dˆt
)2
−ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
dˆt
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−(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2

, (3.3.3)
where Ω ≡ 1+ω ν2
1+ω
and 0 < Ω 6 1.
Equations (3.3.2) and (3.3.3) show that the noncooperative loss function of each
policy maker under LCP consists of nine quadratic terms. The first terms, quadratic
deviations from steady state of output (employment), represent the inefficient fluctua-
tions in output and therefore consumption stemming from markup fluctuations in the
realization of productivity shocks, which hinder consumption smoothing; the second
and third terms, squared inflation rates of local as well as imported products, arise
from the staggered price contracts, which create price dispersions; the fourth and fifth
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terms are the direct consequences from the breakdown of the law of one price; the final
four terms, as explained in Section 3.2.6, represent inefficient fluctuations in the real
marginal costs, which leads to fluctuations in both PPI and import price inflation rates.
The signs associated with those terms represent the national central bank’s incentives
to simultaneously stabilize the inflation rates relevant to its own country and destabilize
those relevant to the counterpart country.
Table 3.3 offers comparison of the loss functions under LCP and noncooperation
to those under (1) PCP and cooperation, (2) PCP and noncooperation, and (3) LCP
and cooperation. We start the comparison given LCP (Table 3.3, column 2). The first
five terms in the noncooperative loss functions, in equations (3.3.2) and (3.3.3), are
also those in the cooperative loss functions. The last four terms regarding fluctuations
in the real marginal costs, representing the terms-of-trade externality, are unique to
the noncooperative policy makers. The existence of the additional terms indicates
national policy makers’ additional concern for stabilization of inflation rates in both
goods categories. Under LCP, that means gains from stabilization of CPI inflation
rates.
Then, we compare column 2 to column 1. The number of objectives (trade-offs) that
policy makers aim to minimize is substantially reduced from LCP to PCP, regardless of
the nature of strategic games. The key to understand this difference is the law of one
price, which holds only under PCP, renders (a) price dispersions within export goods
identical to those within locally produced and consumed goods; (b) dˆt = dˆ
∗
t = 0 by
definitions; and (c) stabilization of the real marginal costs is in line with stabilization
of output fluctuations. Therefore, the additional trade-offs regarding fluctuations in
the real marginal costs that separate the noncooperative loss functions away from the
cooperative ones under LCP no longer exist under PCP. Allocations and prices under
both games coincide under PCP.
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Table 3.3: Quadratic loss functions under PCP / LCP and under cooperation / nonco-
operation
PCP LCP
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Note: we present the period loss functions in the Table. The loss function of each policy maker is the present discounted
value of the sum of current and expected future period loss functions.
Quadratic loss functions are minimized by the central banks subject to the con-
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straint relating to cross country output difference, equation (3.2.20), the familiar New
Keynesian Phillips curves with equations (3.2.12)-(3.2.15) substituted into equations
(3.2.8)-(3.2.11):
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 + δ
[
(σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt + (2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆt + eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆt
]
, (3.3.4)
piF,t = βEtpiF,t+1 + δ
[
(σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆ∗t − eˆt)−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
]
, (3.3.5)
pi∗F,t = βEtpi∗F,t+1 + δ
[
(σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆ∗t − eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
]
,(3.3.6)
pi∗H,t = βEtpi∗H,t+1 + δ
[
(σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt + (2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆt + eˆt)− ν
2
dˆt
]
, (3.3.7)
where qˆt = pˆF,t−eˆt−pˆ∗H,t, qˆ∗t = eˆt+pˆ∗H,t−pˆF,t, dˆt = pˆ∗H,t+eˆt−pˆH,t, and dˆ∗t = pˆF,t−eˆt−pˆ∗F,t,
as well as the relations between inflation rates and relative prices from detrending the
system, equations (3.2.21)-(3.2.24), and definitions of aggregate price indexes:
ν
2
pˆH,t +
2− ν
2
pˆF,t = 0, (3.3.8)
2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t +
ν
2
pˆ∗F,t = 0. (3.3.9)
Under noncooperation, the domestic central bank minimizes (3.3.2) subject to equa-
tions (3.2.20), (3.2.21)-(3.2.24), (3.3.4)-(3.3.7), and (3.3.8)-(3.3.9), given foreign PPI
inflation rates {pi∗F,t} for all t ≥ t0. Similarly, the foreign central bank minimizes (3.3.3)
subject to equations (3.2.20), (3.2.21)-(3.2.24), (3.3.4)-(3.3.7), and (3.3.8)-(3.3.9), given
domestic PPI inflation rates {piH,t} for all t ≥ t0. Each central bank conducts optimal
commitment policy from the timeless perspective as in Woodford (2003).
3.4 Results
In this section, we first draw impulse responses of the two countries to a positive tech-
nology shock to the home country. The dynamics are obtained under the optimal
monetary policy in Section 3.3.2. We consider cooperative and noncooperative games
under both PCP and LCP. As discussed in previous section, cooperative and noncoop-
erative allocations and prices coincide under PCP. We then compute welfare gains from
cooperation using the Ramsey policy problem presented in Section 3.3.1.
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3.4.1 Impulse Responses
The baseline parameters are calibrated as in Table 3.4. β, χ and the probability of
not being able to reset prices θ are set at the conventional values. ν is set at 1.5 as
in Engel (2011) which means that households put 3/4 of the weight on consumption
of domestic goods in utility. σ usually takes the range from 1 to 5. We set it to
1, consistent with our derivation of simplified loss functions in previous section. The
elasticity of substitution among different varieties within goods category is set at 7.66,
implying a degree of market power that results in prices being at a level 15% higher
than marginal costs on average. Empirical data show that the range of the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity 1/ω is 0.05-0.3 so we set ω at 4.71 in the range. Note that Engel (2011)
assumes a linear disutility of labor, ω = 0, which later we will show to be a special
case in which welfare gains from cooperation are zero. In addition, the log-technology
follows an AR(1) stochastic process with serial correlation ρ set at 0.856 and standard
deviation at 0.0064.25
Table 3.4: Parameter values (Baseline)
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
θ 0.75
Probability of a firm not being chosen to reset its prices at each
period
 7.66
Elasticity of substitution among different products within goods
category
ν 1.5
Weight that households put on consumption of domestic goods in
utility (ν/2)
σ 1
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption
χ 1 Coefficient associated with disutility of labor
ω 4.71 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity
Figure 3.1 depicts the impulse responses under PCP and under LCP to one standard
deviation of a positive technology shock to the home country (we scale up the impulse
responses by 100 so the dynamics in Figure 3.1 are measured in per cent). In response to
technology improvement shocks, optimal policy is always expansionary in the country
experiencing such shocks and contractionary in the country without shocks. Specific to
results in Figure 3.1, it means a (nominal and) real exchange rate depreciation for the
home country.
25For the value of , see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). For the range of σ, see Benigno and
Benigno (2006), for the range of ω, see Erceg, Gust, and Lopez-Salido (2007), and for technology
calibration, see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
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Under PCP, optimal policy brings in efficient responses of output and fully stabi-
lizes PPI inflation rates, in response to efficient shocks. A one standard deviation of
the home technology shocks leads to an increase of home output by 0.64 per cent. With
the efficient responses of output, optimal policy is able to fully stabilize PPI inflation
rates of the two countries. Imported goods prices then fluctuate with exchange rates
and changes in CPI inflation rates reflect changes in import price inflation rates propor-
tionately (the proportion is equal to the weight of imported goods in the consumption
basket, i.e. 25 per cent). The home terms of trade weakens with the real depreciation.
Foreign output stays unchanged when σ = 1 because there are no spillovers.
Under LCP and cooperation, optimal policy trades off output responses with sta-
bilization of CPI inflation rates. Specifically, a one standard deviation of the home
productivity improvement shock now leads to an increase of home output by less than
0.64 per cent, which translates into a fall in PPI inflation rates of the home country.
The real exchange rate depreciation under LCP leads to an improvement of the home
terms of trade, raising the real purchasing power of the home country at any given
price level. Thus demand for both goods rises and foreign output increases to meet the
higher demand. CPI inflation rates of both countries are stabilized to a much larger
extent by optimal policy under LCP than under PCP.
Under LCP and noncooperation, optimal policy seeks to stabilize CPI inflation
rates more so than it does under cooperation, as demonstrated by the additional terms
in the noncooperative loss functions in Section 3.3.2. As a trade-off, home output
increases less than it does under cooperation and home PPI inflation rates fall further.
Optimal policy is less expansionary in the home country and thus the real exchange
rate depreciates less under noncooperation than under cooperation. The home terms of
trade deteriorates and the foreign terms of trade improves, compared to their respective
cooperative positions. Given any price level, foreign consumers’ demand for the foreign
goods increases and foreign output rises further accordingly.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses under PCP and LCP to a positive technology shock to
the home country by one S.D.
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3.4.2 Welfare Cost
The welfare cost from noncooperation is measured in consumption units by Lucas
(1992). Specifically, the welfare cost measures the proportion of aggregate consumption
that a representative household has to give up so that it is as well-off under the cooper-
ative regime as under the noncooperative regime. Denote ‘c’ and ‘n’ as superscript for
the cooperative game and noncooperative game, respectively. Following Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2007), denote λc as the welfare cost from noncooperation for the home
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representative household and we have
W nH,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u ((1− λc)Cct )− v (hct)] .
When σ = 1,
W nH,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
log [(1− λc)Cct ]− χ
(hct)
1+ω
1 + ω
)
,
thus λc is given by
λc = 1− exp (1− β) (W nH,t0 −W cH,t0) ,
where W cH,t0 and W
n
H,t0
are the present discounted value of the lifetime utility of the
home representative household under cooperation and noncooperation, respectively, as
defined in equation (3.2.1). When σ 6= 1,
W nH,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
[(1− λc)Cct ]1−σ
1− σ − χ
(hct)
1+ω
1 + ω
)
,
thus λc is given by
λc = 1−
(
W nH,t0 +H
c
t0
Cct0
) 1
1−σ
,
where Cct0 = Et0
∑∞
t=t0
βt−t0 (C
c
t )
1−σ
1−σ and H
c
t0
= Et0
∑∞
t=t0
βt−t0χ (h
c
t )
1+ω
1+ω
are the present
discounted value of the home representative household’s lifetime stream of consumption
and working hours under cooperative policy, respectively, and W nH,t0 is the present
discounted value of the lifetime utility of the home representative household under
noncooperative policy.
We apply the perturbation method to the nonlinear model in Section 3.3.1 to com-
pute W cH,t0 and W
n
H,t0
.26 Figure 3.2 depicts the welfare cost from noncooperation of
the home country, the foreign country and the world economy as functions of ν and σ
for 0 ≤ ν ≤ 2 and σ = 1, 3, 5 when ω = 4.71. Figure 3.3 depicts the three-dimension
figures of the welfare cost from noncooperation as functions of ν and σ for 0 ≤ ν ≤ 2
and 1 ≤ σ ≤ 5 when ω = 4.71. The remaining parameters are calibrated as in Table
3.4.
26We develop our code in Dynare and execute it in MATLAB. Code is available upon request.
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 74
In the baseline parameterization as shown by the line of σ = 1 in Figure 3.2, the
estimated mean welfare cost from noncooperation is λc = 0.037% in response to a
positive home technology shock of one standard deviation. It means that the home
households under the cooperative optimal policy have to give up 0.037 per cent of their
consumption to be as well-off as under the noncooperative regime. Figure 3.3 shows
that in general there exist nonzero gains from cooperation under LCP. The welfare
gains from cooperation are largest under σ = 1 even though two countries are insular in
structural equations under PCP. Overall, the size of the gain is relatively small, though
not negligible. These results imply that in order to have a large welfare gain from
cooperation, frictions other than nominal rigidities or other shocks must be considered.
There are two special cases in which gains from cooperation under LCP become zero:
1) consumption preferences exhibit no home bias, ν = 1 and closed economy, ν = 0
or 2; and 2) disutility of labor becomes linear, i.e. ω = 0. The former makes the two
countries identical in every aspect or reduce to closed economies. In particular, when
there is no home bias, as mentioned in Engel (2011), there exists no trade-off between
eliminating distortions from the breakdown of the law of one price and the inefficient
output fluctuations. The latter eliminates the costs stemming from fluctuating labor
and therefore output, which are the sources of the deviations from the law of one price
as a determinant of the real marginal costs.
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Figure 3.2: Welfare costs from noncooperation as functions of ν under σ = 1, 3, 5, in
percentage
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Figure 3.3: Welfare costs from noncooperation as functions of ν and σ in three-
dimension, in percentage
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper finds that there exist gains from cooperation with optimal monetary policy
under LCP in response to technology shocks. A two-country DSGE model is developed
in the paper and a linear-quadratic approach is adopted to obtain the quadratic loss
functions of noncooperative policy makers. The paper shows that noncooperative policy
makers under LCP face extra trade-offs regarding stabilizing the real marginal costs
induced by deviations from the law of one price. Optimal monetary policy seeks to
stabilize CPI inflation rates more so than it does under cooperation. Also, our study
suggests that as long as nominal rigidities are the sole distortions in the economy, gains
from cooperation are not sizable.
This paper follows Engel (2011) in the optimal monetary policy analysis. One of
the strong assumptions of the model is a complete assets market. Corsetti, Dedola,
and Leduc (2010) review the development in the NOEM literature and point out that a
complete assets market is a highly restrictive assumption which prohibits investigations
of inefficiencies other than nominal rigidities. Given the findings in this paper, it would
be interesting to investigate the welfare implication of optimal monetary policy under
LCP and the incomplete assets market.
Chapter 4
Choice of Policy Instrument and
Optimal Monetary Policy in Open
Economies
4.1 Introduction
In the context of open economies, the interaction between policy makers when imple-
menting optimal monetary policy, that is whether they should conduct their monetary
policy in a cooperative or noncooperative way, is one of the key issues in monetary
policy analysis. While the definition of cooperation between two policy makers in the
literature is straightforward, researchers differ on the specification of monetary policy
under noncooperation, which takes form of a choice of policy instrument.1
Policy instrument choice for noncooperative games is a small but important part of
the monetary policy literature, and yet to be examined extensively. The question at
stake is whether the strategic interaction specified by the choice of instrument matters
for the outcome of implementing optimal monetary policy under noncooperation. And
if so, to what extent it matters?
This question was first discussed in an early literature starting with Poole (1970)
and later Sargent and Wallace (1975). The literature is based on the Hicksian IS-LM
models and compares two classical monetary policy instruments that monetary authori-
ties operate through–interest rate changes or money stock changes–in closed economies
and, as international extensions, in small open economies. It does not consider the
1The cooperative policy is defined as one in which policy makes jointly maximize the weighted sum
of the aggregate welfare of both countries, where the weights are equal to each country’s respective
size.
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impact of domestic monetary policy on the rest of the world. It typically argues that
the choice of instrument could have a significant effect on the volatility of macrovari-
ables and that the welfare ranking of instruments depends on the particular values of
parameters. Later studies by Canzoneri and Henderson (1989), Henderson and Zhu
(1990), and Turnovsky and d’Orey (1989), among others, start to examine monetary
policy instrument choice with two-country models. They still work with the two clas-
sical monetary policy instruments but have strategic game considerations, inspired by
the work of Hamada (1976). The conclusion drawn from these works is that the non-
cooperative equilibrium that emerges from the strategic game played by central banks
depends crucially on the instrument chosen by the two players. Since the mid-1990s,
the NOEM framework has become the workhorse for monetary policy analysis.2 Under
this framework, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998, 2002), Devereux and Engel (2003), and
Sutherland (2004) consider the traditional choice of the money supply as policy in-
strument, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2002) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a) specify
monetary policy regime in terms of output and the nominal interest rate, respectively,
while Benigno and Benigno (2006) choose the inflation rate of the producer goods for
their noncooperative strategic space. Yet none of these studies has explicitly addressed
the issue of whether choosing a different policy instrument would change the equilibrium
outcome of their respective noncooperative monetary policy.
This paper contributes to the NOEM literature on policy instrument choice by ex-
amining four options of policy instrument and their impact on equilibrium outcomes
and welfare in a noncooperative optimal monetary policy environment. The impact is
examined in a microfounded, sticky-price, two-country DSGE model under LCP. The
four policy instrument options are the nominal interest rate, the PPI inflation rate, the
CPI inflation rate, and the inflation rate of price for imported goods.3 The noncoop-
erative game in the paper is defined as one in which each policy maker maximizes the
aggregate welfare function of its own country, taking as given the entire path of the
foreign policy makers’ instrument, as in Blake and Westaway (1995), i.e. an open-loop
2The literature was initiated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Svensson and van Wijnbergen
(1989). Chapter 3 provides a detailed taxonomy of this literature. The NOEM literature assumes
explicit microfoundation of private sector, providing a natural criterion for evaluating welfare implica-
tions of alternative noncooperative monetary policies.
3Under PCP, the law of one price holds and the only appropriate option for policy makers is the
PPI inflation rate, because fluctuations of import price inflation rates fully reflect fluctuations of the
nominal exchange rate, and the CPI inflation rate moves in proportion to the PPI inflation rate.
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Nash equilibrium.4 Lombardo and Sutherland (2006) and Coenen et al. (2010) also
explicitly evaluate the impact of different policy instruments on the equilibria and wel-
fare under the NOEM framework, although they only consider the money supply and
the nominal interest rate as policy instruments and adopt the closed-loop equilibrium,
which makes their results not directly comparable to this paper.
Two key findings are obtained. First, the choice of policy instrument does matter
for the equilibrium under noncooperative games. Choosing different policy instruments
leads to different equilibria. In particular, choosing the nominal interest rate as policy
instrument leads to equilibrium indeterminacy. This repeats the findings in Blake
(2012) and de Fiore and Liu (2002), although they use different models.5 Second, the
welfare ranking of the policy instruments, excluding the nominal interest rate, depends
on the degree of openness of the economy, which is measured by the weight assigned
to imported goods in consumers’ utility function. When countries are less open, that
is, the domestically produced goods carry a higher weight in the consumption basket
than the imported goods, choosing the inflation rate of the domestically produced
goods (the PPI inflation rate) as policy instrument generates a larger welfare cost from
noncooperation than choosing the CPI inflation rate or the inflation rate of price for
the imported goods does. Conversely, the reverse is true when countries are more open:
selecting the PPI inflation rate, among the three choices, for the noncooperative game
then induces the smallest deviation of the welfare from its cooperative level.
In the paper, there are special cases in which the choice of policy instrument is
irrelevant to the equilibrium outcome. They are (1) consumers put equal weight on
both types of goods, or (2) the disutility function is linear in labor. Under LCP, these
are also the special cases in which gains from cooperation become zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the model and
derives equilibrium conditions. Section 4.3 specifies the cooperative policy and the
noncooperative policy under each of the four strategic games. Section 4.4 compares
impulse responses under cooperation and each of the four noncooperative games and
4The alternative Nash equilibrium would be a closed-loop equilibrium for which the sequence of
foreign instruments is known to be dependent on some of the other system variables. See, for example,
Coenen et al. (2010) for a discussion on the distinction between the open- and closed-loop Nash game
and a list of relevant studies adopting the closed-loop Nash equilibrium into different models.
5Blake (2012) uses several canonical New Keynesian models to examine the indeterminacy of fixed
nominal interest rate rules in finite horizons, while de Fiore and Liu (2002) examine the conditions
on equilibrium determinacy with a feedback interest rate rule in a small open economy model under
PCP. They find that a passive interest rate always ensures equilibrium determinacy while an active
interest rate can lead to determinacy only if the degree of openness exceeds a certain threshold and a
certain critical level, both of which are determined by fundamental parameters in preferences and in
technologies.
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computes welfare costs from noncooperation given each of the games. Section 4.5
contains some concluding remarks.
4.2 The Model
The model is nearly identical to the one in Chapter 3. There are two countries of equal
size, Home and Foreign, each populated with a continuum of households with population
size normalized to unity. Agents in the two countries consume both home goods and
foreign goods but put different weights on the two categories of goods for utility. This
is a popular assumption in the open-economy macroeconomics literature, and can be
regarded as a short-cut way of modeling the openness of a country. A less open economy
puts less weight on consumption of imported goods.6 Households supply labor services
to firms within their own country via a competitive labor market. Households are also
the owners of domestic firms. Firms maximize profits in a monopolistically competitive
market using labor as the only input according to aggregate technology. Firms choose
domestic prices and export prices separately under LCP. The law of one price does not
hold. Governments levy a lump-sum tax on households and subsidize firms so that
the deterministic steady-state output level becomes efficient. Central banks as policy
makers are benevolent and aim to maximize social welfare through either cooperation
or noncooperation. In the cooperative equilibrium, both central banks conduct optimal
monetary policies that maximize joint welfare which is defined here as the population-
weighted sum of the utility of the representative households in both economies; In the
noncooperative equilibrium, each central bank maximizes the welfare of its own country,
taking as given the entire path of the other central bank’s instrument. The candidates
for policy instruments include the PPI inflation rate, the CPI inflation rate, the inflation
rate of price for imported goods, and the nominal interest rate. Correspondingly, we
define the Nash game given each of the four policy specifications as Game 1, 2, 3 and
4, respectively.
The structure of the home country is briefly described below. The full details
are available in Chapter 3. The foreign country has an identical structure. Where
appropriate, foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
6In other words, consumers exhibit home bias.
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4.2.1 Households
A representative household in the home country maximizes welfare
WH,t0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u (Ct)− v (ht)] (4.2.1)
subject to the budget constraint:
Et [mt,t+1At+1] +Bt+1 + PtCt ≤ At + (1 + it−1)Bt +Wtht + Πt + Tt,
for t ≥ t0, where the consumption aggregator Ct, the aggregate consumption of locally
produced goods CH,t, and the aggregate consumption of imported goods CF,t is given
by
Ct = C
ν
2
H,tC
1− ν
2
F,t , (4.2.2)
CH,t =
[ˆ 1
0
CH,t (j)
1− 1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, (4.2.3)
CF,t =
[ˆ 1
0
CF,t (j
∗)1−
1
ε dj∗
] ε
ε−1
, (4.2.4)
respectively. u (.) is the period utility function, increasing and concave in consumption.
v (.) is the period disutility function, increasing and convex in labor ht (measured by
working hours). Wt denotes the nominal wage. At+1 denotes the holdings of the state
contingent (Arrow) securities at the end of period t denominated in the domestic cur-
rency, which equates the marginal rates of substitutions of two countries even ex post.
mt,t+1 denotes the price of the Arrow securities in period t which gives an unitary return
in period t + 1. Bt is the amount of one-period risk-free nominal bonds held at the
beginning of period t with net rate of return it−1. Πt represents the dividend from the
ownership of firms. Tt represents the lump-sum tax levied by the government. β is the
discount factor.  denotes the elasticity of substitution among differentiated varieties
within each country. ν ∈ [0, 2] determines the (symmetric) home bias. When ν is larger
(smaller) than unity, consumer preference exhibits home (foreign) bias. There is no
home bias when ν equals unity. CH,t (j) and CF,t (j
∗) denote the home representative
household’s consumption of the goods produced by the home firm j and the foreign
firm j∗, respectively. Note that Lagrange multipliers on the constraints in equations
(4.2.2) to (4.2.4) represent CPI Pt, PPI PH,t, and the import price index PF,t.
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4.2.2 Firms
Firm j in the home country sets prices in a monopolistically competitive market to
maximize the present discounted value of profits:
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
θt−t0mt0,tΠt (j) ,
where
Πt (j) = (1 + τ)PH,t(j)CH,t(j) + (1 + τ)StP
∗
H,t(j)C
∗
H,t(j)−Wtht (j)
subject to the production function:
Yt (j) = exp (zt)ht (j) , (4.2.5)
and the resource constraint:
Yt (j) = CH,t(j) + C
∗
H,t(j). (4.2.6)
mt0,t is the stochastic discount factor by which firms value profits for their owner,
St denotes the nominal exchange rate of the foreign currency in units of the home
currency. τ represents the government subsidy rate. Firm j produces Yt (j) of the
product by hiring ht (j) of labor service from the domestic households according to
aggregate production technology exp (zt), where zt follows an AR(1) exogenous process.
Firms set their optimal prices, PH,t(j) and P
∗
H,t(j), in a staggered manner a` la Calvo
(1983) rule. Each time, only with probability 1 − θ, can they re-optimize their prices.
Note that the Lagrange multiplier on a constraint where the production function in
equation (4.2.5) and the resource constraint in equation (4.2.6) are combined represents
nominal marginal costs:
NMCt =
Wt
exp (zt)
.
There is no firm specificity in marginal costs.
4.2.3 Governments and Central Banks
The government in the home country collects a lump sum tax from households and
subsidizes firms to eliminate steady state distortions stemming from monopolistic com-
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petition.7 Thus, the subsidy rate is given by
τ =
1
− 1 .
The government always achieves a balanced budget constraint:
Tt = τ
ˆ 1
0
[
PH,t(j)CH,t(j) + StP
∗
H,t(j)C
∗
H,t(j)
]
dj.
Benevolent central banks aim to maximize social welfare as Ramsey planners. We
consider two cases: both central banks cooperate to maximize global welfare; each
maximizes social welfare of its own country in an open-loop Nash (noncooperative)
game. Details of such optimal policies will be discussed later.
4.2.4 Aggregate Conditions
Taking the integral of equation (4.2.5) over j gives the aggregate production function
of the home country
Yt = exp (zt)ht.
Taking the integral of the resource constraint equation (4.2.6) over j and making use
of the Hicksian demand functions for good j by consumers in both countries gives the
aggregate resource constraint of the home country
Yt = CH,t∆H,t + C
∗
H,t∆
∗
H,t,
where ∆H,t ≡
´ 1
0
[
PH,t(j)
PH,t
]−
dj and ∆∗H,t ≡
´ 1
0
[
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
]−
dj are the price dispersion
terms.8
The global assets market is assumed complete, and thus trades in the Arrow securi-
ties equate the marginal rates of substitution between two countries even ex post. With
the assumption of the symmetric initial conditions of wealth, the standard risk sharing
condition is obtained as follows:
u′ (C∗t ) = etu
′ (Ct) ,
7There is no strategic interaction between the government and the central bank.
8See Chapter 3 for the details of deriving the Hicksian demand functions.
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where the real exchange rate is defined as
et ≡ StP
∗
t
Pt
.
4.2.5 Equilibrium Conditions
The home representative household’s period utility is specified as
u (Ct) ≡ C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ ,
v (ht) ≡ χ h
1+ω
t
1 + ω
.
The system of equations consists of the first-order necessary conditions from solv-
ing households’ as well as firms’ optimization problem together with market clear-
ing conditions. All nominal variables are detrended by the aggregate price indexes,
Pt and P
∗
t , and inflation rates are defined as follows: pit = Pt/Pt−1, pi
∗
t = P
∗
t /P
∗
t−1,
piH,t = PH,t/PH,t−1, pi∗H,t = P
∗
H,t/P
∗
H,t−1, piF,t = PF,t/PF,t−1, and pi
∗
F,t = P
∗
F,t/P
∗
F,t−1. The
detailed system of equilibrium conditions is summarized in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.
These equations together with monetary policy rules solve the rational expectations
equilibrium.
4.3 Optimal Monetary Policies
In this section, we first set up the Ramsey problem under both cooperative and nonco-
operative games.
• Cooperative Policy
Central banks under cooperation maximize global welfare:
WW,t0 = WH,t0 +WF,t0 ,
where
WH,t0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u (Ct)− v (ht)]
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as in equation (4.2.1) and
WF,t0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u (C∗t )− v (h∗t )] , (4.3.1)
subject to the nonlinear equilibrium conditions summarized in Table 2 in Chapter 3.
• Noncooperative Policy
– Game 1
In this noncooperative case, the domestic central bank maximizes equation (4.2.1)
given {pi∗F,t}∞t=t0 while the foreign central bank maximizes equation (4.3.1) given
{piH,t}∞t=t0 , both central banks are subject to the same nonlinear equilibrium con-
ditions summarized in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.
– Game 2
In this noncooperative case, the domestic central bank maximizes equation (4.2.1)
given {pi∗t }∞t=t0 while the foreign central bank maximizes equation (4.3.1) given
{pit}∞t=t0 , both central banks are subject to the same nonlinear equilibrium condi-
tions as above.
– Game 3
In this noncooperative case, the domestic central bank maximizes equation (4.2.1)
given {pi∗H,t}∞t=t0 while the foreign central bank maximizes equation (4.3.1) given
{piF,t}∞t=t0 , both central banks are subject to the same nonlinear equilibrium con-
ditions as above.
– Game 4
In this noncooperative case, the domestic central bank maximizes equation (4.2.1)
given {i∗t} while the foreign central bank maximizes equation (4.3.1) given {it}∞t=t0 ,
both central banks are subject to the same nonlinear equilibrium conditions as
above.
We apply the perturbation method to solve the above Ramsey problems. Determin-
istic steady states around which the system is locally approximated are obtained and
reported in Appendix A in Chapter 3.9 Results are presented and discussed in the next
section.10
9As discussed in Chapter 3, the deterministic steady state turns out to be irrespective of cooperation
or noncooperation. It is that under the flexible price equilibrium thanks to the appropriate fiscal
subsidy rate that eliminates the monopolistic distortion in output at the steady state. This allows me
to make meaningful comparison of the welfare under alternative policies.
10We develop the code in Dynare and execute it in MATLAB. Code is available upon request.
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4.4 Results
In this section, we first depict the impulse responses of the two countries in response
to a technology shock to the home country under both cooperative policy and non-
cooperative policies as defined in Section 4.3. We then compute welfare costs from
noncooperation specified by each of the games above. Note that under Game 4, where
a central bank chooses the optimal allocation taking as given the foreign interest rate,
a locally indeterminate (explosive) equilibrium emerges. The rationale behind the in-
determinacy is that the domestic central bank would choose a best response to the
exogenously given foreign interest rate such that a saddle-path equilibrium is reestab-
lished, and when two such strategies are combined together, they would produce too
many unstable roots, as Coenen et al. (2010) argue. Below we report dynamics and
welfare costs from noncooperation under cooperation and Games 1-3.
4.4.1 Impulse Responses Results
The baseline calibration for parameter values is identical to that in Table 3.4 in Chapter
3. Briefly, β, χ and the probability of not being able to reset prices θ are set at the
conventional values. ν is set at 1.5 which means consumers put 3/4 of the weight on
domestic goods in utility, that is, consumption preference exhibits home bias or equiva-
lently, countries are less open. The inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption, σ, is set to 1 and the elasticity of substitution among different varieties
within goods category, , is set at 7.66. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity ω is set
to 4.71. And finally the log-technology follows an AR(1) stochastic process with serial
correlation ρ set at 0.856 and standard deviation at 0.0064.
Figure 4.1 depicts the impulse responses of the key macrovariables under both co-
operation and noncooperative games specified by Game 1-3 in response to a positive
technology shock of one standard deviation to the home country (we scale up the im-
pulse responses by 100 so the dynamics in Figure 4.1 are measured in per cent). Figure
4.1 shows that optimal monetary policies under different noncooperative games achieve
different equilibria under LCP in response to the same technology shock. Specifically,
choosing the PPI inflation rate as policy instrument for implementing the optimal pol-
icy (Game 1) gives rise to the largest deviation of the real variables from their respective
cooperative allocations, while taking the import price inflation rate in the counterpart
country as given (Game 3) generates the smallest deviation. Game 2 with the CPI
inflation rate as policy instrument sees a deviation of a degree that lies in between the
first two.
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To understand the dynamics behind these noncooperative regimes, it is important to
first recognize that, under LCP, policy makers under noncooperation seek to stabilize
inflation rates that are relevant to their own country and de-stabilize those relevant
to the foreign country more so than it does under cooperation, as demonstrated by
the additional terms in the quadratic loss functions under noncooperation in Section
3.3.2 in Chapter 3.11 With ν > 1, the two countries are less open and the producer
goods weigh more than the imported goods in the consumption basket for utility. The
stabilizing/destabilizing incentive at home then becomes strongest under Game 1 where
the PPI inflation rate of the foreign country is taken as given. As a result, the CPI
inflation rate of the two countries is stabilized to the greatest extent under Game 1,
and to a lesser extent under Game 2. Game 3 sees the smallest deviation of the CPI
inflation rate from its allocation under cooperation.
Bearing this in mind, under LCP with ν > 1, optimal policy also trades off output
responses with stabilization of the CPI inflation rate. As a trade-off, home output
increases the least under Game 1, which translates into the farthest fall in the home
PPI inflation rate and corresponds to the biggest cut back in home working hours.
In response to a technology improvement shock, the home (foreign) monetary policy
thus becomes the least expansionary (contractionary) under Game 1, evidenced by the
movements in nominal interest rates in both countries. The resultant (nominal and)
real exchange rate depreciation and terms-of-trade improvement of the home country
is of the smallest degree again under Game 1.12 This means the real purchasing power
of the home consumers is raised by the smallest amount at any given price level, thus
the home aggregate consumption (demand for both goods) rises the least under Game
1. Foreign output rises the most under Game 1 because the smallest improvement
of the home terms of trade mirrors the smallest deterioration of the foreign terms of
trade, giving foreign consumers stronger purchasing power under Game 1, relative to
that under Game 2 or 3, which raises foreign demand for the foreign goods at any
given price level. Foreign aggregate consumption is compensated and working hours
are extended the most under Game 1 accordingly.
11See equations (3.3.2) and (3.3.3) in Chapter 3 for quadratic loss function of the home and foreign
policy maker, respectively.
12Recall that under LCP a depreciation of the home currency leads to an improvement of the
home terms of trade as households receive more revenues from export sales denominated in the home
currency, leading to a stronger real purchasing power of the home consumers.
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Figure 4.1: Impulse responses of both countries to home technology improvement shocks
by one SD.
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4.4.2 Welfare Cost from Noncooperation
Table 4.1 reports welfare costs from noncooperation under each of the three strategic
games. The welfare cost is measured in consumption units, following Lucas (1992).13
The first two rows report the welfare costs from noncooperation for the home and foreign
households, respectively, in the baseline parameterization as in Section 4.4.1. It shows
that when ν > 1 in the baseline model, welfare cost from the inability to cooperate is
largest under Game 1 where the PPI inflation rate is selected as policy instrument. The
welfare cost in this case amounts to 0.0297% in consumption units for each country,
meaning that households in each country have to give up about 0.03 per cent of their
aggregate consumption to be as well off under cooperation as under noncooperative
Game 1. Welfare cost from noncooperation reduces to λH = λ
∗
F = 0.0219% under
Game 2 and λH = λ
∗
F = 0.0114% under Game 3 for both countries. Note that the
gain from cooperation is relatively small in absolute values with only technology shocks
(Chapter 3 computes the welfare gain from cooperation over the reasonable range of
parameter calibration and in general the size of the gain with only technology shocks
is small).
The rows in ν = 0.5 in Table 1 show that the ranking of the welfare costs is reversed
when the two countries become more open with ν < 1. Welfare cost from noncoopera-
tion is computed to be the smallest under Game 1 while the largest under Game 3. As
a robustness check, the rows in σ = 2 report welfare costs from noncooperation when
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is not unitary. They show
that given the degree of openness in the baseline calibration, the welfare ranking of the
strategic games stays unchanged.
There are two special cases in which choice of policy instrument is irrelevant to the
equilibrium outcome under LCP, as shown in rows of ν = 1 and ω = 0 in Table 4.1.
They are the exact special cases in which welfare costs from noncooperation are zero
found in Chapter 3.
13See Section 4.2 in Chapter 3 for details in derivation of expressions for consumption units.
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Table 4.1: Welfare costs from noncooperation under different games.
Baseline parameter values: ν = 1.5, ω = 4.71, σ = 1.
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
baseline
λH .0297 .0219 .0114
λ∗F .0297 .0219 .0114
ν = 0.5
λH .0114 .0219 .0297
λ∗F .0114 .0219 .0297
σ = 2
λH .0048 .0037 .0007
λ∗F .0053 .0041 .0008
ν = 1
λH 0 0 0
λ∗F 0 0 0
ω = 0
λH 0 0 0
λ∗F 0 0 0
4.5 Conclusions
This paper adds to the discussion on policy instrument choice in the NOEM literature by
explicitly considering four options of policy instruments–the nominal interest rate, the
PPI inflation rate, the CPI inflation rate and the import price inflation rate–for imple-
menting noncooperative optimal monetary policy. It examines the impact of selecting
different policy instruments on the equilibrium and welfare of the noncooperative policy
in a two-country DSGE model under LCP. It shows that, in general, the choice of policy
instrument does matter for the equilibrium outcome and affects the size of welfare cost
from noncooperation. Excluding the choice of taking as given the nominal interest rate
of the foreign country, which leads to equilibrium indeterminacy, the welfare ranking
of the other three policy instruments depends crucially on the degree of openness of a
country. As consistent with the previous chapter, this paper assumes the presence of
only technology shocks. As an extension of the current paper, it would be interesting
to re-examine the equilibrium and welfare implications of the noncooperative regimes
if other exogenous shocks, such as markup shocks, hit the economy.
Appendix
Technical Appendix for Chapter 2
• log-linearized equilibrium conditions
λˆt = − 1
1− βθ(z∗)−σ
{
σ
1− θ/z∗
[
cˆt − θ
z∗
(cˆt−1 − z∗t )
]
− zbt
}
+
βθ(z∗)−σ
1− βθ(z∗)−σ
[
σ
1− θ/z∗
(
Etcˆt+1 + Etz
∗
t+1 −
θ
z∗
cˆt
)
− Etzbt+1
]
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 − σEtz∗t+1 + rˆnt − Etpˆit+1
mˆt = − 1
σ
(
λˆt +
1
r¯n
rˆnt − zmt − zbt
)
wˆt = wˆt−1 − pˆit + γwpˆit−1 − z∗t + β(z∗)1−σ
(
Etwˆt+1 − wˆt +Etpˆit+1 − γwpˆit +Etz∗t+1
)
+
(1− ξw)(1− β(z∗)1−σξw)
ξw{1 + χ(1 + λw)/λw}
(
χhˆt − λˆt − wˆt + zbt
)
+ zwt
lˆt =
1 + λi
1 + λi − n/k (qˆt + kˆt) +
(
1− 1 + λ
i
1 + λi − n/k
)
nˆt
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Etrˆ
E
t+1 =
(
1− 1− δ
rEψ
)
Etrˆ
k
t+1 +
1− δ
rEψ
Etqˆt+1 − qˆt − Etzψt+1
Etrˆ
E
t+1 = rˆ
n
t − Etpˆit+1 − µ(nˆt − qˆt − kˆt) + zµt
nˆt =
ηrE
z∗
{
1 + λi
n/k
[(
1−1− δ
rEψ
)
rˆkt +
1− δ
rEψ
qˆt−qˆt−1−zψt
]
−
(1 + λi
n/k
−1
)
Et−1rˆEt +nˆt−1−z∗t
}
+zηt
0 = wˆt + hˆt −
(
rˆkt + uˆt + kˆt−1 − z∗t − zψt
)
uˆt = τ
(
rˆkt − qˆt
)
m̂ct = (1− α)wˆt + αrˆkt
pˆit = γppˆit−1 + β(z∗)1−σ
(
Etpˆit+1 − γppˆit
)
+
(1− ξp)(1− β(z∗)1−σξp)
ξp
m̂ct + z
p
t
yˆt = (1 + φ)
[
(1− α)hˆt + α(uˆt + kˆt−1 − z∗t − zψt )
]
yˆt =
c
y
cˆt +
i
y
ιˆt + z
g
t
kˆt =
1− δ − rEψ
z∗ψ
uˆt +
1− δ
z∗ψ
(kˆt−1 − z∗t − zψt ) +
(
1− 1− δ
z∗ψ
)
(ιˆt + z
ν
t )
qˆt = ζ(ιˆt − ιˆt−1 + z∗t + zψt )− β(z∗)1−σζ
(
Et+1ιˆt+1 − ιˆt + z∗t+1 + zψt+1
)− zνt + zit
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
rˆnt = (1−W ) (rn − 1)
(
−λˆt − σmˆt + zbt + zmt
)
+W
[
φrrˆ
n
t−1 + (1− φr)
(
φpi
4
∑3
j=0 pˆit−j + φyyˆt
)
+ φ∆y (yˆt − yˆt−1 + z∗t )
]
+ zrt
if W ∈ (0, 1]
rˆnt = (1−W ) (rn − 1)
(
−λˆt − σmˆt + zbt + zmt
)
if W = 0
where hatted variables represent log-deviations from steady state values and z∗t =
zzt + α/(1− α)zψt .
• Steady-state conditions used in estimations:
β =
(z∗)σpi
rn
, rk =
1 + λi
u
(
rEψ − 1 + δ) ,
λp = φ, w = (1− α)
[ 1
1 + λp
( α
rk
)] 1
1−α
,
h
k
=
1− α
α
u
z∗ψ
rk
w
,
k
y
= (1 + φ)
(z∗ψ
u
)α(h
k
)1−α
,
i
k
= 1− 1− δ
z∗ψ
,
i
y
=
i
k
k
y
,
c
y
= 1− g
y
− i
y
.
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Technical Appendix for Chapter 3
Appendix A. Structural equations
A.1 Structural Equations of Private Agents
In this section we show the derivation of the first-order conditions listed in Table 3.2
in the text. First, equations (i)-(ii), (xix)-(xx) are derived from the representative
household’s optimization problem with respect to consumption, labor and nominal bond
holdings in the home and foreign country, respectively. Next, equations (iii)-(iv), (xxi)-
(xxii) are from cost minimization problem of the two representative households. The
home representative household, for example, chooses CH,t and CF,t to minimize
PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t
subject to the aggregate consumption
Ct = C
ν
2
H,tC
1− ν
2
F,t , (4.5.1)
taking as given the price indexes PH,t and PF,t. The first-order conditions give (iii)-
(iv). Similarly the foreign consumers’ cost minimization problem gives (xxi)-(xxii).
Substituting the Hicksian demand functions (iii)-(iv) into equation (4.5.1) gives price
index equation (v). Analogously, substitution of the foreign Hicksian demand functions
into foreign consumption aggregator C∗t gives (xxiii). Equations (vi)-(viii) for the home
country and (xxiv)-(xxvi) for the foreign country are derived in the text.
Next, we derive firms’ price optimizing conditions under LCP. Specifically, home firm
j takes into account the probability that it will not get to reset prices consecutively
for certain periods of time and chooses PH,t0 (j) and P
∗
H,t0
(j) to maximize its present
discounted value of profits
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
θt−t0mt0,t
{
(1 + τ)PH,t0(j)CH,t(j) + (1 + τ)StP
∗
H,t0
(j)C∗H,t(j)−Wtht (j)
}
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subject to the demand functions
CH,t (j) =
(
PH,t0 (j)
PH,t
)−
CH,t
C∗H,t (j) =
(
P ∗H,t0 (j)
P ∗H,t
)−
C∗H,t
and the resource constraint
Yt (j) = exp (zt)ht = CH,t (j) + C
∗
H,t (j) ,
taking as given the aggregate price indexes PH,t, P
∗
H,t and consumption levels CH,t, C
∗
H,t.
Since all the domestic firms face the same optimizing problem, they eventually set the
same price for the same market. Denote the optimal price as P˜H,t0 and P˜
∗
H,t0
. The
first-order conditions with respect to P˜H,t0 = P˜H,t0 (j) are given by
(
P˜H,t0
PH,t0
)
=

(− 1) (1 + τ)
Et0
∑∞
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0C−σt CH,tMCt
(
PH,t0
PH,t
)−
Et0
∑∞
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0C−σt CH,tpH,t
(
PH,t0
PH,t
)1− .
In addition, the price index PH,t0 evolves according to
P 1−H,t0 = θP
1−
H,t0−1 + (1− θ)P˜ 1−H,t0 ,
that is
P˜H,t0
PH,t0
=
[
1− θ (piH,t0)−1
1− θ
] 1
1−
,
where we define piH,t0 =
PH,t0
PH,t0−1
.
Combining the above two equations regarding
P˜H,t0
PH,t0
and define
KH,t0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0C−σt CH,tMCt
(
PH,t0
PH,t
)−
FH,t0 ≡ Et0
∞∑
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0C−σt CH,tpH,t
(
PH,t0
PH,t
)1−
and we obtain equation (xi) in Table 3,2. Write KH,t0 and FH,t0 for any t ≥ t0 in a
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recursive way and we have equations (xii)-(xiii). Note that we have imposed the subsidy
condition 
(−1)(1+τ) = 1 in the text.
The first-order conditions with respect to P˜ ∗H,t0 = P˜
∗
H,t0
(j) are given by
(
P˜ ∗H,t0
P ∗H,t0
)
=

(− 1) (1 + τ)
Et0
∑∞
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0C−σt C
∗
H,tMCt
(
P ∗H,t0
P ∗H,t
)−
Et0
∑∞
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0C−σt C∗H,tetp
∗
H,t
(
P ∗H,t0
P ∗H,t
)1−
and the evolution of P ∗H,t0 is given by
P˜ ∗H,t0
P ∗H,t0
=
[
1− θ (pi∗H,t0)−1
1− θ
] 1
1−
.
Define K∗H,t0 and F
∗
H,t0
in an analogous way and combine the two above equations, and
we obtain equation (xiv). Equations (xv) and (xvi) are the recursive expressions of
K∗H,t0 and F
∗
H,t0
for any t ≥ t0. Repeat the proceeding process for foreign firm j∗’s
optimization problem and we have equations (xxix)-(xxxiv).
Next, equations regarding price dispersion, (ix)-(x) and (xxvii)-(xxviii) are derived
as follows: Take, for example, the definition of price dispersion within home goods sold
in the domestic market,
∆H,t =
ˆ 1
0
[
PH,t(j)
PH,t
]−
dj.
By the law of large number, it can be written as
∆H,t =
ˆ θ
0
[
PH,t−1(j)
PH,t
]−
dj +
ˆ 1
θ
[
P˜H,t
PH,t
]−
dj
= θ
ˆ 1
0
(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)− [
PH,t−1(j)
PH,t−1
]−
dj + (1− θ)
ˆ 1
0
[
P˜H,t
PH,t
]−
dj
= θ
(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)− ˆ 1
0
[
PH,t−1(j)
PH,t−1
]−
dj + (1− θ)
[
P˜H,t
PH,t
]−
= θ
(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)−
∆H,t−1 + (1− θ)
1− θ
(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)1−
1− θ


−1
.
In the last step we make use of the definition for period t − 1 and the price evolution
process of PH,t as shown above. The remaining three price dispersion equations can be
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derived similarly.
Finally, equations (xvii)-(xviii) and (xxxv)-(xxxvi) are from the detrending defini-
tions. Equation (xxxvii) is the risk sharing condition from the assumption of complete
assets market in the text.
A.2 Deterministic Steady State
In this section we derive the deterministic steady-state values of endogenous variables in
Table 3.2. At this steady state, log-technology is at its zero mean, that is z = 0. Prices
are stable, that is ∆H = ∆
∗
H = ∆F = ∆
∗
F = 1; pi = pi
∗ = piH = pi∗H = piF = pi
∗
F = 1;
KH = FH ; K
∗
F = F
∗
F ; K
∗
H = F
∗
H ; KF = FF . Given these relations, the steady-state
system in Table 3.2 can be solved as follows:
pH = pF = p
∗
H = p
∗
F = MC = MC
∗ = w = w∗ = k
e = 1
i = i∗ =
1
β
− 1
C∗ = C
KH = FH = K
∗
F = F
∗
F =
ν
2 (1− βθ)C
K∗H = F
∗
H = KF = FF =
2− ν
2 (1− βθ)C
CH = C
∗
F =
ν
2
k−1C
C∗H = CF =
(
1− ν
2
)
k−1C
Y = h = Y ∗ = h∗ = k−1C,
where steady-state aggregate consumption C is given by
C =
(
k1+ω
χ
)1/(ω+σ)
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and k ≡ (ν
2
) ν
2
(
1− ν
2
)1− ν
2 . Note that the steady-state equations equating the real wage
to marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, and the steady-state
equation regarding the resource constraint are given as
χhωCσ = k
h = k−1C.
They are useful for the second-order approximation to the utility functions that we will
show later.
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Appendix B. Ramsey Policy
In this section, we first set up the Ramsey problem for the cooperative global policy
maker and derive the necessary optimality conditions. We then solve for the determinis-
tic steady state of this system. We repeat the proceeding process for the noncooperative
policy makers.
The structural equations describing decentralized decisions of private agents and
aggregate equilibrium conditions are given as follows (they are listed in Table 3.2 in the
text and k =
(
ν
2
) ν
2
(
1− ν
2
)1− ν
2 in the following equations):
C−σt wt − χhωt = 0 (4.5.2)
βEt
(
1 + it
pit+1
C−σt+1
)
− C−σt = 0 (4.5.3)
ν
2
p−1H,tCt − CH,t = 0 (4.5.4)
(
1− ν
2
)
p−1F,tCt − CF,t = 0 (4.5.5)
1− k−1 (pH,t)ν/2 (pF,t)1−ν/2 = 0 (4.5.6)
(C∗t )
−σ w∗t − χ (h∗t )ω = 0 (4.5.7)
βEt
(
1 + i∗t
pi∗t+1
(
C∗t+1
)−σ)− (C∗t )−σ = 0 (4.5.8)
(1− ν
2
)p∗−1H,t C
∗
t − C∗H,t = 0 (4.5.9)
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ν
2
p∗−1F,t C
∗
t − C∗F,t = 0 (4.5.10)
1− k−1 (p∗H,t)1−ν/2 (p∗F,t)ν/2 = 0 (4.5.11)
C−σt et − (C∗t )−σ = 0 (4.5.12)
wt
exp (zt)
−MCt = 0 (4.5.13)
CH,t∆H,t + C
∗
H,t∆
∗
H,t − exp (zt)ht = 0 (4.5.14)
exp (zt)ht − Yt = 0 (4.5.15)
(1− θ)
[
1− θ (piH,t)−1
1− θ
] 
−1
+ θ (piH,t)
 ∆H,t−1 −∆H,t = 0 (4.5.16)
(1− θ)
[
1− θ (pi∗H,t)−1
1− θ
] 
−1
+ θ
(
pi∗H,t
)
∆∗H,t−1 −∆∗H,t = 0 (4.5.17)
FH,t
[
1− θ (piH,t)−1
1− θ
] 1
1−
−KH,t = 0 (4.5.18)
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−FH,t + CH,tpH,t
et
+ βθEt
C−σt+1
C−σt
et+1
et
pi−1H,t+1FH,t+1 = 0 (4.5.19)
−KH,t + CH,tMCt
et
+ βθEt
C−σt+1
C−σt
et+1
et
piH,t+1KH,t+1 = 0 (4.5.20)
F ∗H,t
[
1− θ (pi∗H,t)−1
1− θ
] 1
1−
−K∗H,t = 0 (4.5.21)
−F ∗H,t + C∗H,tp∗H,t + βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
(
pi∗H,t+1
)−1
F ∗H,t+1 = 0 (4.5.22)
−K∗H,t +
C∗H,tMCt
et
+ βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
(
pi∗H,t+1
)
K∗H,t+1 = 0 (4.5.23)
w∗t
exp (z∗t )
−MC∗t = 0 (4.5.24)
CF,t∆F,t + C
∗
F,t∆
∗
F,t − exp (z∗t )h∗t = 0 (4.5.25)
exp (z∗t )h
∗
t − Y ∗t = 0 (4.5.26)
(1− θ)
[
1− θ (piF,t)−1
1− θ
] 
−1
+ θ (piF,t)
 ∆F,t−1 −∆F,t = 0 (4.5.27)
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(1− θ)
[
1− θ (pi∗F,t)−1
1− θ
] 
−1
+ θ
(
pi∗F,t
)
∆∗F,t−1 −∆∗F,t = 0 (4.5.28)
F ∗F,t
[
1− θ (pi∗F,t)−1
1− θ
] 1
1−
−K∗F,t = 0 (4.5.29)
−F ∗F,t + etC∗F,tp∗F,t + βθEt
(
C∗t+1
)−σ
et
(C∗t )
−σ et+1
(
pi∗F,t+1
)−1
F ∗F,t+1 = 0 (4.5.30)
−K∗F,t + etC∗F,tMC∗t + βθEt
(
C∗t+1
)−σ
et
(C∗t )
−σ et+1
(
pi∗F,t+1
)
K∗F,t+1 = 0 (4.5.31)
FF,t
[
1− θ (piF,t)−1
1− θ
] 1
1−
−KF,t = 0 (4.5.32)
−FF,t + CF,tpF,t + βθEt
(
C∗t+1
)−σ
et
(C∗t )
−σ et+1
pi−1F,t+1FF,t+1 = 0 (4.5.33)
−KF,t + etCF,tMC∗t + βθEt
(
C∗t+1
)−σ
et
(C∗t )
−σ et+1
piF,t+1KF,t+1 = 0 (4.5.34)
pit
pH,t
pH,t−1
− piH,t = 0 (4.5.35)
pi∗t
p∗H,t
p∗H,t−1
− pi∗H,t = 0 (4.5.36)
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pi∗t
p∗F,t
p∗F,t−1
− pi∗F,t = 0 (4.5.37)
pit
pF,t
pF,t−1
− piF,t = 0 (4.5.38)
B.1 Cooperation
A global policy maker maximizes welfare of both countries
WW,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ +
C∗1−σt − 1
1− σ − χ
h1+ωt
1 + ω
− χh
∗1+ω
t
1 + ω
)
with respect to 39 endogenous variables {it, i∗t , Ct, C∗t , CH,t, CF,t, C∗H,t, C∗F,t, ht, h∗t , pit,
pi∗t , piH,t, pi
∗
H,t, piF,t, pi
∗
F,t, pH,t, pF,t, p
∗
H,t, p
∗
F,t, wt, w
∗
t , et, MCt, MC
∗
t , Yt, Y
∗
t , ∆H,t, ∆
∗
H,t,
∆F,t, ∆
∗
F,t, KH,t, FH,t, K
∗
H,t, F
∗
H,t, KF,t, FF,t, K
∗
F,t, F
∗
F,t} for all t ≥ t0, subject to the
above 37 structural constraints equations (4.5.2) ∼ (4.5.38) associated with Lagrangian
multipliers λ1,t ∼ λ37,t in sequence.
The 39 first-order conditions for all t ≥ t0 are as follows (we use an itemized list to
keep track of the endogenous variable with respect to which the particular first-order
condition is derived).
• it :
λ2,tβEt
C−σt+1
pit+1
= 0
that is
λ2,t = 0 (4.5.39)
• i∗t :
λ7,tβEt
C∗−σt+1
pi∗t+1
= 0
that is
λ7,t = 0 (4.5.40)
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• Ct :
C−σt + λ1,t(−σ)C−σ−1t wt + λ3,t
ν
2
p−1H,t + λ4,t(1−
ν
2
)p−1F,t + λ11,t(−σ)C−σ−1t et
+λ18,tβθσEt
C−σt+1
C−σ+1t
et+1
et
pi−1H,t+1FH,t+1 + λ18,t−1θ(−σ)
C−σ−1t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi−1H,t FH,t
+λ19,tβθσEt
C−σt+1
C−σ+1t
et+1
et
piH,t+1KH,t+1 + λ19,t−1θ(−σ)
C−σ−1t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
piH,tKH,t
+λ21,tβθσEt
C−σt+1
C−σ+1t
et+1
et
pi∗−1H,t+1F
∗
H,t+1 + λ21,t−1θ(−σ)
C−σ−1t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi∗−1H,t F
∗
H,t
+λ22,tβθσEt
C−σt+1
C−σ+1t
et+1
et
pi∗H,t+1K
∗
H,t+1 + λ22,t−1θ(−σ)
C−σ−1t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi∗H,tK
∗
H,t = 0
(4.5.41)
• C∗t :
C∗−σt + λ6,t(−σ)C∗−σ−1t w∗t + λ8,t(1−
ν
2
)p∗−1H,t + λ9,t
ν
2
p∗−1F,t − λ11,t(−σ)C∗−σ−1t
+λ29,tβθσEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σ+1t et+1
(
pi∗F,t+1
)−1
F ∗F,t+1 − λ29,t−1θσ
C∗−σ−1t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
(
pi∗F,t
)−1
F ∗F,t
+λ30,tβθσEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σ+1t et+1
(
pi∗F,t+1
)
K∗F,t+1 − λ30,t−1θσ
C∗−σ−1t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
(
pi∗F,t
)
K∗F,t
+λ32,tβθσEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σ+1t et+1
(piF,t+1)
−1 FF,t+1 − λ32,t−1θσC
∗−σ−1
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
(piF,t)
−1 FF,t
+λ33,tβθσEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σ+1t et+1
(piF,t+1)
KF,t+1 − λ33,t−1θσC
∗−σ−1
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
(piF,t)
KF,t = 0
(4.5.42)
• CH,t :
−λ3,t + λ13,t∆H,t + λ18,tpH,te−1t + λ19,tMCte−1t = 0 (4.5.43)
• C∗H,t :
−λ8,t + λ13,t∆∗H,t + λ21,tp∗H,t + λ22,tMCte−1t = 0 (4.5.44)
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• CF,t :
−λ4,t + λ24,t∆F,t + λ32,tpF,t + λ33,tMC∗t et = 0 (4.5.45)
• C∗F,t :
−λ9,t + λ24,t∆∗F,t + λ29,tp∗F,tet + λ30,tMC∗t et = 0 (4.5.46)
• ht :
−χhωt − λ1,tωχhω−1t − λ13,texp (zt) + λ14,texp (zt) = 0 (4.5.47)
• h∗t :
−χh∗ωt − λ6,tωχh∗ω−1t − λ24,texp (z∗t ) + λ25,texp (z∗t ) = 0 (4.5.48)
• pit :
+λ34,t
pH,t
pH,t−1
+ λ37,t
pF,t
pF,t−1
= 0 (4.5.49)
• pi∗t :
+λ35,t
p∗H,t
p∗H,t−1
+ λ36,t
p∗F,t
p∗F,t−1
= 0 (4.5.50)
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• piH,t :
−λ15,t
[
1− θ (piH,t)−1
1− θ
] 1
−1
θpiH,t
−2
+λ15,tθpiH,t
−1∆H,t−1
+λ17,tFH,t
[
1− θ (piH,t)−1
1− θ
] 
1−
(
θ
1− θ )(piH,t)
−2
+λ18,t−1θ (− 1) C
−σ
t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi−2H,t FH,t
+λ19,t−1θ ()
C−σt
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi−1H,tKH,t
−λ34,t = 0 (4.5.51)
• pi∗H,t :
−λ16,t
[
1− θ (pi∗H,t)−1
1− θ
] 1
−1
θ(pi∗H,t)
−2
+λ16,tθ(pi
∗
H,t)
−1∆∗H,t−1
+λ20,tF
∗
H,t
[
1− θ (pi∗H,t)−1
1− θ
] 
1−
(
θ
1− θ )(pi
∗
H,t)
−2
+λ21,t−1θ (− 1) C
−σ
t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi∗−2H,t F
∗
H,t
+λ22,t−1θ ()
C−σt
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi∗−1H,t K
∗
H,t
−λ35,t = 0 (4.5.52)
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• piF,t :
−λ26,t
[
1− θ (piF,t)−1
1− θ
] 1
−1
θ(piF,t)
−2
+λ26,tθ(piF,t)
−1∆F,t−1
+λ31,tFF,t
[
1− θ (piF,t)−1
1− θ
] 
1−
(
θ
1− θ )(piF,t)
−2
+λ32,t−1θ (− 1) C
∗−σ
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
pi−2F,t FF,t
+λ33,t−1θ ()
C∗−σt
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
pi−1F,t KF,t
−λ37,t = 0 (4.5.53)
• pi∗F,t :
−λ27,t
[
1− θ (pi∗F,t)−1
1− θ
] 1
−1
θ(pi∗F,t)
−2
+λ27,tθ(pi
∗
F,t)
−1∆∗F,t−1
+λ28,tF
∗
F,t
[
1− θ (pi∗F,t)−1
1− θ
] 
1−
(
θ
1− θ )(pi
∗
F,t)
−2
+λ29,t−1θ (− 1) C
∗−σ
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
pi∗−2F,t F
∗
F,t
+λ30,t−1θ ()
C∗−σt
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
pi∗−1F,t K
∗
F,t
−λ36,t = 0 (4.5.54)
• pH,t :
−λ3,tν
2
Ct
p2H,t
− λ5,tν
2
k−1 (pH,t)
−1+ν/2 (pF,t)
1−ν/2
+λ18,t
CH,t
et
+ λ34,tpit
1
pH,t−1
− λ34,t+1βEt(pit+1)pH,t+1
p2H,t
= 0 (4.5.55)
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• p∗H,t :
−λ8,t
(
1− ν
2
) C∗t
p∗2H,t
− λ10,t
(
1− ν
2
)
k−1
(
p∗H,t
)−ν/2 (
p∗F,t
)ν/2
+λ21,tC
∗
H,t + λ35,tpi
∗
t
1
p∗H,t−1
− λ35,t+1βEt(pi∗t+1)
p∗H,t+1
p∗2H,t
= 0 (4.5.56)
• pF,t :
−λ4,t
(
1− ν
2
) Ct
p2F,t
− λ5,t
(
1− ν
2
)
k−1 (pH,t)
ν/2 (pF,t)
−ν/2
+λ32,tCF,t + λ37,tpit
1
pF,t−1
− λ37,t+1βEt(pit+1)pF,t+1
p2F,t
= 0 (4.5.57)
• p∗F,t :
−λ9,tν
2
C∗t
p∗2F,t
− λ10,tν
2
k−1
(
p∗H,t
)1−ν/2 (
p∗F,t
)−1+ν/2
+λ29,tetC
∗
F,t + λ36,tpi
∗
t
1
p∗F,t−1
− λ36,t+1βEt
(
pi∗t+1
) p∗F,t+1
p∗2F,t
= 0 (4.5.58)
• wt :
λ1,tC
−σ
t + λ12,t
1
exp (zt)
= 0 (4.5.59)
• w∗t :
λ6,tC
∗−σ
t + λ23,t
1
exp (z∗t )
= 0 (4.5.60)
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• et :
λ11,tC
−σ
t − λ18,t
CH,tpH,t
e2t
− λ19,tCH,tMCt
e2t
− λ22,t
C∗H,tMCt
e2t
+λ29,tC
∗
F,tp
∗
F,t + λ30,tC
∗
F,tMC
∗
t + λ33,tCF,tMC
∗
t
−λ18,tβθEtC
−σ
t+1
C−σt
et+1
e2t
pi−1H,t+1FH,t+1 + λ18,t−1θ
C−σt
C−σt−1
1
et−1
pi−1H,t FH,t
−λ19,tβθEtC
−σ
t+1
C−σt
et+1
e2t
piH,t+1KH,t+1 + λ19,t−1θ
C−σt
C−σt−1
1
et−1
piH,tKH,t
−λ21,tβθEtC
−σ
t+1
C−σt
et+1
e2t
pi∗−1H,t+1F
∗
H,t+1 + λ21,t−1θ
C−σt
C−σt−1
1
et−1
pi∗−1H,t F
∗
H,t
−λ22,tβθEtC
−σ
t+1
C−σt
et+1
e2t
pi∗H,t+1K
∗
H,t+1 + λ22,t−1θ
C−σt
C−σt−1
1
et−1
pi∗H,tK
∗
H,t
+λ29,tβθEt
C∗−σt+1
C∗−σt
1
et+1
pi∗−1F,t+1F
∗
F,t+1 − λ29,t−1θ
C∗−σt
C∗−σt−1
et−1
e2t
pi∗−1F,t F
∗
F,t
+λ30,tβθEt
C∗−σt+1
C∗−σt
1
et+1
pi∗F,t+1K
∗
F,t+1 − λ30,t−1θ
C∗−σt
C∗−σt−1
et−1
e2t
pi∗F,tK
∗
F,t
+λ32,tβθEt
C∗−σt+1
C∗−σt
1
et+1
pi−1F,t+1FF,t+1 − λ32,t−1θ
C∗−σt
C∗−σt−1
et−1
e2t
pi−1F,t FF,t
+λ33,tβθEt
C∗−σt+1
C∗−σt
1
et+1
piF,t+1KF,t+1 − λ33,t−1θ
C∗−σt
C∗−σt−1
et−1
e2t
piF,tKF,t = 0
(4.5.61)
• MCt :
−λ12,t + λ19,tCH,t
et
+ λ22,t
C∗H,t
et
= 0 (4.5.62)
• MC∗t :
−λ23,t + λ30,tetC∗F,t + λ33,tetCF,t = 0 (4.5.63)
• Yt :
λ14,t = 0 (4.5.64)
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• Y ∗t :
λ25,t = 0 (4.5.65)
• ∆H,t :
λ13,tCH,t − λ15,t + λ15,t+1βθEt(piH,t+1) = 0 (4.5.66)
• ∆∗H,t :
λ13,tC
∗
H,t − λ16,t + λ16,t+1βθEt(pi∗H,t+1) = 0 (4.5.67)
• ∆F,t :
λ24,tCF,t − λ26,t + λ26,t+1βθEt(piF,t+1) = 0 (4.5.68)
• ∆∗F,t :
λ24,tC
∗
F,t − λ27,t + λ27,t+1βθEt(pi∗F,t+1) = 0 (4.5.69)
• FH,t :
λ17,t
1− θ
(
1
piH,t
)1−
1− θ

1
1−
− λ18,t + λ18,t−1θ C
−σ
t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi−1H,t = 0 (4.5.70)
• KH,t :
−λ17,t − λ19,t + λ19,t−1θ C
−σ
t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
piH,t = 0 (4.5.71)
• F ∗H,t :
λ20,t
1− θ
(
1
pi∗H,t
)1−
1− θ

1
1−
− λ21,t + λ21,t−1θ C
−σ
t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi∗−1H,t = 0 (4.5.72)
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• K∗H,t :
−λ20,t − λ22,t + λ22,t−1θ C
−σ
t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi∗H,t = 0 (4.5.73)
• FF,t :
λ31,t
1− θ
(
1
piF,t
)1−
1− θ

1
1−
− λ32,t + λ32,t−1θC
∗−σ
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
pi−1F,t = 0 (4.5.74)
• KF,t :
−λ31,t − λ33,t + λ33,t−1θC
∗−σ
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
piF,t = 0 (4.5.75)
• F ∗F,t :
λ28,t
1− θ
(
1
pi∗F,t
)1−
1− θ

1
1−
− λ29,t + λ29,t−1θC
∗−σ
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
pi∗−1F,t = 0 (4.5.76)
• K∗F,t :
−λ28,t − λ30,t + λ30,t−1θC
∗−σ
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
pi∗F,t = 0 (4.5.77)
The cooperative Ramsey problem thus consists of the above 76 equations for 76 un-
knowns.
The deterministic steady state is derived in two steps: First, steady-state values
of the 39 endogenous variables are derived in Appendix A.2. Given these steady-state
endogenous variables, the above optimality conditions (dropping time subscripts) can
solve for the steady-state values of the 37 Lagrange multipliers.
B.2 Noncooperation
The home policy maker maximizes
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WH,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ − χ
h1+ωt
1 + ω
)
with respect to 38 endogenous variables {it, i∗t , Ct, C∗t , CH,t, CF,t, C∗H,t, C∗F,t, ht, h∗t ,
pit, pi
∗
t , piH,t, pi
∗
H,t, piF,t, pH,t, pF,t, p
∗
H,t, p
∗
F,t, wt, w
∗
t , et, MCt, MC
∗
t , Yt, Y
∗
t , ∆H,t, ∆
∗
H,t,
∆F,t, ∆
∗
F,t, KH,t, FH,t, K
∗
H,t, F
∗
H,t, KF,t, FF,t, K
∗
F,t, F
∗
F,t}, taking as given {pi∗F,t} for all
t ≥ t0, subject to 37 structural constraints equations (4.5.2) ∼ (4.5.38) associated with
Lagrangian multipliers λ1,t ∼ λ37,t in sequence.
The 38 first-order conditions are as follows:
• it: equation (4.5.39)
• i∗t : equation (4.5.40)
• Ct: equation (4.5.41)
• C∗t :
λ6,t(−σ)C∗−σ−1t w∗t + λ8,t(1−
ν
2
)p∗−1H,t + λ9,t
ν
2
p∗−1F,t − λ11,t(−σ)C∗−σ−1t
+λ29,tβθσEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σ+1t et+1
(
pi∗F,t+1
)−1
F ∗F,t+1 − λ29,t−1θσ
C∗−σ−1t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
(
pi∗F,t
)−1
F ∗F,t
+λ30,tβθσEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σ+1t et+1
(
pi∗F,t+1
)
K∗F,t+1 − λ30,t−1θσ
C∗−σ−1t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
(
pi∗F,t
)
K∗F,t
+λ32,tβθσEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σ+1t et+1
(piF,t+1)
−1 FF,t+1 − λ32,t−1θσC
∗−σ−1
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
(piF,t)
−1 FF,t
+λ33,tβθσEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σ+1t et+1
(piF,t+1)
KF,t+1 − λ33,t−1θσC
∗−σ−1
t
C∗−σt−1
et−1
et
(piF,t)
KF,t
= 0
(4.5.78)
• CH,t: equation (4.5.43)
• CF,t: equation (4.5.45)
• C∗H,t: equation (4.5.44)
• C∗F,t: equation (4.5.46)
• ht: equation (4.5.47)
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• h∗t :
−λ6,tωχh∗ω−1t − λ24,texp (z∗t ) + λ25,texp (z∗t ) = 0 (4.5.79)
• pit: equation (4.5.49)
• pi∗t : equation (4.5.50)
• piH,t: equation (4.5.51)
• pi∗H,t: equation (4.5.52)
• piF,t: equation (4.5.53)
• pH,t: equation (4.5.55)
• p∗H,t: equation (4.5.56)
• pF,t: equation (4.5.57)
• p∗F,t: equation (4.5.58)
• wt: equation (4.5.59)
• w∗t : equation (4.5.60)
• et: equation (4.5.61)
• MCt: equation (4.5.62)
• MC∗t : equation (4.5.63)
• Yt: equation (4.5.64)
• Y ∗t : equation (4.5.65)
• ∆H,t: equation (4.5.66)
• ∆∗H,t: equation (4.5.67)
• ∆F,t: equation (4.5.68)
• ∆∗F,t: equation (4.5.69)
• FH,t: equation (4.5.70)
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• KH,t: equation (4.5.71)
• F ∗H,t: equation (4.5.72)
• K∗H,t: equation (4.5.73)
• FF,t: equation (4.5.74)
• KF,t: equation (4.5.75)
• F ∗F,t: equation (4.5.76)
• K∗F,t: equation (4.5.77).
The foreign policy maker maximizes
WF,t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
C∗1−σt − 1
1− σ − χ
h∗1+ωt
1 + ω
)
with respect to 38 endogenous variables {it, i∗t , Ct, C∗t , CH,t, CF,t, C∗H,t, C∗F,t, ht, h∗t ,
pit, pi
∗
t , pi
∗
H,t, piF,t, pi
∗
F,t, pH,t, pF,t, p
∗
H,t, p
∗
F,t, wt, w
∗
t , et, MCt, MC
∗
t , Yt, Y
∗
t , ∆H,t, ∆
∗
H,t,
∆F,t, ∆
∗
F,t, KH,t, FH,t, K
∗
H,t, F
∗
H,t, KF,t, FF,t, K
∗
F,t, F
∗
F,t}, taking as given {piH,t} for all
t ≥ t0, subject to 37 structural constraint equations (4.5.2) ∼ (4.5.38) associated with
Lagrangian multipliers λ∗1,t ∼ λ∗37,t in sequence.
Note that we use lambda with asterisk as Lagrangian multipliers for the foreign
maximization problem. While most of the first-order conditions in this optimization
problem are the same with those in the cooperative optimization above, and we indeed
make references to them to save space, one needs to keep in mind that all λi,t in the
following first-order conditions should be replaced to λ∗i,t for i = {1, ...37}.
The 38 first-order conditions are
• it: equation (4.5.39)
• i∗t : equation (4.5.40)
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• Ct:
λ∗1,t(−σ)C−σ−1t wt + λ∗3,t
ν
2
p−1H,t + λ
∗
4,t(1−
ν
2
)p−1F,t + λ
∗
11,t(−σ)C−σ−1t et
+λ∗18,tβθσEt
C−σt+1
C−σ+1t
et+1
et
pi−1H,t+1FH,t+1 + λ
∗
18,t−1θ(−σ)
C−σ−1t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi−1H,t FH,t
+λ∗19,tβθσEt
C−σt+1
C−σ+1t
et+1
et
piH,t+1KH,t+1 + λ
∗
19,t−1θ(−σ)
C−σ−1t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
piH,tKH,t
+λ∗21,tβθσEt
C−σt+1
C−σ+1t
et+1
et
pi∗−1H,t+1F
∗
H,t+1 + λ
∗
21,t−1θ(−σ)
C−σ−1t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi∗−1H,t F
∗
H,t
+λ∗22,tβθσEt
C−σt+1
C−σ+1t
et+1
et
pi∗H,t+1K
∗
H,t+1 + λ
∗
22,t−1θ(−σ)
C−σ−1t
C−σt−1
et
et−1
pi∗H,tK
∗
H,t
= 0
(4.5.80)
• C∗t : equation (4.5.42)
• CH,t: equation (4.5.43)
• CF,t: equation (4.5.45)
• C∗H,t: equation (4.5.44)
• C∗F,t: equation (4.5.46)
• ht:
−λ∗1,tωχhω−1t − λ∗13,texp (zt) + λ∗14,texp (zt) = 0 (4.5.81)
• h∗t : equation (4.5.48)
• pit: equation (4.5.49)
• pi∗t : equation (4.5.50)
• pi∗H,t: equation (4.5.52)
• piF,t: equation (4.5.53)
• pi∗F,t: equation (4.5.54)
• pH,t: equation (4.5.55)
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• p∗H,t: equation (4.5.56)
• pF,t: equation (4.5.57)
• p∗F,t: equation (4.5.58)
• wt: equation (4.5.59)
• w∗t : equation (4.5.60)
• et: equation (4.5.61)
• MCt: equation (4.5.62)
• MC∗t : equation (4.5.63)
• Yt: equation (4.5.64)
• Y ∗t : equation (4.5.65)
• ∆H,t: equation (4.5.66)
• ∆∗H,t: equation (4.5.67)
• ∆F,t: equation (4.5.68)
• ∆∗F,t: equation (4.5.69)
• FH,t: equation (4.5.70)
• KH,t: equation (4.5.71)
• F ∗H,t: equation (4.5.72)
• K∗H,t: equation (4.5.73)
• FF,t: equation (4.5.74)
• KF,t: equation (4.5.75)
• F ∗F,t: equation (4.5.76)
• K∗F,t: equation (4.5.77)
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The noncooperative Ramsey problem thus consists of 113 equations for 113 unknowns.
The deterministic steady state is derived in two steps: First, steady-state values
of the 39 endogenous variables are derived in Appendix A.2. Given these values, the
above optimality conditions (dropping time subscripts) can solve for the steady-state
values of 74 Lagrange multipliers.
We note that thanks to the efficient subsidy, the steady-state values of endogenous
variables are always given by Appendix A.2 regardless of strategic games, which allows
for meaningful welfare comparison.
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Appendix C. Second-order Approximation
Section (C.1) to (C.4) show how to substitute linear terms cˆt − hˆt and cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t with
second-order terms by using the second-order approximation to some of the structural
equations. Specifically, C.1 shows the second-order approximation to the price disper-
sion terms which comes in useful later. C.2 shows the second-order approximation to
the price setting conditions to obtain AS equations. C.3 shows the second-order ap-
proximation to the resource constraints. C.4 solves for the linear terms using results
obtained in C.1-3.
Section C.5 presents the general form and simplified form of the quadratic loss
functions for noncooperative policy makers under LCP, making use of the results in
C.4.
C.1
Price dispersion terms are shown in equations (ix)-(x) and (xxvii)-(xxviii) in the text.
Take a second-order approximation to equation (ix) around its deterministic steady
state ∆H = 1 and we have
∆ˆH,t =
θ
2 (1− θ)pi
2
H,t + θ∆ˆH,t−1.
Taking a summation on both sides from initial time t0 to infinity gives
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0∆ˆH,t = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
θ
2 (1− θ)pi
2
H,t + θ∆ˆH,t0−1 + θβEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0∆ˆH,t,
that is
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0∆ˆH,t = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
θ
2 (1− βθ) (1− θ)pi
2
H,t, (4.5.82)
where ∆ˆH,t0−1 = 0.
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Analogously, equations (x), (xxvii) and (xxviii) are approximated to be
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0∆ˆ∗H,t = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
θ
2 (1− βθ) (1− θ)pi
∗2
H,t (4.5.83)
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0∆ˆF,t = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
θ
2 (1− βθ) (1− θ)pi
2
F,t (4.5.84)
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0∆ˆ∗F,t = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
θ
2 (1− βθ) (1− θ)pi
∗2
F,t. (4.5.85)
C.2
We consider home firms’ optimal pricing conditions first. Consider an arbitrary period
of time in the infinite time horizon, t, where t ≥ t0, as shown in equations (xi)-(xvi) in
the text, the optimality conditions with LCP can be written as
P˜H,t
PH,t
=
KH,t
FH,t
(4.5.86)
P˜H,t
PH,t
=
1− θ
(
PH,t−1
PH,t
)1−
1− θ

1
1−
(4.5.87)
where
KH,t ≡ Et
∑∞
T=t(βθ)
T−tC−σT CH,TMCT
(
PH,t
PH,T
)−
(4.5.88)
FH,t ≡ Et
∑∞
T=t(βθ)
T−tC−σT CH,TpH,T
(
PH,t
PH,T
)1−
(4.5.89)
for choosing P˜H,t for the domestic market, and
P˜ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
=
K∗H,t
F ∗H,t
(4.5.90)
P˜ ∗H,t
P ∗H,t
=
1− θ
(
P ∗H,t−1
P ∗H,t
)1−
1− θ

1
1−
(4.5.91)
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where
K∗H,t ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(βθ)T−tC−σT C
∗
H,TMCT
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗H,T
)−
(4.5.92)
F ∗H,t ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(βθ)T−tC−σT C
∗
H,T eTp
∗
H,T
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗H,T
)1−
. (4.5.93)
for choosing P˜ ∗H,t for the export destination market. Note that we use a slightly different
notation for summation as we are now considering the path from an arbitrary time t
onward.
Following Benigno and Woodford (2005) we take a second-order approximation to
(4.5.86) and (4.5.87) and make use of the second-order approximation to equations
(4.5.88) and (4.5.89). After a few messy steps we obtain the second-order home AS
equation
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 (m̂ct − pˆH,t) (4.5.94)
=− Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
1
2
(m̂ct − pˆH,t) (2 (−σcˆt + cˆH,t) + pˆH,t + m̂ct) + 
2δ
pi2H,t
]
+ t.i.p
where we have used equation (4.5.82), and the t.i.p term contains terms that are inde-
pendent of policy and determined by parameters and predetermined initial conditions
only:
VH,t0 = piH,t0 −
(1− 2+ θ)
2 (1− θ) pi
2
H,t0
+
(1− βθ)
2
piH,t0Z¯H,t0 , (4.5.95)
where Z¯H,t0 = Et0
∑∞
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0
(
2 (−σcˆt + cˆH,t) + pˆH,t + m̂ct − βθ(1−2)(1−βθ) piH,t+1
)
.
Similarly we approximate equations (4.5.90) and (4.5.91) along with (4.5.92) and
(4.5.93) up to the second order and obtain
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
m̂ct − pˆ∗H,t − eˆt
)
(4.5.96)
=− Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
1
2
(
m̂ct − pˆ∗H,t − eˆt
) (
2
(−σcˆt + cˆ∗H,t)+ pˆ∗H,t + eˆt + m̂ct)+ 2δpi∗2H,t
]
+ t.i.p,
where we have used equation (4.5.83) and the t.i.p term contains
V ∗H,t0 = pi
∗
H,t0
− (1− 2+ θ)
2 (1− θ) pi
∗2
H,t0
+
(1− βθ)
2
pi∗H,t0Z¯
∗
H,t0
, (4.5.97)
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where Z¯∗H,t0 = Et0
∑∞
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0
(
2
(−σcˆt + cˆ∗H,t)+ m̂ct + pˆ∗H,t + eˆt − βθ(1−2)(1−βθ) pi∗H,t+1) .
We then look at foreign firms’ optimal pricing conditions. As shown in equations
(xxix)-(xxxiv) in the text, the optimality conditions can be written as
P˜ ∗F,t
P ∗F,t
=
K∗F,t
F ∗F,t
(4.5.98)
P˜ ∗F,t
P ∗F,t
=
1− θ
(
P ∗F,t−1
P ∗F,t
)1−
1− θ

1
1−
(4.5.99)
where
K∗F,t = Et
∞∑
T=t
(βθ)T−tC∗−σT C
∗
F,TMC
∗
T
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,T
)−
(4.5.100)
F ∗F,t = Et
∞∑
T=t
(βθ)T−tC∗−σT C
∗
F,Tp
∗
F,T
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,T
)1−
(4.5.101)
for choosing P˜ ∗F,t for the domestic market and
P˜F,t
PF,t
=
KF,t
FF,t
(4.5.102)
P˜F,t
PF,t
=
1− θ
(
PF,t−1
PF,t
)1−
1− θ

1
1−
(4.5.103)
where
KF,t = Et
∞∑
T=t
(βθ)T−tC∗−σT CF,TMC
∗
T
(
PF,t
PF,T
)−
(4.5.104)
FF,t = Et
∞∑
T=t
(βθ)T−tC∗−σT CF,TpF,T e
−1
T
(
PF,t
PF,T
)1−
(4.5.105)
for choosing P˜F,t for the export destination market.
Repeat the exact same procedure as in approximating home firms’ price setting
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equations and we obtain the two second-order foreign AS equations
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
m̂c∗t − pˆ∗F,t
)
(4.5.106)
=− Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
1
2
(
m̂c∗t − pˆ∗F,t
) (
2
(−σcˆ∗t + cˆ∗F,t)+ pˆ∗F,t + m̂c∗t )+ 2δpi∗2F,t
]
+ t.i.p,
and
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0 (m̂c∗t − pˆF,t + eˆt) (4.5.107)
=− Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
1
2
(m̂c∗t − pˆF,t + eˆt) (2 (−σcˆ∗t + cˆF,t) + pˆF,t − eˆt + m̂c∗t ) +

2δ
pi2F,t
]
+ t.i.p,
where we have used equations (4.5.85) and (4.5.84), and the first t.i.p contains
V ∗F,t0 = pi
∗
F,t0
− (1− 2+ θ)
2 (1− θ) pi
∗2
F,t0
+
(1− βθ)
2
pi∗F,t0Z¯
∗
F,t0
, (4.5.108)
where Z¯∗F,t0 = Et0
∑∞
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0
(
2
(−σcˆ∗t + cˆ∗F,t)+ pˆ∗F,t + m̂c∗t − βθ(1−2)(1−βθ) pi∗F,t+1) , and
the second t.i.p contains
VF,t0 = piF,t0 −
(1− 2+ θ)
2 (1− θ) pi
2
F,t0
+
(1− βθ)
2
piF,t0Z¯F,t0 , (4.5.109)
where Z¯F,t0 = Et0
∑∞
t=t0
(βθ)t−t0
(
2 (−σcˆ∗t + cˆF,t) + pˆF,t − eˆt + m̂c∗t − βθ(1−2)(1−βθ) piF,t+1
)
.
Look at the four AS equations. The real marginal costs and aggregate consumption
of each type of goods can be substituted out by using the exact and approximated log-
linear forms of structural equations (ii)-(viii) and (xx)-(xxvi).14 They are now expressed
14Although one needs to be careful in the substitution: exact log-linear equations can be used to
substitute both linear terms and squared terms while log-linearized equations can be used to substitute
the squared terms only.
APPENDIX 124
as
ωhˆt + σcˆt − pˆH,t = −1
2
[
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
+
1
2
(1− σ)2 cˆ2t −

2δ
pi2H,t (4.5.110)
ωhˆt + σcˆ
∗
t +
ν
2− ν pˆ
∗
F,t = −
1
2
[
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
+
1
2
(1− σ)2 cˆ∗2t −

2δ
pi∗2H,t (4.5.111)
ωhˆ∗t + σcˆ
∗
t − pˆ∗F,t = −
1
2
[
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
+
1
2
(1− σ)2 cˆ∗2t −

2δ
pi∗2F,t (4.5.112)
ωhˆ∗t + σcˆt +
ν
2− ν pˆH,t = −
1
2
[
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
+
1
2
(1− σ)2 cˆ2t −

2δ
pi2F,t (4.5.113)
C.3
Now we approximate resource constraints, equations (vii) and (xxv), in the text.
Make use of equations (iii) and (xxi) to write equation (vii) as
exp (zt)ht =
ν
2
p−1H,tCt∆H,t +
2− ν
2
p∗−1H,t C
∗
t ∆
∗
H,t.
Take a second-order approximation around its deterministic steady state and we obtain
zt + hˆt − ν
2
cˆt − 2− ν
2
cˆ∗t +
ν
2
pˆH,t +
2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t
= −1
2
(
hˆt + zt
)2
+
ν
4
(pˆH,t − cˆt)2 + 2− ν
4
(
pˆ∗H,t − cˆ∗t
)2
+
ν
2
∆ˆH,t +
2− ν
2
∆ˆ∗H,t.
Note that up to the first order, the above equation is approximated to
zt + hˆt =
ν
2
cˆt − ν
2
pˆH,t +
2− ν
2
cˆ∗t −
2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t
which is sufficient to substitute
(
hˆt + zt
)2
. As Benigno and Woodford (2005) argue,
linear technology terms are independent of policy when as part of quadratic policy
objective, so we can drop out zt. Then we make use of exact log-linear relations of price
index (xxiii), risk sharing condition (xxxvii) and quadratic price dispersion equations
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(4.5.82)-(4.5.83) and obtain
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[(
hˆt − cˆt
)
+
2− ν
2
(cˆt − cˆ∗t ) +
ν
2
(
pˆH,t − pˆ∗F,t
)]
(4.5.114)
= Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
ν (2− ν)
8
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)2
+
ν
2
θ
2 (1− βθ) (1− θ)pi
2
H,t +
2− ν
2
θ
2 (1− βθ) (1− θ)pi
∗2
H,t
]
.
Similarly foreign resource constraint, equation (xxv) is approximated as
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[(
hˆ∗t − cˆ∗t
)
− 2− ν
2
(cˆt − cˆ∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆH,t − pˆ∗F,t
)]
(4.5.115)
= Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
ν (2− ν)
8
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)2
+
ν
2
θ
2 (1− βθ) (1− θ)pi
∗2
F,t +
2− ν
2
θ
2 (1− βθ) (1− θ)pi
2
F,t
]
.
C. 4
Given the results in C.1-3, we now have enough second-order equations to find pure
quadratic expressions for the linear terms cˆt− hˆt and cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t . Note that the linear terms
of interest appear explicitly in resource constraints (4.5.114) and (4.5.115) only. So our
indirect goal is to find the appropriate linear combination for cˆt− cˆ∗t and pˆH,t− pˆ∗F,t first.
Write equations (4.5.110)-(4.5.113) (4.5.114)-(4.5.115) as a group and denote the
(pure quadratic) expressions on the RHS of each of the equations as f1, f2, f3, f4, f5
and f6:
ωhˆt + σcˆt − pˆH,t = f1
ωhˆt + σcˆ
∗
t +
ν
2− ν pˆ
∗
F,t = f2
ωhˆ∗t + σcˆ
∗
t − pˆ∗F,t = f3
ωhˆ∗t + σcˆt +
ν
2− ν pˆH,t = f4(
hˆt − cˆt
)
+
2− ν
2
(cˆt − cˆ∗t ) +
ν
2
(
pˆH,t − pˆ∗F,t
)
= f5(
hˆ∗t − cˆ∗t
)
− 2− ν
2
(cˆt − cˆ∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆH,t − pˆ∗F,t
)
= f6
After a few steps of algebra we obtain
pˆH,t − pˆ∗F,t = −
2− ν
2
(
σ + ω (1− ν)
γ
)
(f1 − f3)
−2− ν
2
(
σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)
(f2 − f4)
+
σω (2− ν)
γ
(f5 − f6)
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cˆt − cˆ∗t =
ν
2
(
1 + ω (2− ν)
γ
)
(f1 − f3)
−2− ν
2
(
1 + νω
γ
)
(f2 − f4)
+
ω (1− ν)
γ
(f5 − f6)
where γ = σνω (2− ν) + σ + ω (1− ν)2. Substitute the two expressions in equations
(4.5.114) and (4.5.115) and we finally obtain
cˆt − hˆt = −ν
2
2− ν
2
(
σ − 1− ω
γ
)
(f1 − f3)
−ν
2
2− ν
2
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2
ν
γ
)
(f2 − f4)
−1
2
(
1 +
σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)
f5
−1
2
(
1− σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)
f6 (4.5.116)
and
cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t =
ν
2
2− ν
2
(
σ − 1− ω
γ
)
(f1 − f3)
+
ν
2
2− ν
2
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2
ν
γ
)
(f2 − f4)
−1
2
(
1− σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)
f5
−1
2
(
1 +
σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)
f6. (4.5.117)
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Plug in the denoted expressions of f1 to f6 and we obtain
−
(
cˆt − hˆt
)
= +
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1 +
σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1− σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)2
+

4δ
[
ν
2
(
1 +
α
γ
)
pi2H,t +
2− ν
2
(
1 +
α
γ
)
pi2F,t
]
+

4δ
[
ν
2
(
1− α
γ
)
pi∗2F,t +
2− ν
2
(
1− α
γ
)
pi∗2H,t
]
−(σ − 1)
2
2
(
2− ν
2
)(
ων + 1
γ
)
(cˆt)
2
+
(σ − 1)2
2
(
2− ν
2
)(
ων + 1
γ
)
(cˆ∗t )
2
+
ν (2− ν)
8
(−σ + 1 + ω
γ
)[
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν)
8
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2ν
γ
)[
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν)
8
(−σ + 1 + ω
γ
)[
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν)
8
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2ν
γ
)[
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
.
(4.5.118)
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and
−
(
cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t
)
= +
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1− σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1 +
σ − ω (1− ν)
γ
)(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)2
+

4δ
[
ν
2
(
1− α
γ
)
pi2H,t +
2− ν
2
(
1− α
γ
)
pi2F,t
]
+

4δ
[
ν
2
(
1 +
α
γ
)
pi∗2F,t +
2− ν
2
(
1 +
α
γ
)
pi∗2H,t
]
−(σ − 1)
2
2
(
2− ν
2
)(
ων + 1
γ
)
(cˆ∗t )
2
+
(σ − 1)2
2
(
2− ν
2
)(
ων + 1
γ
)
(cˆt)
2
−ν (2− ν)
8
(−σ + 1 + ω
γ
)[
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν)
8
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2ν
γ
)[
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν)
8
(−σ + 1 + ω
γ
)[
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν)
8
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2ν
γ
)[
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
,
(4.5.119)
where we denote
α = ω + 1 + (1− σ) (1− ν)
γ = σνω (2− ν) + σ + ω (1− ν)2
δ =
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
.
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In the special case imposing σ = 1, the above expressions reduce to
−
(
cˆt − hˆt
)
=
ν
4δ
(piH,t)
2 +
 (2− ν)
4δ
(piF,t)
2
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
8
(
dˆt
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (1− Ω)
8
(
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
dˆt
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
−ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
−(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
dˆt
)2
, (4.5.120)
and
−
(
cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t
)
=
ν
4δ
(
pi∗F,t
)2
+
 (2− ν)
4δ
(
pi∗H,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
8
(
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (1− Ω)
8
(
dˆt
)2
−ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
dˆt
)2
−(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(ω + 1) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(ω + 1) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
dˆt
)2
. (4.5.121)
where we denote Ω =
1+ω ν
2
1+ω
, 0 < Ω 6 1, dˆt = pˆ∗H,t + eˆt − pˆH,t and dˆ∗t = pˆF,t − eˆt − pˆ∗F,t.
C.5
Given the second-order expressions of the linear terms in the utility functions, equations
(4.5.118) and (4.5.119), the quadratic loss function of the home noncooperative policy
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maker under LCP is given by
Lt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0

1 + ω
2
(yˆt − zt)2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1 +
σ + ω (ν − 1)
γ
)(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1− σ + ω (ν − 1)
γ
)(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)2
+
ν
8δ
(
1 +
α
γ
)
(piH,t)
2 +
 (2− ν)
8δ
(
1 +
α
γ
)
(piF,t)
2
+
ν
8δ
(
1− α
γ
)(
pi∗F,t
)2
+
 (2− ν)
8δ
(
1− α
γ
)(
pi∗H,t
)2
+
[
σ − 1
2
− (σ − 1)
2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
4γ
](
yˆt − 2− ν
2
qˆt +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
+
(σ − 1)2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
4γ
(
yˆ∗t −
2− ν
2
qˆ∗t −
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν) (σ − 1 + ω + 2ν )
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν)
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2ν
)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2

,
(4.5.122)
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while the quadratic loss function of the foreign noncooperative policy maker under LCP
is given by
L∗t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0

1 + ω
2
(yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1− σ + ω (ν − 1)
γ
)(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν)
16
(
1 +
σ + ω (ν − 1)
γ
)(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)2
+
ν
8δ
(
1− α
γ
)
(piH,t)
2 +
 (2− ν)
8δ
(
1− α
γ
)
(piF,t)
2
+
ν
8δ
(
1 +
α
γ
)(
pi∗F,t
)2
+
 (2− ν)
8δ
(
1 +
α
γ
)(
pi∗H,t
)2
+
(σ − 1)2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
4γ
(
yˆt − 2− ν
2
qˆt +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
+
(
σ − 1
2
− (σ − 1)
2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
4γ
)(
yˆ∗t −
2− ν
2
qˆ∗t −
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
−ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν)
(
σ − 1 + ω + 2ν
)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν) (σ − 1 + ω + 2ν )
8γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2

.
(4.5.123)
In the text, we obtain two simplified expressions of the loss functions by imposing
σ = 1. In this case, the second-order approximation of the welfare function will make
use of equations (4.5.120) and (4.5.121) above. Specifically, the quadratic loss function
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of the home policy maker under LCP and noncooperation is given by
Lt0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0

1 + ω
2
(yˆt − zt)2
+
ν
4δ
(piH,t)
2 +
 (2− ν)
4δ
(piF,t)
2
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
8
(
dˆt
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (1− Ω)
8
(
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
dˆt
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
−ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
−(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
dˆt
)2

, (4.5.124)
and the quadratic loss function of the foreign policy maker is given by
L∗t0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0

1 + ω
2
(yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
+
ν
4δ
(
pi∗F,t
)2
+
 (2− ν)
4δ
(
pi∗H,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
8
(
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (1− Ω)
8
(
dˆt
)2
+
ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν
2
dˆt
)2
−ν (1− Ω)
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν
2
dˆt
)2
−(2− ν) Ω
4
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2

. (4.5.125)
They are equations (3.3.2) and (3.3.3) in the text.
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Appendix D. Log-linearization
In this section, we show the complete set of exact or approximated log-linear form of
the structural equations (as in Table 3.2 in the text).
Exact log-linear form of deviations from the law of one price:
dˆt = pˆ
∗
H,t + eˆt − pˆH,t (4.5.126)
dˆ∗t = pˆF,t + eˆt − pˆ∗F,t. (4.5.127)
Log deviations of the terms of trade from the steady state are
qˆt = pˆF,t − eˆt − pˆ∗H,t,
qˆ∗t = −qˆt,
and exact log-linear form of price indexes equations (v) and (xxiii):
ν
2
pˆH,t +
2− ν
2
pˆF,t = 0, (4.5.128)
ν
2
pˆ∗F,t +
2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t = 0. (4.5.129)
Exact log-linear form of definitions of detrending, equations (xvii), (xviii), (xxxv)
and (xxxvi):
piH,t = pit + pˆH,t − pˆH,t−1
piF,t = pit + pˆF,t − pˆF,t−1
pi∗H,t = pi
∗
t + pˆ
∗
H,t − pˆ∗H,t−1
pi∗F,t = pi
∗
t + pˆ
∗
F,t − pˆ∗F,t−1.
Subtracting the first equation by the second and using (4.5.128) gives
pˆH,t − pˆH,t−1 = 2− ν
2
(piH,t − piF,t) ; (4.5.130)
Subtracting the fourth equation by the third and using (4.5.129) gives
pˆ∗F,t − pˆ∗F,t−1 =
2− ν
2
(
pi∗F,t − pi∗H,t
)
. (4.5.131)
Exact log-linear form of equation (xxxvii):
cˆt − cˆ∗t =
1
σ
eˆt. (4.5.132)
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Exact log-linear form of equations (iii), (iv), (xxi) and (xxii):
cˆH,t = −pˆH,t + cˆt (4.5.133)
cˆF,t = −pˆF,t + cˆt (4.5.134)
cˆ∗H,t = −pˆ∗H,t + cˆ∗t (4.5.135)
cˆ∗F,t = −pˆ∗F,t + cˆ∗t (4.5.136)
Exact log-linear form of equations (ii) and (xx):
wˆt = ωhˆt + σcˆt (4.5.137)
wˆ∗t = ωhˆ
∗
t + σcˆ
∗
t (4.5.138)
Exact log-linear form of equations (vi) and (xxiv):
m̂ct = wˆt − zt (4.5.139)
m̂c∗t = wˆt − z∗t (4.5.140)
Exact log-linear form of equations (viii) and (xxvi):
yˆt = zt + hˆt (4.5.141)
yˆ∗t = z
∗
t + hˆ
∗
t (4.5.142)
so from the above conditions (4.5.137)-(4.5.142) we obtain deviations from steady state
of the real marginal costs: (equations (3.2.12)-(3.2.15) in the text.)
m̂ct − pˆH,t = (σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt + 2− ν
2
(1− σ) (qˆt + eˆt) + 2− ν
2
dˆt,
m̂c∗t − pˆ∗F,t = (σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
2− ν
2
(1− σ) (qˆ∗t − eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t ,
m̂c∗t − pˆF,t + eˆt = (σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
2− ν
2
(1− σ) (qˆ∗t − eˆt)−
ν
2
dˆ∗t ,
m̂ct − pˆ∗H,t − eˆt = (σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt +
2− ν
2
(1− σ) (qˆt + eˆt)− ν
2
dˆt.
Log-linearized resource constraints, equations (vii) and(xxv):
yˆt = cˆt − ν
2
pˆH,t − 2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t −
2− ν
2
1
σ
eˆt, (4.5.143)
yˆ∗t = cˆ
∗
t −
ν
2
pˆ∗F,t −
2− ν
2
pˆF,t +
2− ν
2
1
σ
eˆt, (4.5.144)
so subtracting equation (4.5.144) from (4.5.143) gives
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yˆt − yˆ∗t = −
ν
2
pˆH,t − 2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t +
(ν − 1)
σ
eˆt +
ν
2
pˆ∗F,t +
2− ν
2
pˆF,t,
where we have used equation (4.5.132). This is equation (3.2.20) in the text.
New Keynesian Phillips curves are derived as follows. Write the second-order ap-
proximation of the AS equation (4.5.95) in Appendix C in a recursive way:
VH,t = δz¯H,t +
δ
2
z¯H,tx¯H,t +

2
pi2H,t + βEt (VH,t+1) .
Up to the first order, it reduces to
VH,t = δz¯H,t + βEtpiH,t+1.
where we have defined z¯H,t = m̂ct − pˆH,t and δ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ . Up to the first order,
equation (4.5.95) itself reduces to
VH,t = piH,t,
so combining the above two equations, we obtain the corresponding log-linear NKPC
piH,t = βEtpiH,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(m̂ct − pˆH,t) . (4.5.145)
Similarly, we can obtain the other three New Keynesian Phillips curves as follows:
pi∗F,t = βEtpi∗F,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(
m̂c∗t − pˆ∗F,t
)
, (4.5.146)
piF,t = βEtpiF,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(m̂c∗t − pˆF,t + eˆt) , (4.5.147)
pi∗H,t = βEtpi∗H,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(
m̂ct − pˆ∗H,t − eˆt
)
. (4.5.148)
These are equations (3.2.8)-(3.2.11) in the text.
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